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Chair’s Foreword 
This is the fourth review report of the Joint Committee of the National Broadband 
Network and has proved to be the most difficult of all four.  Even though we have 
successfully come inside the Terms of Reference reporting date by 24 hours, it has 
been several months of disagreement between committee members on some very 
basic points in this report that have seen the report delivered later than planned. 
This is disappointing.  The tradition of committee membership in Australian 
political culture is that adversarial politics is left at the door.  It is a concern to 
many that this culture is showing signs of changing on this Committee, where 
sensitivities of our oversight work as compared to political party election 
platforms has made the work of the committee much more difficult than it need 
be.  In my view, this is an early warning sign that the topic of higher speed 
broadband technology is likely to feature strongly in political debate throughout 
2013, an election year. 
I want to pay a very special tribute to the staff of the Secretariat of the JCNBN.  At 
times, they were unfairly caught in the middle of party politics.  They managed 
this with great skill and dexterity, and the fact a report of any kind has been able 
to be produced, is a direct credit to these individuals.  Through this period, we lost 
Peter Stephens to a different role in the Parliament. I particularly thank Peter for 
his work, and his subtle skills in managing a highly charged political committee 
reflects very well on his knowledge of the APS and Parliamentary culture and 
practice.  
This year, there is one more report due in July/August, as a fifth and final report 
of the NBN oversight committee. Between now and then, public hearings 
involving the NBN Co CEO and the Department will be held.  Personally, I am 
concerned about setting the Secretariat up to fail in trying to get a committee 
report produced several months before an election.  Therefore, I do flag we may 
not be able to reach agreement and may not produce a fifth report at all. 
I am not confident that the focus of the committee is an oversight of an existing 
build under the existing Shareholder Ministers arrangements.  Instead, I think the 
  
committee has become somewhat stuck on a policy dispute between different 
build options, and will only deepen divisions on this in the pre-election period. 
If we can manage to produce a 5th report, there is a danger it won’t mean much 
from an oversight perspective. Despite the opportunities to report and provide 
oversight on a number of important aspects of the current roll-out, there is every 
chance the next report will be nothing more than a compendium of political 
statements and election promises. If this is all we can produce, I could write it 
now, and it makes the entire committee process worthless and a waste of time for 
all involved. 
I therefore hope I am wrong, and in a way challenge the committee members to 
revel in proving me wrong, in a hope that the work of an important committee of 
16 MP’s and Senators, with 68 participating MP’s and Senators, does actually have 
some worth in advancing policy for Australia over the coming six month period.  
Somewhat naively, I live in hope! 
Enjoy this fourth report, and the additional comments.  It has, for many, been 
many hours of hard work. 
 
Robert Oakeshott MP 
Chair 
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Terms of Reference 
The resolution of appointment establishing the Joint Committee on the National 
Broadband Network was passed by the House of Representatives on 1 March 2011 and by 
the Senate on 3 March 2011 and provides: 
(1) That a Joint Committee on the National Broadband Network be appointed to 
inquire into and report on the rollout of the National Broadband Network (NBN); 
(2) That every six months, commencing 31 August 2011, until the NBN is complete 
and operational, the committee provide progress reports to both Houses of 
Parliament and to shareholder Ministers on: 
(a) The rollout of the NBN, including in relation to the Government’s objective 
for NBN Co Limited (NBN Co) to: 
(i) connect 93 per cent of Australian homes, schools and businesses 
with fibre‐to‐the premises technology providing broadband speeds 
of up to 100 megabits per second, with a minimum fibre coverage 
obligation of 90 per cent of Australian premises; and 
(ii) service all remaining premises by a combination of next‐generation 
fixed wireless and satellite technologies providing peak speeds of at 
least 12 megabits per second; 
(b) The achievement of take‐up targets (including premises passed and 
covered and services activated) as set out in NBN Co’s Corporate Plan 
released on 20 December 2010 as revised from time to time; 
(c) Network rollout performance including service levels and faults; 
(d) The effectiveness of NBN Co in meeting its obligations as set out in its 
Stakeholder Charter; 
(e) NBN Co’s strategy for engaging with consumers and handling complaints; 
(f) NBN Co’s risk management processes; and 
(g) Any other matter pertaining to the NBN rollout that the committee 
considers relevant. 
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Recommendations 
 
2  Performance Reporting 
Recommendation 1 
The committee recommends that the key performance indicator 
information presented in the Shareholder Ministers’ six-monthly 
National Broadband Network (NBN) performance report list and detail: 
(1) established Business Plan targets and (2) actual results which track the 
progress of the NBN rollout over each six month period as well as yearly, 
to enable the comparison of actual physical NBN rollout results with 
published NBN Co Corporate Plan targets. 
Recommendation 2 
The committee recommends that the Shareholder Ministers' six monthly 
performance report on the progress of the National Broadband Network 
rollout include audited financial statements with accompanying 
explanatory notes, and where it is not possible to provide these in the 
first instance, that they be forwarded to the Joint Committee on the 
National Broadband Network when prepared, as an addendum to the 
Performance Report. 
Recommendation 3 
The committee recommends that subsequent Shareholder Ministers' six 
monthly performance report on the progress of the National Broadband 
Network rollout be provided to the committee no less than one month 
before the scheduled biannual hearing with the Joint Committee on the 
National Broadband Network. 
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4 Regional and Remote Issues 
Recommendation 4 
The committee recommends that the Government support the NBN Co to 
continue to: 
  explore the synergies between fixed and mobile 
telecommunications networks with a view to using the National 
Broadband Network to improve mobile telecommunications; and 
  facilitate private providers use of NBN Co infrastructure to 
provide and improve mobile telephone services and coverage across 
Australia, particularly in regional and remote areas. 
5  Additional Issues 
Recommendation 5 
The committee recommends that the Department of Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE) and NBN Co 
continue to work with the Personal Emergency Response Services 
Association, the Communications Alliance and retail service providers to 
implement a range of initiatives to address concerns with the operation of 
medical alarms for aged and at-risk persons under the National 
Broadband Network rollout. This process should be in consultation with 
the Australian Communications and Media Authority, with the DBCDE 
to report back to the committee on specific progress in this area. 
6  Private Equity Engagement and Workforce Issues 
Recommendation 6 
The committee recommends that the Government: 
  seek to gauge investor interest in the National Broadband 
Network; and 
  investigate the optimum capital structure for the NBN Co. 
Recommendation 7 
The committee recommends that, in providing an annual statement to the 
committee on the progress of the Telstra Retraining Funding Deed (RFD), 
the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital 
Economy (DBCDE) include in this information an update on: 
 xxi 
 
 
  ongoing company retention rates for employees in the 
Automatically Eligible Workgroup, retrained under the RFD; 
  the current numbers and roles of employees in the other eligible 
workgroup under the RFD and an overview of the current reasons for 
eligibility or exclusion in terms of this group. 
Recommendation 8 
The committee recommends that, in providing an annual statement to the 
committee outlining the major areas of emerging National Broadband 
Network (NBN) workforce demand and training need, the Department of 
Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy include in this 
information a more detailed report on: 
  the workforce development strategy supporting the NBN rollout, 
including current workforce modelling and outcomes from work with 
training organisations and industry skills boards, to identify skills gaps 
in this area and develop training programs; 
  how the development and implementation of this overall 
workforce strategy is being coordinated. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
Background 
1.1 The Shareholder Minister’s Third Performance Report (the Performance 
Report) on the rollout of the National Broadband Network (NBN) details 
performance information relating to progress of the NBN rollout for the 
six month period from 1 January to 30 June 2012. 
1.2 Since the second Performance Report, the NBN Co Limited (NBN Co) has 
revised its performance targets and issued a new Corporate Plan.1 The 
new corporate plan ‘incorporates the following major changes when 
compared to the’ …previous…’corporate plan:’ 
 ‘Changes in the scope of the overall project resulting from: 
 The inclusion of the Optus HFC Agreement in the Corporate Plan 
forecasts; and 
 The latest assessment of the impact of implementing a number of 
policy requirements, including the full impact of the New 
Developments policy announced in December 2010 and revised in 
June 2011; the impact of the 121 semi-distributed Points of 
Interconnect decision; and the requirement for NBN Co to rollout the 
Fibre network in all the current Telstra Band 1 and Band 2 copper 
exchanges. 
 Other changes since the 2011-13 Corporate Plan resulting from: 
 
1  The NBN Co Corporate Plan 2012-2015 released on 8 August 2012 replaces the NBN Co 
Corporate Plan 2011-2013 released 20 December 2010. 
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 The impact of the delayed Commencement Date of the Telstra 
Definitive Agreements, which has led to a corresponding delay in the 
start of the volume rollout; 
 Reduced Capital Expenditure and increased Operating Expenditure 
as a result of more infrastructure being accessed under the Telstra 
Definitive Agreements; and 
 Accelerated Capital Expenditure during the Construction period to 
FY2021 as a result of adopting a ‘Build Drop’ strategy for connecting 
premises to the Fibre network.’2 
1.3 These changes in scope outlined in paragraph 1.4.1 of the 2011-2013 
Corporate Plan have contributed to a ‘decrease in capital expenditure 
during the construction period, an increase in operating expenditure to 
2021 and’...an overall ‘reduction in revenues to’ 2021 ‘compared with the’ 
previous corporate plan.3 The NBN Co has attributed the changes to its 
financials, but not limited these changes to the: 
 ‘Delayed commencement of volume rollout 
 Increased Telstra Infrastructure, and  
 Accelerated Customer Connect Costs.’4 
1.4 In regard to outstanding regulatory issues, the NBN Co Special Access 
Undertaking (SAU) has been withdrawn, revised and resubmitted to the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) for formal 
consideration.5 
Committee’s Role 
1.5 Pursuant to its Resolution of Appointment (RoA) and in accordance with 
its terms of reference, the committee is required to report to the Parliament 
and the NBN Shareholder Ministers6 every six months ‘until the NBN is 
complete and operational’. 
 
2  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, August 2012, p. 10. 
3  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, August 2012, p. 12. 
4  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, August 2012, pp 12 and 13. 
5  ACCC, 2012, ACCC Receives New NBN Co Special Access Undertaking, media release, 
28 September. 
6  The Shareholder Ministers are Senator the Hon Stephen Conroy, Minister for Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy and Senator the Hon Penny Wong, Minister for 
Finance and Deregulation. 
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1.6 The committee is primarily enabled to examine and report on matters 
relating to the NBN Co’s objective to connect Australian premises to the 
NBN which includes: 
  the achievement of take-up targets as outlined in the 
NBN Co Corporate Plan 
 Progress of the NBN rollout and performance matters relating to the 
NBN Co such as consumer engagement, complaint handling, risk 
management and  
 ‘any other matter pertaining to the NBN rollout that the committee 
considers relevant.’ 
1.7 To date, the committee has reviewed and reported on a number of 
significant and ongoing issues associated with the NBN rollout which 
include:  
 NBN rollout across the three technologies of fibre, wireless and satellite 
 issues raised and faced by regional and remote areas 
 regulatory issues associated with establishment of the NBN 
 E-readiness of small business, communities, governments and 
individuals and associated consultation by the NBN Co 
 funding arrangements directly and indirectly associated with the NBN 
 Telstra workforce issues associated with the Retraining Funding Deed 
under the Binding Definitive Agreement between the NBN Co and 
Telstra Corporation (Telstra). 
1.8 The Shareholder Ministers’ Performance Report provides an overview of 
the NBN Co’s progress in managing the NBN rollout for the six month 
period ended on 30 June 2012. In addition, information covering the 
period from 1 July to 1 October 2012 has been included in the Performance 
Report. As a result, as contained in previous reports,7 the committee is 
again able to follow and report on matters progressed and on current 
issues. 
1.9 Information contained in the Performance Report forms the basis of the 
committee’s six-monthly review, and is supplemented with submissions, 
published reports, hearings and questions placed on notice which are part 
of the formal parliamentary committee inquiry and review process. 
1.10 The committee has in its First, Second and Third reports commented on: 
 
7  These are the committee’s First, Second and Third Reports. 
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  specific key performance indicators to be included in future 
Shareholder Minister’s reports, and 
 the delay in receiving answers to questions placed on notice with the 
NBN Co and the Department of Broadband, Communications and the 
Digital Economy (DBCDE). 
1.11 The committee is continuing its pursuit of these matters in its Fourth 
Report. 
Reporting Timeframe 
1.12 Through its RoA, the committee is required to report to the Parliament 
every six months on the progress of the NBN rollout. With agreement 
from the Shareholder Ministers the committee reports biannually in June 
and December. 
1.13 In line with reporting requirements, the committee previously reported 
(Third Report) in June 2012 on the progress of the six monthly NBN 
rollout period from 1 July to 31 December 2011, and a number of 
regulatory events that took place outside this six month timeframe. These 
events flowed on into the first half of 2012. 
1.14 This is the committee’s fifth report on NBN related matters and the fourth 
NBN rollout review report. The Fourth Report includes examination and 
comment on the progress of the six monthly NBN rollout from 1 January 
to 30 June 2012, as well as discussion, where relevant, on current matters 
associated with the NBN rollout. 
1.15 The Fourth Report also includes continuing examination and commentary 
on the progress of the NBN rollout and associated regulatory matters, 
initially reported on in the First Report. 
About the Review 
Objectives and Scope 
1.16 As part of its Fourth Review, the committee examined and provided 
comment on: 
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 The NBN rollout through the fibre, satellite and fixed wireless networks 
and associated issues such as service delivery, community consultation, 
public education and engagement activities; 
 KPIs included in the Shareholder Ministers’ six monthly performance 
report; 
 ongoing regulatory and pricing issues. 
1.17 The committee has also continued its examination of: 
 The potential of private equity to fund the NBN, and 
 Telstra workforce issues associated with the Retraining Funding Deed 
under the Telstra Agreement. 
Conduct 
1.18 A media release issued on 20 June 2012 announced the commencement of 
the Fourth Review and called for submissions to be received by 
3 August 2012. In addition, a similar advertisement appeared in 
The Australian on 11 July 2012. 
1.19 Appendix A lists the 28 submissions and three exhibits received as part of 
the Fourth Review. 
1.20 The committee subsequently held four public hearings in Canberra on 
26 June, 14 August, 9 and 30 October 2012. 
1.21 Witnesses who gave evidence at public hearings are listed at Appendix B. 
Transcripts of the public hearings are available at www.aph.gov.au/jcnbn. 
Information Provided to the Committee 
1.22 The committee has previously reported on the limited information 
provided to it by the NBN Co and the DBCDE in reference to its Third 
Review. More specifically, the committee has noted the continued lateness 
of receiving pertinent answers to questions on notice, and the unnecessary 
pressure this has placed on the committee’s reporting timeframe. 
1.23 In an effort to assist both the NBN Co and the DBCDE to provide answers 
to questions on notice within an acceptable timeframe, individual 
members of the committee placed a number of questions on notice for 
response in advance of between six and two weeks of the 30 October 2012 
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public hearing. By the 30 October 2012 hearing, only five answers to the 17 
questions placed on notice had been received by the committee. 
1.24 Following the public hearing on 30 October 2012, the committee was 
informed via correspondence from the DBCDE that it would receive 
answers to questions on notice ‘at the earliest opportunity and to the best 
extent possible’ the DBCDE ‘will endeavour to meet the committee’s 
deadline.’8 
1.25 Over the course of three weeks, the committee received the majority of its 
answers to questions on notice which enabled it to adequately finalise its 
report. Additional comment about information provided to the committee 
during the course of its Fourth Review is included in Chapter 2. 
Committee’s Visit to New Zealand 
1.26 From 24 to 28 September 2012 the committee represented the Australian 
Parliament in the reciprocal Australia New Zealand Parliamentary 
Committee Exchange Program (NZCEP). As part of its New Zealand visit, 
the committee met with private and public sector individuals and 
organisations involved in the design, development, and implementation of 
the New Zealand high speed broadband network. 
1.27 In addition, the committee met with parliamentary representatives 
including the: Minister for Communications and Information Technology, 
Minister of Commerce, Spokesperson for Economic Development, 
Commerce Select Committee, previous members of the Finance and 
Expenditure Select Committee and the Speaker of the New Zealand 
Parliament. 
1.28 As part of its visit, the committee undertook a half day inspection of fibre 
and copper broadband network infrastructure, including the central 
exchange in Wellington. 
1.29 The Visit Report attached to this report includes an overview of New 
Zealand’s experience in the development and early build of its high speed 
broadband network and associated issues, as well as a summary of the 
issues discussed by Members. 
 
8  Correspondence from the DBCDE dated and received 13 November 2012. 
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Report Outline 
1.30 Chapter 2 examines the six monthly NBN rollout performance information 
and associated issues. This includes discussion about the revision of 
targets and key performance indicators contained in the new NBN Co 
Corporate Plan. 
1.31 Chapter 3 continues discussion of the regulatory and pricing issues 
associated with the rollout of the NBN. Matters discussed include: the 
ACCC review of the NBN Co SAU and developments relating to the term 
of the Wholesale Broadband Agreement. 
1.32 Chapter 4 continues examination of issues associated with the NBN 
rollout to regional and remote Australia through the fibre, satellite and 
fixed wireless networks. 
1.33 Chapter 5 discusses additional issues relating to the NBN rollout such as 
medical alarms and the connection of multi-dwelling units. 
1.34 Chapter 6 examines issues associated with private equity engagement in 
funding the NBN. It also considers Telstra workforce issues associated 
with the Retraining Funding Deed under the Telstra Agreement. 
1.35 The committee’s report on the 2012 NZCEP is included following the body 
of this report as a stand-alone chapter. The delegation report contains a 
summary of the information presented to Members and the associated 
issues discussed during the committee’s visit to New Zealand. 
 2 
Performance Reporting 
Background 
2.1 The Shareholder Ministers’ Third National Broadband Network (NBN) 
rollout Performance Report (the Performance Report) covers the six 
month period ended on 30 June 2012. 
2.2 The Third Performance Report includes: 
 A summary of the key milestones met by NBN Co Limited (NBN Co) 
in the period covered 
 Six monthly and annual financial statements for the period ended 
30 June 2012, and 
 ‘Measurement against’ Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the 
NBN Co ‘as at 30 June 2012’.1 
2.3 This chapter outlines and discusses the performance information 
associated with the physical NBN rollout. Discussion on additional 
NBN rollout issues such as medical alarms and providing a fibre 
connection to multi-dwelling units is included in Chapter 5. An outline 
of the progress on regulatory and pricing issues is included in Chapter 
3. Remaining issues relating to regional and remote Australia are 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
1  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 3. 
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Key Features of the Performance Report 
Format and Content 
2.4 The Third Performance Report provides an overview of the status of the 
NBN rollout in a similar format to the previous performance report. 
The KPIs table at the back of the report provides an overall snapshot of 
the progress of completion of the fibre, fixed wireless and satellite 
networks. Unaudited financial results for the NBN Co Group have 
continued to be included within the Performance Report. 
2.5 The main difference in the presentation of the information contained in 
the Performance Report is that the data for the fixed wireless and 
satellite networks has now been combined. 
2.6 A map of the places visited by the NBN Co Discovery Truck (covering 
New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria) is included 
as an attachment for the first time. 
2.7 A similar qualifying statement as included in previous Performance 
Reports, supporting the status of the NBN rollout is included. The 
NBN Co has stated in the preamble to its ‘Corporate KPI’ tables: 
This is the third report and as such reflects initial reporting while 
systems and reporting processes are still in development. The data 
will become more meaningful against actual and forecast 
measures as the reporting series builds up over time. This report is 
consistent with a start-up company in the early years of the 
rollout. Further KPIs will be brought online as agreed with the 
Shareholders.2 
2.8 In response to the change in KPIs and comparing NBN rollout 
performance against targets into the future, the NBN Co stated: 
The KPI reporting framework has been broadly consistent across 
each of the three progress reports provided to the [committee]. The 
indicators included in future reports will be expanded so that, 
over time, the reports will include further detail as the company 
and its reporting systems mature and the rollout ramps up. KPIs 
will measure NBN Co performance against its Corporate Plan 
targets.3 
 
2  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 36. 
3  NBN Co, Submission 7.10, Answer to Question on Notice No. 6. 
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Key Performance Indicators 
New Targets and Timeframes 
2.9 The NBN Co Corporate Plan sets out a revised table of NBN targets for 
premises passed or covered and premises with active service, but with 
new classifications of the three technologies under the NBN.4 
2.10 The Fibre-to-the-Premise (FTTP) Brownfield category remains; fixed 
wireless and satellite have been combined; and FTTP for Greenfields is 
represented separately. In addition, figures are presented as cumulative 
year on year instead of incremental year on year.5 
2.11 The NBN Co explained the reason for combining the fixed wireless and 
satellite targets and stated: 
The reason we have combined them is that we are finding that, 
where we are not able to put up a cell site, a tower, we obviously 
have to use a satellite solution—and we have made that very 
public. The reason we have then combined them is that we want to 
have that flexibility in case we cannot get a site approved. ... We 
are not certain of the break-up, so we thought it best to say: this is 
the total of those two technologies.6 
2.12 While ‘the annual run rate is back in line with the 2011-2013 Corporate 
Plan by FY2015’, changes to deployment forecasts have been attributed 
to the below factors:7 
 Delays in finalising the conditions precedent of the Telstra 
Agreement 
 Prolonged negotiations in order to achieve sustainable and cost 
effective construction contracts 
 The decision to increase the points of interconnect from 14 to 121 
 Slower than anticipated occupation rate and connection demand in 
new developments 
 Priority given to deployment of the transit network, NBN Co’s 
obligation to connect new developments and deployment of the 
fixed wireless network.8 
 
4  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, August 2012, p. 36. 
5  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, August 2012, p. 36. 
6  Mr Mike Quigley, CEO, NBN Co, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 19. 
7  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, August 2012, p. 35. 
8  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, August 2012, p. 35. 
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2.13 Tables of targets included in both the 2011-2013 Corporate Plan and the 
2012-2015 Corporate Plan follow. 
Drawing Target Comparisons 
2.14 Comparing the targets of premises passed figures in the NBN Co 
Corporate Plan 2011-2013 and similar targets in the new NBN 
Corporate Plan 2012-2015 shows a marked difference in figures. 
2.15 For the financial year ended on 30 June 2012, the original target for 
FTTP Brownfields for Premises Passed or Covered was 132 000, this 
figure was revised down to 29 000 in the new NBN Co Corporate Plan 
2012-2015. The actual figure reached as stated in the Performance 
Report is 28 860 premises passed. Similarly, the majority of targets 
originally listed in the NBN Co Corporate Plan 2011-2013 have either 
been revised down, combined or no original target figure published. 
2.16 The legal notice preamble in the NBN Co Corporate Plan 2013-2015 
places a caveat on its ‘forward looking statements’. The Legal Notice 
states: 
...Such forward looking statements are not guarantees of future 
performance and involve known and unknown risks, 
uncertainties, assumptions and other important factors, many of 
which are beyond NBN Co’s control. While such forward looking 
statements are based on NBN Co’s best considered professional 
assessment, NBN Co’s officers do not give any assurance to any 
third party that the results, performance or achievements 
expressed or implied by such forward looking statements will 
actually occur, and such statements should not be relied on or 
considered to be a representation of what will happen by any third 
party. Other than as required by NBN Co's reporting obligations 
to the Commonwealth, NBN Co and its officers have no obligation 
to update these forward looking statements based on 
circumstances, developments or events occurring after the date of 
this Corporate Plan.9 
2.17 When asked whether the NBN Co had a moral or legal obligation to 
meet the NBN rollout targets outlined in its revised corporate plan, the 
NBN Co stated: 
I do not think that we have a legal requirement. I can check with 
our lawyers on this one, but I do not think so.10 
 
9  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, August 2012, p. 2. 
10  Mr Quigley, NBN Co, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 24. 
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2.18 Further, during the Third Review the NBN Co stated that it was 
‘neither reasonable, nor valid to compare NBN Co’s performance with 
the deployment forecasts that were included in the December 2010 
corporate plan.’ The NBN Co stated: 
… it is neither reasonable nor valid to compare NBN Co's 
performance with the deployment forecasts that were included in 
the December 2010 corporate plan. However, it is perfectly 
legitimate to measure NBN Co's performance against the 
announcements we have made in our 12-month and three-year 
rollout schedules. We are ready to be measured and held 
accountable for our performance versus what we have committed 
to in those rollout schedules, but I would also like to be clear that, 
if there are any future policy changes, the assumptions in the 
corporate plan we are about to submit may have to change.11 
NBN Co Corporate Plan 2011-2013 
Table 2.1 Premises Passed or Covered (incremental year on year)12 
 FTTP 
Brownfields 
FTTP 
Greenfields 
Build 
FTTP 
Greenfields 
BOT 
Satellite 
First 
Release 
Wireless Total 
June 2011 13 000 - 45 000 165 000 - 223 000 
June 2012 132 000 7000 120 000 - 14 000 273 000 
June 2013 805 000 63 000 84 000 - 269 000 1 221 000 
Total 950 000 70 000 249 000 165 000 283 000 1 717 000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11  Mr Quigley, NBN Co, Transcript of Evidence, Sydney, 16 April 2012, pp 47-48. 
12  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2011-2013, December 2010, Exhibit 1.1, p. 15. 
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New NBN Co Corporate Plan 2012-2015 
Table 2.2 Premises or Lots Passed or Covered (cumulative year-on-year)13 
2012-15 CP 
Premises or Lots Passed*/Covered YoY 
 FTTP 
Brownfields 
Fixed wireless 
and satellite 
Subtotal 
brownfields and 
fixed wireless 
and satellite 
FTTP 
Greenfields** 
Total 
FY2011 18 000 165 000 183 000 - 183 000 
FY2012 29 000 174 000 203 000 10 000 213 000 
FY2013 286 000 320 000 606 000 55 000 661 000 
FY2014 1 129 000 374 000 1 503 000 178 000 1 681 000 
FY2015 2 499 000 752 000 3 251 000 413 000 3 664 000 
FY2016 3 862 000 907 000 4 769 000 763 000 5 532 000 
*Greenfields in new developments: lots passed may not equal premises passed depending on 
developer’s timeframe to build. 
**FTTP Greenfields are demand-driven activities which are subject to variations in housing starts 
and Developer activities (supply of new premises and demand from new developers for NBN Co 
to install fibre). 
NBN Co Corporate Plan 2011-2013 
Table 2.3 Premises with Active Service (incremental year on year)14 
 FTTP 
Brownfields 
FTTP 
Greenfields 
Build 
FTTP 
Greenfields 
BOT 
Satellite 
First Release 
Wireless Total 
June 2011 - - 35 000 - - 35 000 
June 2012 5000 5000 92 000 13 000 1000 116 000 
June 2013 255 000 55 000 64 000 20 000 25 000 419 000 
Total 260 000 60 000 191 000 33 000 26 000 570 000 
 
 
 
13  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, December 2010, Exhibit 5-1, p. 36. 
14  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2011-13, December 2010, Exhibit 1.2, p. 15. 
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New NBN Co Corporate Plan 2012-2015 
Table 2.4 Premises with Active Service (cumulative year on year)15 
2012-15 CP 
Premises or Lots Passed*/Covered YoY 
 FTTP 
Brownfields 
Fixed wireless 
and satellite 
Subtotal brownfields 
and fixed wireless 
and satellite 
FTTP 
Greenfields* 
Total 
FY2011 600 200 800 - 800 
FY2012 3000 10 000 13 000 500 13 500 
FY2013 44 000 38 000 82 000 10 000 92 000 
FY2014 420 000 64 000 484 000 67 000 551 000 
FY2015 1 311 000 100 000 1 411 000 204 000 1 615 000 
FY2016 2 559 000 145 000 2 704 000 477 000 3 181 000 
*FTTP Greenfields are demand-driven activities which are subject to variations in housing starts 
and Developer activities (supply of new premises and demand from new developers for NBN Co 
to install fibre). 
Delay in NBN Rollout Commencement 
2.19 The NBN Co 2012-2015 Corporate Plan includes adjustments that have 
been made in regard to the stated nine month delay in the NBN 
rollout.16 The NBN Co outlined these delays and stated: 
There were a number of reasons, one of which was the ACCC 
decision on the points of interconnect. They moved from 14, which 
we had based our network on and designed it for, to 121. That 
required a rejig of the network—quite a substantial one. We had 
anticipated getting the national duct data in June. We got it the 
following March. Of course, the construction contracts themselves 
took a bit longer for us to negotiate because we terminated a 
process and went into a new process to make sure that we get 
value for money for the Australian taxpayer. I have to also say that 
the issues we talked about with addresses were also quite a task to 
undertake. We also took on board, on 1 January 2011, the 
 
15  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, August 2012, Exhibit 5-2, p. 36. 
16  These reasons are outlined in Chapter 1 of the report on page 1. 
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greenfields requirement—and I have some information because I 
know the committee is interested in greenfields, but it looks like 
we are out of time to do that—and that was quite a substantial 
undertaking.17 
2.20 The ACCC commented on its role in the consideration of the Telstra 
Structural Separation Undertaking (on which the Telstra Agreement 
relied for finalisation) and the perception that the ACCC had 
contributed to the delay in the NBN rollout commencement. The ACCC 
stated: 
...any delay that I have heard potentially attributed to us was 
potentially the delay in approving the Telstra structural separation 
undertaking. That took us six and a half months to approve. My 
understanding was the original NBN timetable meant that that 
would all be settled by the middle of 2011. As it happened, it never 
came to us until the end of July, so we never even had it. To have 
even approved it in one month would have meant that we would 
have had to just close our eyes and sign. In fact, because we were 
trying to get interim equivalence and transparency, it was 
necessarily a complicated issue. I can understand that NBN were 
forecasting on the basis of an agreement that actually had to be 
settled between the ACCC and Telstra. So they may have found 
that hard to judge. I think the key delay was the negotiations 
between NBN and Telstra. Our role necessarily was always going 
to take an amount of time—whether that was four, five, six or nine 
months. These things do take time. I do not think we contributed 
to the delay at all.18 
2.21 The NBN Co clarified the events that lead to the delay in the 
commencement of the NBN rollout and stated: 
We are not suggesting that the ACCC contributed to the delay. We 
anticipated in December 2010 that we would have reached 
agreement and could start using the national duct data from 
Telstra—which we need to do all the things that .... [have been] 
spoken about—by June 2011. That was probably optimistic. We 
underestimated the length of time and the complexity of reaching 
final agreement with Telstra and we also did not anticipate the fact 
that the deal could not commence until after the Telstra [structural 
separation undertaking] SSU, nor how long that would take. It did 
 
17  Mr Quigley, NBN Co, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 23. 
18  Mr Rod Sims, Chairman, ACCC, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 14 August 2012, p. 2. 
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not occur until March [2012], so we could not get the national duct 
data until then. So we could not do the design process that we 
talked about earlier.19 
National Broadband Network Rollout Progress 
Progress over the Reporting Period 
2.22 The Performance Report, similarly to previous reports included the 
progress information on the NBN rollout over the period from 1 
January to 30 June 2012, in addition to developments contributing to the 
NBN rollout covering the three month period from 1 July to 1 October 
2012. 
2.23 The key statistical results for the NBN rollout in the reporting period 
are listed in Table 2.5. For the purposes of comparison and to facilitate 
identification of progress, results are presented alongside the NBN Co 
Corporate Plan 2012-2015 targets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19  Mr Quigley, NBN Co, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, pp 22-23. 
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Table 2.5 Key Results of the National Broadband Network Rollout for the six month period ended 
on 30 June 2012 (Construction commenced and Premises Passed/Covered) 
Cumulative Metrics NBN Co 2012-2015 
Corporate Plan 
Targets (p. 36) 
Cumulative 
current half year as 
at 30 June 2012 
Cumulative 
previous half year 
as at 31 Dec 2011 
Construction Commenced20    
Brownfields  280 142 77 357 
New Development Lots  13 885 12 723 
Fixed Wireless and Satellite  7062 1952 
Premises passed (PP)/covered    
Brownfields 29 000 28 860 18 243 
New Development Lots 10 000 10 054 951 
Fixed Wireless and Satellite 174 000 173 885 165 000 
Total PP (across the three technologies) 213 000 212 799  
Source Shareholder Ministers’ Performance Report, Submission 13, p. 5. 
2.24 For Premises passed/covered, the half year results show that the NBN 
Co achieved for: 
 Brownfields – 28 860 premises passed/ covered which is just below 
the target of 29 000. 
 New development lots or greenfields - 10 054 lots passed/covered 
which slightly exceeds the target of 10 000 lots. 
 Fixed wireless and satellite – 173 885 premises passed/ covered 
which is just below the target of 174 000 premises. 
2.25 Table 2.5 contains a comparison of the totals (across the three network 
technologies) for the six month period ended 30 June 2012 and shows 
 
20  Construction commenced represents contract instructions have been issued together with the 
initial Network Design Document so that construction partners can commence work on the 
detailed design, field instructions and rodding/roping activities in a Fibre Serving Area 
Module (FSAM). This is followed by the release of a rollout map for the FSAM on the NBN Co 
website showing the coverage areas for that FSAM and the estimated number of premises to 
be passed/covered. Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012, 
Submission 13, p. 5. 
PERFORMANCE REPORTING 19 
 
the NBN Co is just below its total target of premises passed/ covered 
(213 000), with 212 799 premises covered.21 
Table 2.6 Key Results of the National Broadband Network Rollout for the six month period ended 
on 30 June 2012 (Premises Activated) 
Cumulative Metrics NBN Co 2012-2015 
Corporate Plan 
Targets (p. 36) 
Cumulative 
current half year as 
at 30 June 2012 
Cumulative 
previous half year 
as at 31 Dec 2011 
Premises Activated (PA)    
Brownfields 3000 3364 2095 
New Development Lots 500 503 110 
Fixed Wireless and Satellite 10 000 9669 2197 
Total PA (across the three Technologies) 13 500 13 536  
2.26 As shown in Table 2.6, for Premises Activated, the half year results show 
that the NBN Co achieved for: 
 Brownfields – 3364 premises activated which exceeds the target of 3000. 
 New development lots or greenfields - 503 lots activated which slightly 
exceeds the target of 500 lots. 
 Fixed wireless and satellite - 9669 premises activated which is just 
below the target of 10 000 premises. 
2.27 Comparison of totals (across the three network technologies) for the six 
month period ended 30 June 2012, shows that while the NBN Co is just 
below its total target of premises activated for fixed and wireless, overall, 
the NBN Co has exceeded its target (13 500), with 13 536 premises 
activated.22 
 
21  The NBN Co targets for premises or lots passed/covered are rounded to the nearest thousand. 
NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, August 2012, p. 36. 
22  The NBN Co targets for premises activated are rounded to the nearest thousand where 
number of premises or lots exceeds 1000. NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, August 2012, 
p. 36. 
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Current Progress 
2.28 The Government’s Performance Report also includes an update on 
events that have occurred since the reporting period from 1 July to 
1 October 2012. 
2.29 The key announcements and events identified in the Performance 
Report are listed in Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7 Key National Broadband Network Rollout Events from 1 July 2012 to 1 October 2012 
Date (2012) Event/Announcement 
3 – 12 July NBN Co announces local government areas in NSW and Qld to receive fixed 
wireless services from mid to late 2013 
12 July  NBN Co published its Network Extension Program 
 NBN Co announces ViaSat - Carlbad, California selected to provide 
ground systems for Long Term Satellite Service  
19 July Optus Agreement authorised by ACCC 
8 August NBN Co’s new Corporate Plan released 
9 August Opening of expanded Prysmian fibre manufacturing facility in Dee Why, NSW 
16 August Report released – Operation of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 and its 
application to NBN Co held documents 
24 August Ceduna, SA selected as fourth satellite ground station location 
4 September NBN Co released ‘NBN for Business’ a publication to assist small business ‘to 
make the most of high speed broadband’ 
6 September Silcar and Service Stream are announced as the NBN network maintenance 
and installation providers over the next two years 
NBN fixed wireless services are made available in Geraldton, WA 
19 September Opening of NBN Co’s National Contact Centre at Varsity Lakes, Qld 
28 September  NBN Co lodges its revised Special Access Undertaking with the ACCC 
 Telecommunication providers are now able to use NBN’s Multicast feature 
1 October Geraldton, Carnarvon and Kalgoorlie, WA selected as location for three new 
satellite ground stations 
Source Shareholder Ministers’ Performance Report, Submission 13, pp 4-5. 
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Planned Progress 
Table 2.8 Deployment Schedule for 2012-2015 Corporate Plan23 
Deployment Schedule from FY 2011 to FY2021 
June YE 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Brownfields Premises Passed (000’s) 18 29 286 1129 2499 3862 5168 6423 7610 8879 10091 
BF Premises passed Daily Run Rate (250 working days/year) 73 42 1028 3372 5482 5450 5225 5020 4746 5078 4847 
Greenfields Premises Passed (000’s premises) - 10 55 178 413 763 1111 1415 1673 1904 2111 
GF Premises Passed Daily Run Rate (250 working days/year) - 40 179 492 941 1400 1392 1215 1033 922 829 
Fibre Premises Passed (000’s Premises) 18 39 341 1307 2912 4625 6279 7838 9283 10 783 12 202 
Fibre Premises Passed Daily Run Rate (250 working days/year) 73 83 1207 3864 6423 6850 6617 6235 5780 6001 5677 
Brownfields Premises Connected (000’s) 1 3 44 420 1311 2559 3566 4578 5468 6195 6939 
BF Premises connected Daily Run Rate (250 working days/year) 3 11 161 1504 3565 4991 4029 4047 3562 2908 2976 
Greenfields Premises Connected (000’s premises) - 1 10 67 204 477 775 1017 1227 1412 1574 
GF Premises Connected Daily Run Rate (250 working days/year) - 2 40 227 548 1092 1189 968 841 740 649 
Fibre Premises Connected (000’s Premises) 1 4 54 487 1515 3036 4341 5594 6695 7607 8513 
Fibre Premises Connected Daily Run Rate (250 working days/year) 3 13 201 1731 4114 6083 5218 5016 4403 3648 3624 
Fixed Wireless and Satellite Premises Covered (000’s Premises) 165 174 320 374 752 907 921 934 948 961 974 
Fixed Wireless and Satellite Premises Connected (000’s Premises) 0 10 38 64 100 145 161 191 206 219 232 
Total Premises Connected – All Platforms (000’ Premises) 1 14 92 551 1615 3181 4502 5785 6901 7827 8745 
 
23  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, August 2012, Exhibit 5-3, p. 37. 
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2.30 Table 2.8 shows the NBN Co’s planned deployment schedule for 2012-
2015 for brownfields, greenfields, and fixed wireless and satellite - 
premises passed, daily run rates, and premises connected. 
2.31 By the end of 2012, as shown in Table 2.8, 14 000 premises are planned 
to be connected across all platforms of the NBN, with this number 
increasing exponentially to 92 000 by the end of 2013. 
2.32 In a statement made in relation to NBN rollout data for the six month 
period ended on 31 December 2012, the NBN Co stated that it expected 
NBN rollout to be ‘ramped up’ in the fourth quarter of the 2012-2013 
financial year. The NBN Co stated: 
The results reflect progress in the early stages of the rollout, and 
are what we would expect given the time and work necessary to 
put in place the contracts and agreements needed to get to this 
point of execution. As can be seen by our targets, this rollout is not 
a linear progression, but a rapid ramp-up. We are targeting to pass 
more premises in the final quarter of the financial year than we 
will have passed in the entire project up to the beginning of that 
quarter. Additional construction resources will be added over the 
coming months to help achieve these targets.24 
NBN Co’s Unaudited Financial Results 
2.33 The Shareholder Ministers’ report contains unaudited consolidated 
financial statements for the NBN Group for the six month period and 
financial year ended on 30 June 2012. 
2.34 As these statements are unaudited they were not accompanied with an 
auditor’s statement or explanatory notes verifying their non 
qualification and accuracy respectively. 
2.35 When asked about why unaudited financial results instead of audited 
financial statements were included in the Performance Report, the 
NBN Co stated: 
That is what I would have to refer to the department. This is the 
Government's report, so I would have to refer it to them.25 
 
24  NBN Co, 2013, 34 500 Australian homes and businesses now using the NBN, media release, 29 
January. 
25  Mr Robin Payne, Chief Financial Officer, NBN Co, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra 
30 October 2012, p. 24. 
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2.36 The Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital 
Economy (DBCDE) subsequently responded that: 
The Government's progress reports on the National Broadband 
Network cover six monthly periods to 30 June and 31 December 
and are based on information provided by NBN Co. 
The financial statements contained within the government's 
progress reports are not subject to the same auditing arrangements 
as those applied to annual reports. While NBN Co's annual report 
had been tabled by the time of the 30 October Joint Committee 
hearing, preparation of the government's progress report was 
undertaken separately and was therefore appropriately marked as 
unaudited.26 
2.37 In the absence of accompanying explanatory and verification 
documents, supporting financial information and some information has 
been taken from the NBN Co 2012 Annual Report and some from the 
Performance Report. 
Equity Funding 
2.38 Over the six month period the Government provided $350 million in 
equity funding to the NBN Co.27 In reference to equity funding 
provided, the NBN Co Annual Report states: 
To the extent that the Commonwealth has provided for equity 
funding in forward budget estimates, NBN Co has recorded this as 
expected equity funding in the Schedule of Commitments. The 
expected equity funding to the company as at 30 June 2012 is 
$24.668 billion. As at 30 June 2012 a total of $2.832 billion has been 
made available to the [NBN Co].28 
2.39 The current Equity Funding Agreement between NBN Co and the 
Government was capped at $27.5 billion with reference to the NBN Co 
Corporate Plan 2011-2013. With the release of the 2012-2015 NBN Co 
Corporate Plan (which contains revised targets), on 8 August 2012, total 
equity funding was increased by approximately $3 billion to a total of 
$30.4 billion.29 
 
26  DBCDE, Submission 14, answer to question on notice No. 88. 
27  NBN Co, Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 101. 
28  NBN Co, Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 101. 
29  NBN Co, Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 101. 
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Financial Result 
2.40 Over the six month period, the NBN Co experienced an operating loss 
of approximately $300 million (exact amount is $299 639 000)30 with an 
operating loss of approximately $520 million (exact amount is 
$520 205 000) for the end of the 12-month period.31 This is 
approximately $197 million more than for the previous year. 
Operational expenditure over the 12-month period to 30 June 2012 was 
attributed to: 
 $222 million – employment costs32 ($119 million for previous year)33 
 $136 million for IT and direct telecommunications costs34 ($37 million 
for previous year)35 
 $89 million for outsourced technical and legal advice expenses36 
($161 million for previous year).37 
2.41 For the 2011-2012 financial year the NBN Co received revenue of 
approximately $62 million consisting of telecommunications revenue 
($1.9 million), other revenue ($19 000) and interest income 
(approximately $60 million).38 
2.42 Total expenses increased from the previous year of $355 837 million to 
$589 052 million.39 
2.43 When asked how long the NBN Co expects to be in the position of 
experiencing an operating loss, the NBN Co stated ’that is in the 
corporate plan; I think it is 2019.’40 
2.44 The NBN Co explained the operating loss timeframe and stated: 
 
30  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 31. 
31  NBN Co, Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 58. 
32  NBN Co, Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 18 and Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 
30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 27. 
33  NBN Co, Annual Report 2010-2011, p. 10. 
34  NBN Co, Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 18 and Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 
30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 27. 
35  NBN Co, Annual Report 2010-2011, p. 10 
36  NBN Co, Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 18 and Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 
30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 27. 
37  NBN Co, Annual Report 2010-2011, p. 10. 
38  NBN Co, Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 58 and Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 
June 2012, Submission 13, p. 30. 
39  NBN Co, Annual Report 2011-2012, p. 58. 
40  Mr Quigley, NBN Co, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 24. 
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NBN Co’s projected cash flows are typical of large-scale 
infrastructure projects that require up front capital and operating 
expenditure to design and construct the network in order to 
generate revenue streams in future periods. NBN Co’s revenue 
streams are gradually projected to build up as the network is 
rolled out and service providers develop their customer base of 
end-user premises onto the Fibre, Fixed Wireless and Satellite 
networks. As revenue streams gradually build up, these are 
projected to exceed Operating expenditure in FY2019.41 
Timing of Performance Information 
Government’s Performance Report 
2.45 The Government’s Performance Report was received by the committee 
on 23 October 2012. 
2.46 In its First Report, the committee recommended that the Government’s 
six monthly performance report be provided to the committee: 
... no later than three months before the committee is due to report 
to the Parliament.42 
2.47 Taking into consideration this timeframe, the Government’s 
Performance Report was due to the committee by the end of September 
2012. 
Answers to Questions on Notice 
2.48 In previous reports there has been substantial discussion about the 
delay in receiving answers to questions taken on notice by the NBN Co 
and the DBCDE. In addition, the quality of answers has also been 
commented on. 
2.49 The committee has also commented on the pressure this has placed on 
it in regard to the timing of its reporting to Parliament. The committee 
subsequently made recommendations in this regard and has received 
comment through the Government’s formal responses to reports. 
 
41  NBN Co, Submission 7.12, Answer to Question on Notice No. 12. 
42  Joint Committee on the National Broadband Network (JCNBN), August 2011, Review of the 
Rollout of the National Broadband Network: First Report, p. 22. 
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2.50 In an effort to receive answers to questions on notice to supplement the 
committee’s hearing on 30 October 2012, the committee set an eight day 
timeframe for receiving answers to questions on notice. 
2.51 In correspondence regarding the provision of answers to questions on 
notice from the 30 October 2012 hearing the DBCDE stated: 
The Department and NBN Co aim to deliver answers to questions 
on notice at the earliest opportunity and to the best extent possible 
will endeavour to meet the Committee’s deadline. A number of 
responses have already been tabled with the Committee, and more 
will be tabled later tomorrow before the 14 November 2012 
deadline.... We understand that the NBN Co will be in a position 
to provide a further 20 responses over the next several days and 
the remainder shortly thereafter. 
To assist the Committee in preparing its report, NBN Co and the 
Department have prioritised the questions that are relevant to the 
performance of the NBN in the review period to June 2013.43 
Concluding Comments 
Key Performance Indicators 
2.52 The tabular representation of actual results achieved for the physical 
NBN rollout contained in the Shareholder Ministers’ performance 
report is not presented in a format which enables comparison with 
Corporate Plan targets. 
2.53 The committee has previously commented on the type of data that 
should be included in the Shareholder Ministers’ Performance Report to 
better enable comparison of data across years in line with published 
NBN rollout targets. 
2.54 In particular, the committee reiterates the statements it made in the 
Third Report that it ‘does not find it meaningful to be provided with 
data on how many premises have been passed or premises made active 
between periods or years without any kind of target or benchmark on 
which to compare this data.’ 
 
43  Correspondence from the DBCDE dated and received 13 November 2012. 
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2.55 In addition, the NBN Co corporate plan presents targets by financial 
years (covering the periods from 1 July to 30 June), not in six monthly 
periods as contained in the Shareholder Ministers’ Performance Report. 
2.56 In respect to this issue, the committee expects high levels of 
accountability and transparency from an organisation that is 
responsible for the design and build of Australia’s largest ever 
infrastructure project.  
2.57 The committee finds that the Performance Report while providing a 
general overview of the activities associated with the NBN rollout does 
not easily show which NBN rollout targets have been met over the six 
month period. The committee has made a recommendation in regard to 
this finding. 
Delay of Commencement of the NBN Rollout 
2.58 The committee has now on several occasions during the course of its 
reviews heard the reasons why the commencement of the NBN rollout 
has been delayed. Although it is stated in the new NBN Co Corporate 
Plan that the NBN rollout was delayed, and the rollout timeframe has 
been extended by six months, it is uncertain whether the NBN rollout is 
still subject to delay, and the extent of the impact of the previous delay. 
2.59 The ACCC has commented that it was not responsible for any delay to 
the commencement of the NBN rollout as a result of its consideration of 
the Telstra SSU. The NBN Co has agreed with comments made by the 
ACCC in this regard. 
NBN Co’s Unaudited Financial Results 
2.60 The Performance Report again contains unaudited financial statements 
with the only accompanying disclaimer-type statement being 
‘Unaudited financial statements are presented in the following section. 
Further information is available in the audited financial statements 
included in the 2011‐12 Annual Report.’44 
2.61 Without an accompanying auditor’s statement or accompanying 
explanatory notes, the accuracy of financial statements provided in the 
Performance Report and whether the financial statements were 
prepared in accordance with accounting standards, may be questioned. 
Where accounting standards are not followed to prepare financial 
statements implies that without such rigour in the process, there is 
more likely to be resulting errors. 
 
44  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 27. 
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2.62 The DBCDE’s response to the reason for providing unaudited financial 
statements in the Performance Report is not satisfactory. In particular, 
the DBCDE’s response states that ‘the financial statements contained 
within the Government's progress reports are not subject to the same 
auditing arrangements as those applied to annual reports.’ 
2.63 To then state in the Performance Report that further information is 
provided in the NBN Co’s Annual Report is unhelpful as the two are 
not comparable as they were prepared using different methodologies. 
2.64 Given that the NBN Co Annual report was released before the 
Performance Report was provided to the committee, there would have 
been no reason not to include it in the Performance Report. 
2.65 The committee would prefer to receive audited financial statements so 
that results are certified and so can be verified, and has recommended 
this course of action. 
Timing of Government’s Performance Report 
2.66 To date, through four reviews, the Government’s Performance Report 
has not reached the committee within the three month period that the 
committee recommended in its First Report. 
2.67 One week before the committee’s biannual hearing with the NBN Co, 
originally scheduled for 8 October 2012, the committee had not yet 
received the Government’s Performance Report. 
2.68 The hearing was subsequently rescheduled from 8 October to 30 
October 2012 to accommodate witnesses’ schedules. While this 
timeframe would have provided additional time for the Government’s 
Performance Report to reach the committee, the Performance Report 
was not received by the committee until 23 October 2012. This is four 
working days prior to the 30 October 2012 biannual hearing. 
2.69 Receiving the Government’s Performance Report at least three months 
before it is required to report to the Parliament allows the committee to 
undertake its oversight role without any initial delay in the review 
process. 
2.70 While the committee appreciates receiving the Government’s 
Performance Report ahead of its biannual hearing, it would be 
preferable for the committee to receive the Performance Report at least 
one month before the biannual hearing with the NBN Co is scheduled 
to take place. This would assist the committee in fulfilling its reporting 
and oversight obligations more uniformly. 
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Answers to Questions on Notice 
2.71 Given the short time available for the committee to finalise its report 
following its rescheduled biannual hearing with the NBN Co and in an 
effort to receive answers to questions on notice to supplement the 
committee’s evidence, an eight day timeframe for receiving answers to 
questions on notice was put in place. 
2.72 The committee appreciates that this timeframe was relatively short and 
appreciates the efforts of the NBN Co and DBCDE to provide answers 
to questions on notice within this timeframe. 
2.73 Receiving answers to questions on notice in this short timeframe has 
enabled the committee to meet its reporting obligations and provide 
more up to date information on the NBN rollout to the Parliament and 
interested citizens. 
 
Recommendation 1 
2.74 The committee recommends that the key performance indicator 
information presented in the Shareholder Ministers’ six-monthly 
National Broadband Network (NBN) Performance Report list and detail: 
(1) established Business Plan targets and (2) actual results which track 
the progress of the NBN rollout over each six month period as well as 
yearly, to enable the comparison of actual physical NBN rollout results 
with published NBN Co Corporate Plan targets. 
 
Recommendation 2 
2.75 The committee recommends that the Shareholder Ministers’ six monthly 
performance report on the progress of the National Broadband Network 
rollout include audited financial statements with accompanying 
explanatory notes, and where it is not possible to provide these in the 
first instance, that they be forwarded to the Joint Committee on the 
National Broadband Network when prepared, as an addendum to the 
Performance Report. 
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Recommendation 3 
2.76 The committee recommends that subsequent Shareholder Ministers’ six 
monthly performance report on the progress of the National Broadband 
Network rollout be provided to the committee no less than one month 
before the scheduled biannual hearing with the Joint Committee on the 
National Broadband Network. 
 
 3 
Regulatory and Pricing Issues 
Introduction 
3.1 The Shareholder Ministers’ Six Monthly Performance Report (the 
Performance Report) provides an update of the regulatory matters 
facilitating and associated with the National Broadband Network (NBN) 
rollout for the period ended on 30 June 2012. 
3.2 These matters include an update on the binding definitive agreements 
with the Telstra Corporation (Telstra) and SingTel Optus Pty Ltd (Optus), 
the NBN Co Limited (NBN Co)  Special Access Undertaking (SAU) and 
Wholesale Broadband Agreement (WBA). In addition, general pricing 
issues are discussed. 
Binding Definitive Agreements with Telstra and Optus 
Telstra Agreement 
3.3 The broad terms of the Binding Definitive Agreement between the 
NBN Co and Telstra (the Telstra Agreement) were outlined in the Second 
and Third Reports. With the ACCC’s approval of the Telstra Structural 
Separation Undertaking and accompanying draft customer migration 
plan, the final conditions precedent were met and the Telstra Agreement 
came into force on 7 March 2012.1 
 
1  For an overview of the process and negotiations undertaken to arrive at the Telstra Agreement 
see JCNBN Second Report, Chapter 3, November 2011 and Third Report, Chapter 3, June 2012. 
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3.4 The Telstra Deal is now in its implementation stage with the following 
‘key milestones’ achieved over the period covered in the Performance 
Report: 
 ‘Delivery of the Transit schedule with 142 exchanges and 99 dark fibre 
links handed over at the end of June 2012.’ 
 ‘Significant work has been undertaken in relation to Network Design 
Documents and detailed processes developed.’ 
 ‘In conjunction with Telstra, NBN Co has updated its design rules to 
reduce excess remediation and to reduce the amount of augmentation 
required.’2 
Optus Agreement 
3.5 The ACCC issued a final determination on the $800 million Binding 
Definitive Agreement between the NBN Co and SingTel Optus Pty Ltd 
(Optus Agreement) on 19 July 2012.3 With the conditions precedent to the 
Optus Agreement being met, the agreement came into force. The NBN Co 
2012-15 Corporate Plan now incorporates the financial impact of the Optus 
Agreement. 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Review 
3.6 The ACCC stated that its determination on the Optus Agreement was ‘an 
extremely difficult decision’, but that it had ‘made the right decision.’4 
3.7 In making its determination in reference to the Optus Agreement, the 
ACCC stated that it weighed up the benefits and the detriments of the 
authorisation in regard to the impact on competition. The ACCC 
explained: 
...we have to weigh the benefits with the detriments, under the 
authorisation test. Is there a net benefit from the arrangement? 
Normally, whenever a party in this situation as it were buys out its 
main competitor, the detriments are enormous in terms of price 
competition, non-price competition and dynamic effects from both 
the player that is still there and the one that is coming, but here it 
is very difficult for NBN to respond, because they have to provide 
a universal price and service across the country. So you lose a lot 
 
2  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 7. 
3  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, 6 August 2012, p. 31; ACCC, <www.accc.gov.au> 
4  Mr Rod Sims, Chairman, ACCC, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 14 August 2012, p. 5. 
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of the dynamic response from NBN. Then, from Optus' point of 
view, we judged they were not going to roll out the HFC any 
further. I think it really is quite clear that, under the legislation, 
they have no incentive to do that. And the amount they would 
need to invest to match the higher level services is something that, 
again, we judged they would not do. So it is a very unusual 
situation. If you look at it from Optus's point of view, one way to 
look at this is: if the NBN had been rolled out as an open access 
network first, if that was the first investment made, would Optus 
subsequently want to invest in an HFC? I doubt they would, 
because this is an open access fibre network. Optus is making 
those judgements all the time about whether they would compete 
against something that has been overbuilt against them. It is a very 
unusual situation.5 
Access Pricing 
NBN Co’s Special Access Undertaking 
3.8 On 5 December 2011, the NBN Co voluntarily lodged a Special Access 
Undertaking (SAU)6 with the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) for review.7 Following receipt of the SAU, the ACCC 
began its legislatively required consideration process (which includes 
industry consultation).8 
3.9 As a result of the ACCC’s process, and subsequent discussions with the 
NBN Co, on 20 June 2012, to ‘address issues raised by Access Seekers and 
the ACCC’ the NBN Co released a document containing its revised 
approach to the SAU.9 
 
5  Mr Sims, ACCC, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 14 August 2012, p. 3. 
6  The SAU will cover key price and product aspects of access to NBN Co’s fibre, wireless and 
satellite networks as well as a number of non price terms and conditions over a 30-year period 
(until 2040) with a mid-term review, JCNBN, November 2011, Second Report, p. 51 and 
JCNBN, June 2012, Third Report, p. 47. 
7  ACCC, 2012, ACCC Commences Public Consultation on NBN Co Special Access Undertaking, 
media release, 20 December. 
8  The ACCC considers the NBN Co SAU under the criteria set out in section 152CBD of the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010, ACCC, <www.accc.gov.au> 
9  This document contains ‘high level design principles for the proposed incentive based 
modular SAU’, NBN Co, NBN Co Corporate Plan 2012-2015, 6 August 2012, p. 31. 
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3.10 In anticipation of receiving a revised SAU and to allow the NBN Co to 
develop its revised SAU approach, the ACCC suspended its consideration 
of the NBN Co’s original SAU.10 
3.11 Following the release of the revised approach document, subsequent 
industry feedback and ongoing discussion with the ACCC, on 
7 September 2012, the NBN Co withdrew its original SAU. Withdrawal of 
the NBN Co SAU meant the ACCC would not have to make a decision on 
the SAU by 12 September 2012 as legislatively required.11 
3.12 The NBN Co stated in its Corporate Plan that it expected to lodge its 
revised SAU with the ACCC in advance of finalisation of its Wholesale 
Broadband Agreement.12 
3.13 On 28 September 2012, NBN Co Limited and NBN Tasmania Limited 
lodged a revised SAU with the ACCC. The ACCC then commenced its 
consideration of the SAU under the criteria set out in section 152CBD of 
the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 which included an industry 
consultation process.13 
3.14 This process was restarted with the NBN Co’s withdrawal of the revised 
SAU and the lodgment of a new SAU and accompanying documents, with 
the ACCC on 18 December 2012. The new SAU ‘includes amended non-
price terms which NBN Co states have arisen out of the now concluded 
Contract Development Process’…and…’some other amendments which 
NBN Co states clarify the operation of the SAU.’14 
3.15 The ACCC was to release a draft decision on the original SAU by mid-
March 201315, which has now changed with the lodgement of the second 
revised SAU. The ACCC is required to make its decision on the SAU 
within six months of its receipt. If the ACCC has not arrived at a decision 
within this timeframe, the SAU would be deemed to be accepted.16 
 
10  ACCC, 2012, ACCC Suspends Assessment of NBN Co Special Access Undertaking, media 
release, 20 June; Mr Sims, ACCC, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 14 August 2012, p. 11; 
NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, 6 August 2012, p. 31. 
11  ACCC, 2012, NBN Co Withdraws Special Access Undertaking, media release, 11 September. 
12  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, 6 August 2012, p. 31. 
13  On 12 November 2012, the ACCC released its first consultation paper on the revised NBN Co 
SAU, to be followed by a stakeholder forum in December. Submissions to the ACCC’s 
consultation were due by 11 January 2013. ACCC, 2012, ACCC commences first public 
consultation on NBN Co Special Access Undertaking, media release, 12 November, p. 2. 
14  ACCC, NBN Co Special Access Undertaking (December 2012), www.accc.gov.au 
15  ACCC, NBN Co Original Special Access Undertaking (December 2011), www.accc.gov.au 
16  ‘This timeframe is subject to its ability to extend this period and periods which are discounted 
from the assessment timeframe such as when the ACCC is consulting on the SAU, or NBN Co 
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Wholesale Broadband Agreement 
3.16 Under the SAU, the NBN Co is required to ‘ensure that its Standard Form 
of Access Agreement (including the Wholesale Broadband Agreement) 
remains aligned with the SAU.’17 
3.17 The Wholesale Broadband Agreement (WBA) is a standard form of access 
agreement (SFAA) or contract between a RSP which outlines ‘the complete 
terms and conditions of access to all of the services and products being 
provided over’ the NBN’s ‘fibre, wireless and satellite networks.’18 
3.18 Following a ten-month industry consultation and several versions of the 
document on 30 November 2011, the NBN Co released its WBA. 
3.19 With the absence of an approved SAU, the ACCC raised concerns about 
the initial five-year term of the WBA. As the SAU would set the 
framework under which the WBA could be entered into, without the SAU, 
RSPs would not have recourse to the ACCC if required.19 
3.20 On the ACCC’s advice and without an approved SAU, the NBN Co 
revised the term of its WBA to only 12 months. 
3.21 As at 30 June 2012, 41 RSPs (or Access Seekers) have signed the WBA. 
Those RSPs that have signed a WBA with the NBN Co constitute over 
94 per cent of market participants in the fixed broadband market.20 
3.22 In the same vein as the WBA, the NBN Co has also released the Wireless 
Trial Agreement, the Interim Satellite Services Agreement, the Satellite 
Wholesale Broadband Agreement and Testing Terms and Conditions all 
as SFAAs. Twelve RSPs have signed onto the Interim Satellite Services 
Agreement and 16 RSPs have signed the Fixed Wireless Trial Agreement.21 
3.23 On 20 June 2012, when it announced its suspension of the assessment of 
the NBN Co SAU, the ACCC stated its expectation that: 
                                                                                                                                                    
is responding to any Notice to vary, issued to it.’ ACCC, NBN Co Special Access Undertaking 
(December 2012), www.accc.gov.au 
17  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, 6 August 2012, pp 31-32. 
18  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2011-2013, pp 106-107. 
19  JCNBN, November 2011, Review of the Rollout of the National Broadband Network: Second Report, 
p. 56. 
20  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 11. 
21  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, p. 31. 
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...the regulatory framework established by the SAU should be in 
place prior to the execution of longer term Access Agreements 
between NBN Co and access seekers.22 
3.24 On 12 November 2012, with the release of its industry consultation paper 
on the SAU, the ACCC reiterated that: 
...it expects parties to agree to short term arrangements for the 
continuing supply of NBN Co’s services until assessment of the 
undertaking concludes and the regulatory framework is 
established.23 
3.25 The NBN Co is continuing to engage with industry: 
...regarding the further enhancement of the WBA, via the Contract 
Development Process (CDP) set out in the WBA itself.24 
3.26 The CDP has over the period made ‘substantial progress... in relation to... 
the terms and structure of the WBA and its interaction with the SAU, 
intellectual property and confidential information and an appropriate 
approach to service levels including the development of service levels 
over time.’25 
3.27 Given the expected finalisation, lodgement and assessment of the revised 
SAU, the ACCC stated ‘that NBN Co and access seekers will need to agree 
upon interim contractual arrangements.’26 
3.28 In its new Corporate Plan, the NBN Co provides scope for the extension of 
an interim WBA by mutual agreement between itself and an RSP.27 
Following lodgement of the revised SAU the NBN Co ‘proposed to its 
customers that current agreements be extended while the ACCC considers 
the revised SAU.’28 
3.29 Later, the NBN Co confirmed that the current WBA has been extended 
until the earlier of either 30 April 2013 or a month after the SAU is 
accepted. The NBN Co stated: 
 
22  ACCC, 2012, ACCC Suspends Assessment of NBN Co Special Access Undertaking, media 
release, 20 June, p. 2. 
23  ACCC, 2012, ACCC commences first public consultation on NBN Co Special Access 
Undertaking, media release, 12 November, p. 2. 
24  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, p. 31. 
25  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 22. 
26  ACCC, 2012, ACCC Suspends Assessment of NBN Co Special Access Undertaking, media 
release, 20 June, p. 2. 
27  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, p. 31. 
28  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 22. 
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The majority of customers have now extended the current WBA, 
until the earlier of 30 April 2013 or a month after the SAU is 
accepted. Only a couple of customers are yet to return the 
extension documentation to NBN Co, but are expected to do so 
shortly.29 
3.30 The NBN Co also stated that the final WBA is expected to be finalised by 
the end of November 2012 and will be made available to NBN Co 
customers when the SAU has been accepted. The final WBA will have a 
two-year term. The NBN Co stated: 
NBN Co is planning to finalise its next Wholesale Broadband 
Agreement (WBA) at the end of November 2012. The next WBA 
will be available for execution by customers when the Special 
Access Undertaking (SAU) has been accepted, and will have a 
term of 2 years. Having the next WBA finalised shortly will give 
NBN Co and its customers certainty to prepare for its 
implementation, and also facilitate the SAU assessment process (as 
the SAU, once accepted, and the next WBA will operate 
together).30 
Impact of Access Price 
3.31 The impact of the CVC31 price (or access pricing for RSPs) on the retail 
prices offered for broadband consumers (or end users) has been raised as 
an issue since the committee’s First Review. 
3.32 An NBN Co comparison between wholesale pricing offered by Telstra 
ADSL versus NBN Co shows that the NBN Co is offering cheaper 
wholesale pricing.32 The information contained in the NBN Co Corporate 
Plan 2012-2015 is reproduced in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
29  NBN Co, Submission 7.8, Answer to question on notice No. 19. 
30  NBN Co, Submission 7.8, Answer to question on notice No. 19. 
31  Connectivity Virtual Circuit ‘is an aggregation of the bandwidth allocated to the end user 
premises and the point of interconnect’ to the NBN. NBN Co Corporate Plan 2011-2013, 
pp 151-152. 
32  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, p. 60. 
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Table 3.1 Comparative Wholesale Pricing between the National Broadband Network and Telstra 
 Telstra Proposed 
Wholesale ADSL Pricing 
($) January 2012 
ACCC Interim Access 
Determination ($) 
February 2012 
NBN 25/5 Pricing 
($) December 2011 
Zone 1 30 25.40 27 
Zone 2/3 37 30.80 27 
AGVC/CVC (per Mbps) 55 40.50*/33.65** 20 
*until 31 June 2012 
**from 1 July 2012 
Source NBN Co Corporate Plan 2012-2015, Exhibit 7-11: Comparative Wholesale Pricing NBN vs. Telstra, p. 60. 
3.33 The NBN Co 2012-2015 Corporate Plan also states that the NBN Co 
expects ‘to reduce CVC prices as traffic across the network increases over 
time.’33 However, the NBN Co stated that it cannot prevent any price rises 
being directly passed onto the consumer. The NBN Co stated: 
We deal with wholesale prices. We have agreed in the SAU that 
we are holding prices fixed for the first five years of the SAU, but 
we cannot make any guarantees. But we are expecting the market 
to operate at the retail level....We will drive wholesale prices 
down.34 
3.34 The ACCC commented that the price of the CVC charge should fall over 
time, but that NBN Co’s revenue (from CVC pricing) may still increase. 
The ACCC explained: 
It is a very live issue what the trend rates are going to be in the 
CVC charges over the life of the SAU. NBN Co has recently said it 
accepts that the price per unit of CVC charges should come down 
over time. That does not mean that revenues cannot increase 
because you get more for less, basically, or more for more but at a 
lower price per unit. What those CVC charges end up at and what 
the trend rate over time is will be relevant to the margin for 
retailers in the provision of services.35 
3.35 In relation to CVC pricing, as part of its consideration of the NBN Co SAU, 
the ACCC is seeking consumer and industry views on: 
The commitments around NBN Co’s proposed ‘usage’ based 
charge (the ‘connectivity virtual circuit), and in particular its 
implications for how NBN Co’s customers and end-users take up 
 
33  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-2015, p. 67. 
34  Mr Mike Quigley, CEO, NBN Co, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, pp 23-24. 
35  Mr Ed Willett, Commissioner, ACCC, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 14 August 2012, p. 11. 
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services and for NBN Co’s ability to recover the costs of its 
investments.36 
3.36 Further, the ACCC has stated that it: 
... will consider whether more binding pricing commitments to 
lower the usage based charge are required.37 
Concluding Comments 
Optus Agreement 
3.37 The committee acknowledges the evidence it received from the ACCC on 
its analysis and acceptance of the Optus Agreement. 
NBN Co’s Special Access Undertaking 
3.38 The NBN Co has revised and relodged its original SAU in response to 
industry feedback and ongoing negotiation with the ACCC. The 
committee understands that the ACCC is currently reviewing the revised 
NBN Co SAU and is expected to finalise its consideration of the 
undertaking within six months of its receipt. 
3.39 In the meantime, the NBN Co has proposed to RSPs that the interim WBA 
agreements be extended. With the release of its NBN Co SAU consultation 
paper, the ACCC has also reiterated its expectation that this approach be 
taken by the NBN Co. 
3.40 The NBN Co has stated that it has already extended its WBA with the 
‘majority of customers’ until the earlier of either 30 April 2013 or a month 
after the SAU is accepted. The remaining few who are yet to return the 
extension documentation ‘are expected to do so shortly.’ 
Impact of Access Price 
3.41 The committee acknowledges that the NBN Co is holding prices fixed for 
the first five years of the SAU, will drive wholesale prices down, but that it 
cannot make any price guarantees at the retail service level. The ACCC 
explained how the CVC price is likely to fall over time. While the CVC is a 
determinant of the retail price offered by RSPs, and taking into 
 
36  ACCC, 2012, ACCC commences first public consultation on NBN Co Special Access 
Undertaking, media release, 12 November, p. 1. 
37  ACCC, 2012, ACCC commences first public consultation on NBN Co Special Access 
Undertaking, media release, 12 November, p. 1. 
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consideration the comments made by the NBN Co, it remains to be seen 
whether competition at the retail level will provide lower prices for 
consumers into the longer term. The committee believes the NBN Co and 
the Government have a responsibility to ensure that high speed 
broadband is affordable for all consumers. 
 4 
Regional and Remote Issues 
Introduction 
4.1 The committee’s Third Report canvassed both the opportunities and 
challenges facing regional and remote communities in accessing and 
utilising the National Broadband Network (NBN). The Fourth Report will 
focus on progress to date.  
4.2 Stage 1 of the large scale fibre rollout has commenced, and will see 
construction commenced or completed in 1500 communities containing 
3.5 million premises, including a significant number of non metropolitan 
localities, and a number of regional centres. Further, NBN Co Limited 
(NBN Co) has published its Network Extension Program, describing a 
process by which communities, businesses or individuals may apply for 
an extension of the fibre or fixed wireless network to their premises.1 
4.3 Finally, the interim satellite service is now in operation, and the rollout of 
the fixed wireless service has commenced.  
4.4 As at 30 June 2012, 173 885 premises were passed or covered by the fixed 
wireless or satellite services, with 9669 premises activated.2  
4.5 By the 2016 financial year, it is anticipated that fixed wireless and satellite 
services will be available to 907 000 premises and activated in 145 000 
premises.3  
 
1  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 28. 
2  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, pp 5–6. 
3  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012–2015, p. 36. 
42 REVIEW OF THE ROLLOUT OF THE NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK: FOURTH REPORT 
 
4.6 NBN Co indicated that the aggregation of data for the wireless and 
satellite rollout was intended to provide flexibility in service provision to 
different localities outside the Fibre-to-the-Premise (FTTP) footprint.4 
4.7 Revenue forecasts for the NBN fixed wireless and satellite services are 
provided in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 Forecast Fixed Wireless and Satellite Revenues ($ Million) 
 
Source NBN Co Corporate Plan 2012–15, p. 68. 
Fibre Network 
Rollout Progress 
4.8 A combination of the three NBN technologies (fibre, fixed wireless and 
satellite) will be rolled out to rural and regional areas of Australia. While 
the fibre footprint does include rural and regional areas, the last seven per 
cent of premises to be included under the NBN fall within the fixed 
wireless and satellite footprints. Fixed wireless and satellite will be ‘used 
to reach areas of low population density that make it both difficult and 
expensive to build infrastructure to…premises’, which ‘are towns located 
in regional and remote Australia.’5 Fibre will account for 70 per cent of the 
NBN rollout to regional Australia. 6 
4.9 While the announcement of Stage 1 of the large scale fibre rollout has 
clarified the NBN timetable for some regional centres, others await news 
of when they might be connected to the NBN.7 
 
4  Mr Mike Quigley CEO, NBN Co, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 18. 
5  Joint Committee on the National Broadband Network, Third Report, p. 79. 
6  Joint Committee on the National Broadband Network, Third Report, p. 80. 
7  There are currently over 40 retail service providers making their services available across 
Australia. Shareholder Ministers’ Performance Report, Submission 13, p. 11. 
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4.10 This has caused some concern in the Broken Hill community which, as 
previously reported, has a high level of interest in receiving the NBN, but 
which is excluded from Stage 1. Two submissions have been received 
requesting an accelerated rollout for Broken Hill, especially given its 
proximity to a main backhaul route.8 Another submission has highlighted 
the NBN needs of the Western Australian town of Esperance.9 
Fibre and Fixed Wireless Network Extensions 
4.11 The committee has dealt with the question of network extensions in its 
previous reports and tracked the evolution of NBN Co’s network 
extension policy. In response to Recommendation 11 of the Committee’s 
Third Report, the Government noted: 
The company [NBN Co] conducted a network extension trial 
process in Tasmania, which informed development of the final 
policy. The trial’s most important finding was the need for 
effective community consultation activities at the commencement 
of the rollout process in relevant areas. As such, the company has 
now published its Network Extension policy, and provides 
significant information to interested parties at NBN Company 
Information Sessions which are generally held at the 
commencement of the rollout in a particular area.10 
4.12 The Network Extensions framework allows individuals, businesses or 
governments to pay the incremental cost of extension of the fibre or fixed 
wireless network to areas where it would not otherwise be built. Under 
the Network Extension Programme, premises outside the fibre footprint 
can apply to have NBN Co extend the fibre optic network (individual 
premises located in areas adjacent to the fibre footprint or large projects 
covering towns or groups of premises). Small towns with planned access 
to satellite services can apply to be connected to the fixed wireless 
network.11 
4.13 In regard to network extensions, NBN Co commented that while there had 
been considerable interest from the community and various levels of 
government in Network Extensions:12 
 
8  Change Agent nb Pty Ltd, Submission 2; Regional Development Australia, Far West NSW, 
Submission 3. 
9  Hon Wendy Duncan MLC, Submission 4. 
10  Australian Government, October 2012, Response to the Joint Committee on the National Broadband 
Network Third Report of 25 June 2012, p. 16. 
11  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012–2015, p. 32. 
12  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012–2015, p. 32. 
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  there had not to date been a large number of applications for network 
extensions, and  
 that network extensions require NBN infrastructure to be in place in 
adjacent areas from which the extension can then be made.13  
4.14 In November 2012, NBN Co advised that 68 applications to extend the 
footprint had been received since the launch of the Network Extension 
policy on 12 July 2012.14 
4.15 Of these applications: 
 One quote to extend the fibre footprint has been issued, with seven 
under development 
 Eleven are being assessed 
 Thirty are in future rollout areas, and therefore not requiring an 
extension 
 Eight were eligible for a fibre extension, but were outside of the 
programme’s timeframe policy 
 Nine were cases where extending to the applicant’s premises is not 
possible; and 
 Two were withdrawn by the applicants.15 
Fixed Wireless Network 
Background 
4.16 The Fixed Wireless network is designed to provide high capacity 
broadband services for premises beyond the fibre network. NBN Co has 
acquired licenses to operate in the 2.3 GHz and 3.4 GHz spectrum bands 
from AUSTAR, and acquired spectrum in Western Australia, the Northern 
Territory, South Australia, outback Queensland and far west New South 
Wales at an auction run by the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority (ACMA).  
4.17 On 1 June 2011, NBN Co signed a 10 year fixed wireless equipment supply 
and managed services contract with Ericsson. The first services over NBN 
Co’s Fixed Wireless network commenced in April 2012. As at 30 June 2012, 
 
13  Mr Quigley, NBN Co., Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 22. 
14  NBN Co, Submission 7.6, Answer to Question on Notice No. 45. 
15  NBN Co, Submission 7.9, Answer to question on notice No 46. 
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NBN Co had Construction Commenced or Completed in Wireless Serving 
Areas (WSAs) containing approximately 15 000 premises.16 
Rollout Progress 
4.18 The fixed wireless access service has begun to rollout. The Fixed Wireless 
rollout plan has been developed to take into account the availability of the 
Transit network, spectrum and likely community consultations for the 
building of new poles and towers for the Fixed Wireless network.17 
4.19 The service was launched in Armidale, New South Wales (NSW), 
providing a 12 Mbps downstream and 1 Mbps upstream service.18 The 
service was initially offered through five Retail Service Providers (RSPs). 
Since launching, another seven RSPs have become accredited for the fixed 
wireless product. The ‘Initial Release’ commenced on 2 April 2012, with 
the trial ending on 30 September 2012. The fixed wireless network has 
since expanded to the regions around Armidale, Toowoomba, Tamworth, 
Geraldton and Ballarat.19 Design and construction work has commenced at 
all five sites.20 Sixteen Access Seekers have signed the Fixed Wireless Trial 
Agreement.21 
4.20 The NBN Co has signed an interim agreement with Telstra for the First 
Release Sites towers. This provides access for three years. It also allows for 
a full agreement covering volume rollout to be negotiated. The agreement 
supplements the other framework agreements already in place for First 
Release Sites with Optus, Crown Castle, SPAusnet and Prime Media 
Group.22 
4.21 The NBN Co also reported that in the period 1 January 2012 to 30 June 
2012, ‘an important contract milestone was achieved confirming that the 
fixed wireless technology meets the technical and operational 
requirements of NBN Co’: 
This enabled the first fixed wireless sites to be brought into service 
in Armidale. Business Readiness Testing (BRT) commenced with 
the initial installation and activation of Fixed Wireless Services in 
Armidale with three Access Seekers—APN, iiNet and 
 
16  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012–15, p. 20. 
17  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012–2015, p. 39. 
18  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012–2015, p. 57. 
19  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 12. 
20  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012–2015, p. 39. 
21  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 11. 
22  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 7. 
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Skymesh…As at 30 June 2012, the activation of fixed wireless 
services was initially performed by five Access Seekers. During the 
period Ericsson and NBN Co have continued with planning and 
site acquisition activities for the volume rollout.23 
4.22 In July 2012, NBN Co announced that planning proposals would be 
lodged to deliver fixed wireless broadband in local government areas in 
the Central West and Mid-western regions of New South Wales and the 
Rockhampton, Townsville and Mackay regions of Queensland. The fixed 
wireless network will cover up to 54 500 premises across more than 
24 local councils, subject to final radio frequency planning and other 
approvals.24 
4.23 In September 2012, fixed wireless services became available in Geraldton, 
Western Australia. Two of six NBN fixed wireless sites are now online, 
providing 354 homes and businesses in Geraldton with broadband speeds 
of up to 12 Mbps. Ultimately, around 1300 premises will be covered in 
Geraldton.25 
Satellite Network 
Background 
4.24 The NBN satellite service is designed to provide a standard internet 
service (12 Mbps download and 1 Mbps upload) to the 3% of Australians 
living outside the FTTP and wireless footprints, at the same wholesale 
price as FTTP and wireless services. 
4.25 The Interim Satellite Service (ISS) is now in place and covers the entire 
country. Eleven Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) hubs operate from 
Kalgoorlie, Broken Hill and Belrose.26  
4.26 The ISS acts as a transition between the Australian Broadband Guarantee 
(ABG) Scheme (which expired on 1 July 2011) and NBN Co’s Long Term 
Satellite Service (LTSS) (scheduled for commercial service by mid-2015). 
Satellite capacity is provided by a contract between NBN Co and Optus 
(May 2011) to provide managed satellite services for an initial 5 year 
period. Another contract was signed with IPStar for additional satellite 
capacity.  
 
23  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 14. 
24  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, pp 27–28. 
25  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 29. 
26  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 14. 
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4.27 The ISS was launched on 1 July 2011 and, as at 30 June 2012, had 9578 
users.27 Twelve Access Seekers have signed the Interim Satellite Services 
Agreement.28 In regard to the progress of the interim satellite service and 
comparisons with the ABG, NBN Co responded that: 
As of just recently, we got close to 19 000 active customers on the 
satellite, so there are a hell of a lot of people who are ordering a 
service from us in terms of RSPs—satellite providers—who are 
obviously doing it because they think there is a profitable business 
there. Is it possible that they are not making as much money as 
they made on the ABG? That is possible. What I can tell you is the 
end user is getting a much better service for a competitive 
price…In moving from the ABG to the Interim Satellite Service it is 
a very good deal for the end user.29 
4.28 The NBN Co noted that the Wholesale Broadband Agreement for the 
interim satellite service provided that a service should be installed and 
activated in a customer premise 20 business days for Zone 1/2 
(urban/rural) and 25 business days for Zone 3 (remote) customers after 
the service has been ordered from an RSP.30 
Rollout Progress 
4.29 The Government’s Performance Report outlines the progress on the 
development of the Long Term Satellite Service (LTSS). The NBN Co 
stated that the $620m Spacecraft and Telemetry, Tracking and Control 
(TT&C) contract with Space Systems/Loral (SS/L) was executed on 
7 February 2012, with delivery of the spacecraft to NBN Co for launch 
scheduled for the first quarter of 2015. The Spacecraft and TT&C contract 
progressed well during the period, with the SS/L completing a number of 
milestones according to plan. 
4.30 Following the execution of the SS/L contract, ground system requirements 
were issued to short-listed ground segment suppliers in March for 
proposed pricing.31 
4.31 The securing of ground station locations for the LTSS was progressed. In 
July 2012, NBN Co selected Woolooma near Merimbula (New South 
Wales Far South Coast) as the site of its first satellite ground station. 
 
27  NBN Co, NBN Co Corporate Plan 2012–2015, pp 20–1. 
28  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 11. 
29  Mr Quigley, NBN Co., Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 19. 
30  NBN Co, Submission 7.5, Answer to Question on Notice No. 72. 
31  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 14. 
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Further locations, the first of 10 such facilities, were indentified at Bourke 
(NSW), Geeveston (Tasmania)32 and Ceduna (SA).33 In October 2012, 
NBN Co announced that Western Australia had been selected as the 
location for three new satellite ground stations, with facilities near 
Geraldton, Carnarvon and Kalgoorlie.34 Roma, Queensland35 and Broken 
Hill, NSW have also been selected as sites.36 
4.32 In July 2012, NBN Co announced that US company ViaSat had been 
selected to provide LTSS ground systems. ViaSat will also supply the 
equipment to be installed in end user premises. The initial contract is 
valued at approximately AU$280 million.37 
4.33 As at 30 June 2012 NBN Co had secured all the spectrum required for the 
LTSS.38 
4.34 The request for proposal for launch services was released with evaluation 
of responses expected in the September 2012 quarter. The planned launch 
date for the two satellites remains unchanged from previous forecasts, at 
FY2015.39  
4.35 Frequency coordination associated with the International 
Telecommunications Union orbital slot confirmation process also 
continued. NBN Co has continued active dialogue with the ACMA on the 
availability of further spectrum, and with owners of existing spectrum 
licences. As at 30 June 2012, there were 11 RSPs selling services over 
NBN Co’s interim satellite network.40 
4.36 The NBN Co confirmed that they are on track in terms of cost and service 
implementation: 
We have contracted for the spacecraft, the ground stations and 50 
per cent of the VSATs, and we will, before the end of the year, 
contract for the launch. So our long-term satellite is coming in 
right where we hoped it would by the corporate plan.41 
 
32  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, pp 14–15. 
33  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 28. 
34  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 29. 
35  NBN Co, Submission 7.9, Answer to question on notice 39. 
36  NBN Co, 2012, NBN Co Selects Broken Hill as Satellite Centre, media release, 15 November. 
37  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, p. 28. 
38  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012–2015, p. 33. 
39  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012–2015, p. 39. 
40  Shareholder Ministers, ‘Performance Report to 30 June 2012’, Submission 13, pp 14–15. 
41  Mr Quigley, NBN Co, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 18. 
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4.37 The NBN Co also indicated that the expected lifespan of equipment 
related to the satellite service would be about 15 years for the satellites, 
longer for the dishes, but that people might wish to upgrade modems 
sooner. The NBN Co stated it was anticipated that within the 30 year life 
span of the project new satellites might be needed.42 
4.38 With regard to the reliability of the LTSS, NBN Co stated that the new 
satellites will be ‘purpose-built to minimise the technology limitations 
associated with current satellite services’, and that this would ‘deliver a 
step-change in performance for satellite users in terms of speed and 
reliability’. The use of two satellites ensures that in the case of satellite 
failure, ‘service could be maintained through a single NBN Co satellite’. 
User links will also incorporate the ‘ability to dynamically vary their 
transmission attributes (uplink power level and waveform characteristics) 
in order to maximise availability during degraded weather conditions.’ 
The NBN Co added that: 
Other measures include a Disaster Recovery Gateway station 
which can assume full traffic loads from any of the nine primary 
Gateway stations, carrier class network architecture and 
infrastructure at the data processing and network management 
centres and Customer Premises Equipment that is designed to 
withstand the wide range of adverse conditions (temperature, dust 
vermin, corrosion, wind etc.).43 
Upgrades to Wireless and Satellite Technology 
4.39 The 2012–15 Corporate Plan has incorporated additional costs and 
revenues associated with anticipated technology upgrades for Fixed 
Wireless and LTSS.44 It is anticipated that both networks will continue to 
be upgraded to match the fibre speed tiers when the technology and costs 
make this possible.45  
4.40 In addition, NBN Co has indicated that it is working towards offering 
multicasting over its wireless and satellite services.46 
4.41 The NBN Co has also given consideration to develop mobile backhaul, 
although no decision has yet been made on the development of such 
service.47 In response to the committee, NBN Co noted that: 
 
42  Mr Quigley, NBN Co., Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 18. 
43  NBN Co, Submission 7.8, Answer to Question on Notice No. 41. 
44  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012–2015, p. 33. 
45  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012–2015, p. 38. 
46  NBN Co, Submission 7.5, Answer to Question on Notice No. 40. 
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The recent increases in mobile data usage driven by smart-phones, 
tablet devices and other forms of wireless internet usage have 
created network capacity challenges for mobile providers globally. 
NBN Co has received requests from existing mobile service 
providers who see the benefit of using the high-capacity NBN 
fibre network to also carry traffic from mobile base-stations. 
Mobile providers typically connect individual base-stations to 
their wider network using fibre technology, and providers have 
requested that NBN Co also connect to these base-stations as NBN 
Co are constructing the fibre network in relevant areas.48 
4.42 The NBN Co advised that mobile backhaul would not involve NBN Co in 
the construction of a mobile network, but rather that the ‘proposal would 
allow the utilisation of NBN Co’s fibre infrastructure for connectivity 
between mobile base stations and an operator’s core network’. The NBN 
Co is ‘considering these requests and evaluating whether to develop 
products suitable for use as mobile backhaul’.49 
Mobile Networks 
4.43 The NBN Co has repeatedly emphasised that it is not building a mobile 
telephone network and that the extension of such a service is not part of its 
remit.50 Nonetheless, NBN Co has undertaken to develop a Facilities 
Access Policy for towers, duct and depot space, which would allow access 
seekers to obtain terms, prices and ordering and provisioning processes 
for accessing NBN Co facilities. This would allow for the co-location of 
mobile network equipment on NBN wireless sites.51 The NBN Co has 
already reached reciprocal agreements with Telstra and Optus for access 
to each others’ facilities, including NBN Co built and owned wireless 
towers.52 
4.44 The costs facing mobile carriers for access to NBN Co facilities include 
application and project management fees, annual rental and the cost of 
any works required to make the facilities mobile ready. Pricing is based on 
market rates and reflects an annualised replacement cost.53 
                                                                                                                                                    
47  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012–2015, p. 68. 
48  NBN Co, Submission 7.6, Answer to Question on Notice No. 47. 
49  NBN Co, Submission 7.6, Answer to Question on Notice No. 48. 
50  Mr Quigley, NBN Co, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, pp 20 and 22. 
51  NBN Co, Submission 7.5, Answer to Question on Notice No. 67. 
52  NBN Co, Submission 7.5, Answer to Question on Notice No. 66. 
53  NBN Co, Submission 7.5, Answer to Question on Notice No. 68. 
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Concluding Comments 
Fibre Network 
4.45 The committee is pleased that the first stage of the large-scale fibre rollout 
has commenced and in the process given certainty to some regional 
communities as to when they will get access to the fibre network. On the 
other hand, many regional communities still await news as to when the 
fibre network will be available to them. For these communities, the cost of 
making themselves NBN ready is compounded by the uncertainty of the 
timing of the rollout. The committee believes that an indicative schedule 
for completion of the network, with estimates of when the network would 
reach any given community, should be made publicly available to assist 
communities in their preparations for the NBN. 
Network Extensions 
4.46 The committee is also pleased to see that a framework for network 
extensions is now in place. The committee looks forward to future 
discussions with NBN Co regarding the operation, costs and achievements 
of this framework, especially for communities in regional and remote 
Australia. 
Fixed Wireless Network 
4.47 The committee notes the commencement of the rollout of the fixed 
wireless network. The committee looks forward to receiving information 
on the progress of the rollout, particularly with regard to network access 
and coverage by access seekers and RSPs.  
Satellite Network 
4.48 The committee has expressed concern in the past about the risks 
associated with satellite deployment, particularly in obtaining orbital slots. 
The committee will seek future evidence upon the progress of the LTSS, 
risk management surrounding launch and progress in obtaining orbital 
slots for the LTSS satellites. 
Upgrades 
4.49 The committee is interested in the potential for upgrades to wireless and 
satellite technology to improve the broadband service for regional and 
remote Australia. The committee looks forward to obtaining more detail 
from NBN Co about the potential of technology upgrades to improve the 
speed and capacity of access for wireless and satellite service users. The 
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committee is also interested in the future development of mobile backhaul, 
with its potential to create a higher level of integration of Australia’s 
telecommunications systems. 
Mobile Networks 
4.50 The committee acknowledges early efforts to facilitate expansion and 
improvement to mobile telephony in regional and remote Australia 
through the co-location of mobile facilities with NBN Co infrastructure. 
The synergies are obvious and their promotion a step forward. The 
committee is of the view, however, that the opportunity to facilitate the 
expansion of mobile telephony, particularly in regional and remote areas, 
needs to continue to be explored to further capitalise on progress already 
made in this area. 
4.51 In this vein, the committee has recommended that the Australian 
Government expand the scope of NBN Co responsibilities to continue to 
explore the synergies between fixed and mobile telecommunications 
networks with a view to using the NBN to improve mobile 
telecommunications as well as providing broadband services. Allowing 
private providers to ‘piggyback’ off of NBN Co infrastructure to provide 
mobile telephone services would be a timely and efficient use of 
telecommunications resources in regional and remote Australia. 
 
Recommendation 4 
4.52 The committee recommends that the Government support the NBN Co 
to continue to: 
 explore the synergies between fixed and mobile 
telecommunications networks with a view to using the 
National Broadband Network to improve mobile 
telecommunications; and   
 facilitate private providers use of NBN Co infrastructure to 
provide and improve mobile telephone services and coverage 
across Australia, particularly in regional and remote areas. 
 
 5 
Additional Issues 
Medical Alarms 
Background 
5.1 The Personal Emergency Response Services Association (PERSA) and 
Tunstall Healthcare raised a series of issues concerning the operation of 
medical alarms for aged and at-risk persons under the NBN rollout—in 
particular: 
 support for medical alarms by NBN retail service providers (RSPs) 
through the User Network Interface Voice (UNI-V) port service1 
 battery back-up for NBN customer equipment in terms of medical 
alarm functionality2 
5.2 By way of background, there are ‘approximately 250,000 existing medical 
alarms protecting aged and at-risk persons’ in Australia, in both private 
homes and residential aged-care facilities.3 Tunstall Healthcare has some 
72,000 monitored clients in Australia, and its Brisbane emergency 
response centre takes over 2,000 emergency calls per day, with an average 
of 500 to 600 of those calls per week requiring emergency assistance.4 
Tunstall Healthcare noted that it currently had 136 clients living in the 
 
1  Personal Emergency Response Services Association (PERSA), Submission 10, p. 1, and Tunstall 
Healthcare, Submission 8, p. 2. 
2  PERSA, Submission 10, p. 3, and Tunstall Healthcare, Submission 8, p. 2. 
3  PERSA, Submission 10, p. 1. 
4  Mr Gary Morgan, Health Services Director, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, 
Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 1. 
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NBN footprint, and by June next year it estimated that 2,000 of its clients 
would be on the NBN.5 
Retail Service Providers and Uni-V Port Service 
5.3 Analogue medical alarms will be supported on the NBN via NBN Co’s 
User Network Interface Voice (UNI-V) port, which is supported by the 
backup battery. Internet Protocol (IP) based medical alarms will be 
supported by the NBN over the User Network Interface Data (UNI-D) 
product. NBN Co is currently developing battery backup functionality for 
the UNI-D and, once this is implemented, IP-based medical alarms will 
also be fully supported on the NBN.6 
5.4 Connectivity over the UNI-V port requires a client’s RSP to support the 
UNI-V port service and, as PERSA noted, ‘not all RSPs [are to]... support 
the analogue (UNI-V) port service’.7 Further clarifying this point, Tunstall 
Healthcare identified that ‘less than a third’ of the ‘approximately 35 
RSPs... who have been accepted and endorsed for the NBN’ have the 
ability to facilitate voice calls over the UNI-V ports on the NTD.8 
5.5 As not all RSPs will be supporting medical alarms through the UNI-V port 
service, consumers will therefore need to select an RSP providing this 
service. This raised concerns for PERSA and Tunstall Healthcare about 
how people would know which RSP to select to ensure their medical 
alarm continued to work under the NBN rollout.  
5.6 For example, PERSA noted that ‘typical users of medical alarms are not 
aware of the technical requirements of their equipment’ and therefore may 
‘run the risk of being locked-in to a long term telecommunications contract 
with an RSP which, for them, is unsuitable’.9 Similarly, Tunstall 
Healthcare stated its concern that some clients ‘unknowingly or 
unwittingly may sign up to an RSP who cannot support their medical 
alarm or deliver the service they require’.10 
5.7 PERSA proposed a range of initiatives to address these issues: 
 
5  Mr Morgan, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 1. 
6  NBN Co, Submission 7.6, Answer to Question on Notice Nos 26, 27, p. 2. 
7  PERSA, Submission 10, p. 2. 
8  Tunstall Healthcare, Submission 8, p. 2. 
9  PERSA, Submission 10, p. 2. 
10  Mr Geoff Feakes, Chief Information Officer, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, 
Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 2. 
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 ...Require RSPs to properly inform potential client’s about the 
compatibility of their service offering with [medical alarm] 
equipment... 
 Require RSPs to include information about service 
compatibility with medical alarms and other 
telecommunications equipment in their product sales 
information. 
 Place a list of RSP’s who can support existing medical alarms 
through the UNI-V port in a prominent position on the NBN Co 
Limited (NBN Co) website. 
 In order to ensure preservation of the correct Mode-3 wiring 
format for medical alarms, require all RSPs that remove the 
copper service to only connect the analogue (UNI-V) port to the 
clients incoming copper exchange line. 
 In order to ensure the continuing operation of any medical 
alarm equipment, require all RSPs to perform a medical alarm 
test-call through to the emergency monitoring centre 
immediately after service change-over. If the medical alarm 
fails the test the RSP should immediately reconnect the copper 
service to the medical alarm in the original configuration. 
 Lengthen the telecommunications service contract cooling-off 
period from 10 days to 30 days, to allow for further 
identification of any non-compatible equipment. 
 NBN Co. to educate consumers and RSP’s about the 
requirements of medical alarms. 
 Ensure the copper service to a client is not disconnected or 
decommissioned before all medical alarm connectivity issues 
are fully resolved.11 
5.8 Like PERSA, Tunstall Healthcare also proposed a range of initiatives to 
address these broader issues,12 including: 
 The provision of a Free Call consumer hotline made available to 
assist with information and guidance for consumers with 
medical alarms. 
 NBN Co to provide and maintain a publically available up to 
date list of Retail Service Providers who offer UNI-V (Voice) 
port services (i.e. landline telephones over NBN) so consumers 
can make an informed choice about which NBN RSP can meet 
their needs. 
 
11  PERSA, Submission 10, p. 2. 
12  Tunstall Healthcare also supported PERSA’s proposal to lengthen the telecommunications 
service contract cooling-off period—Mr Feakes, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, 
Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 2. 
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 As part of the standards—copper wires and POTS services are 
not decommissioned for consumers who have a medical alarm 
unless their RSP provides for Voice ports (UNI-V).13 
5.9 On the proposal for the establishment of a free-call number, Tunstall 
Healthcare further explained: 
...we believe it is important that every medical alarm patient, 
client, and resident of Australia have an advocacy service in 
regard to the benefits and what NBN is actually deploying, as 
opposed to being an industry representation or an RSP provision 
service. That way, a client can actually get true information in 
regard to what NBN is about, what the benefits to them are, and 
what their requirements are.14 
5.10 In particular, Tunstall Healthcare emphasised the need for the 
establishment of a code of conduct for RSPs: 
We would like to see some safeguards in place to protect the 
vulnerable customer and to ensure that the RSPs adhere to a duty 
of care for the service they provide. We would also suggest that it 
be mandatory that the RSP investigate the client’s requirements 
before signing them up to a contract. Further to this, we would 
suggest that the code of conduct set some response of the RSP in 
relation to the installation of the medical alarm.15 
Battery Back-up 
5.11 PERSA and Tunstall Healthcare also raised a number of issues concerning 
battery back-up for NBN customer equipment in terms of medical alarm 
functionality—in particular, the short run-time of battery back-up during 
a mains power failure in contrast to the requirements of Australian 
Standard AS4607 for the provision of personal emergency alarm services. 
5.12 By way of background, Tunstall Healthcare explained that the current unit 
NBN Co are supplying ‘supports six to eight hours of battery supply to 
the NTD during a mains fail’.16 However, as PERSA pointed out, while it 
is proposed to provide ‘the standard 6-hour battery backed-up power 
supply at no cost to the consumer at the time of NBN service installation 
(optional by informed consent)’, this proposed battery run-time for the 
 
13  Tunstall Healthcare, Submission 8, p. 3. 
14  Mr Feakes, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 2. 
15  Mr Feakes, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 2. 
16  Mr Feakes, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 3. 
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NBN customer equipment ‘falls significantly short of the 36 hours 
required for medical alarms under Australian Standard AS4607’.17  
5.13 Tunstall Healthcare similarly noted that many of their customers and 
corporate client groups ‘expect that their alarm equipment will have a 
minimum of 36-40 hours back up support in line with the requirements of 
the AS4607 standards for the provision of Personal Emergency Alarm 
Services’.18 
5.14 As Tunstall Healthcare further clarified: 
The current AS4607 provides a requirement for 40 hours of battery 
capacity or battery back-up to be provided to the medical alarm 
during a mains failure or power failure. The standard at this stage 
highlights the requirement for 40 hours and that is what the 
medical alarm actually delivers to every medical alarm user in the 
country. It is our understanding that the existing NBN NTD, or 
power supply unit, will supply approximately six to eight hours of 
battery back-up in the event of a mains failure. That is significantly 
less than the 40 hours that is currently provisioned. Obviously that 
is a significant difference in regard to what can be provided to a 
client during a power failure or an outage of power in Australia... 
At the moment, under AS4607, our batteries inside our alarms last 
for 40 hours. On the existing infrastructure in place now, prior to 
NBN, during a mains fail we will get their alarm calls through for 
more than 40 hours—40 hours is our minimum. With the 
introduction of NBN, as soon as the power supply unit—the 
NTD—loses power there will be no telephony in or out of that 
device.19 
5.15 Tunstall Healthcare outlined the potential impact on their clients of this 
shorter battery back-up time: 
The problem is that if they lose power during the night, for 
example, with a 40-hour battery we would get notified that they 
had lost power but we would know that they would have power 
in the morning. We did not wake them up to say, ‘Margaret, 
 
17  PERSA, Submission 10, p. 3. In terms of the battery supply, NBN Co explained that this is 
provided ‘at no cost to the end-user as part of a standard installation. If a customer requests a 
battery backup unit to be installed to support an existing NBN connection it is also proposed 
that this would be provided at no cost to the end user’, Submission 7.4, Answer to Question on 
Notice No. 33, p. 4. 
18  Tunstall Healthcare, Submission 8, p. 2. 
19  Mr Feakes, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 2, p. 3. 
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you’ve lost power’ at this stage. When they are longer than the six 
hours, we can get through the night and work with the client and 
we can work with family the next day to address those issues. The 
problem with having a smaller window is that if a power failure 
happens at say eight o’clock at night, potentially there is no power 
for the client to press the medical alarm button at four o’clock in 
the morning with no notification.20 
5.16 Mr Geoff Feakes, Chief Information Officer from Tunstall Healthcare, 
usefully summarised the issue, as follows: 
As an industry we adhere to AS4607 as a standard. With the 
provision of the battery backup inside the NTD or for NBN the 
battery life standard has been reduced and our industry is 
concerned about that... 
Australian standard AS4607 is in place to provision a service for 
the medical alarm client and patient. What we are looking for is 
extending the battery backup as currently provisioned by NBN to 
come back as close as we can to AS4607, that way providing the 
best outcome for the patient and the client so that we can get 
through a night or a period of time in the event of a mains fail.21 
5.17 Given this reduced battery back-up time during a mains power failure, 
there was interest in establishing the number of power outages generally 
experienced each year in the community. Tunstall Healthcare responded 
that, ‘with our 72,000 clients and patients around the country in the last 12 
months we had some 22,000 power outages notified to our emergency 
response centre. If you do the mathematics you would see that we had 
some 60 patients and clients who were impacted by power outages every 
day in Australia’.22 
5.18 Further, given the reduction in battery back-up time from 40 hours to six 
to eight hours, the committee was interested in the average length of these 
power outages—specifically, in terms of how often power was lost for six 
or eight hours. In response, Tunstall Healthcare analysed their national 
database for the months of January 2012, May 2012 and August 2012 and 
 
20  Ms Lisa Capamagian, Marketing and Strategy Implementation Manager, Tunstall Healthcare, 
Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 4. 
21  Mr Feakes, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 4, p. 5. 
22  Mr Morgan, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 4. 
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provided the following information about ‘mains failure notifications’23 
relating to their monitored clients: 
 January 2012 = 5229 total mains failure notifications 
 Of which 1023 were greater than 8 hours within any 24 hour 
period. 
 May 2012 = 5162 total mains failure notifications 
 Of which 1150 were greater than 8 hours within any 24 hour 
period. 
 August 2012 = 4914 total mains failure notifications 
 Of which 1118 were greater than 8 hours within any 24 hour 
period.24 
5.19 On the basis of these figures, Tunstall Healthcare concluded that a 
‘monthly average of 1097 equates to approximately 13,164 instances per 
year of mains failures greater than 8 hours’.25 
5.20 Options supported by PERSA to address these broader issues included 
that: 
 NBN Co supply longer run-time battery back-up options 
 NBN Co allow after-market suppliers to connect their own, 
longer run-time, battery backup units.26 
5.21 Similarly, Tunstall Healthcare made the following proposals to assist in 
addressing these issues: 
 Standards for installations be established and published to 
protect consumers who need and have medical alarms in their 
homes or places of residence. 
 The existing AS4607 standards are taken into account in the 
development of NBN installation standards for the protection 
of consumers with medical alarms... 
 As part of the standards—the installation of a power pack and 
back-up battery to the UNI-V (Voice) ports are mandatory for 
all consumers identified as having a medical alarm.27 
5.22 It is important to highlight here that, at the time of the committee’s 
inquiry, NBN Co had recently announced some changes to its process 
concerning batteries. For example, Tunstall Healthcare pointed to ‘the 
 
23  The term ‘mains failure notification’ was used by Tunstall Healthcare to classify a signal 
received by the Tunstall monitoring centre due to a power outage—Tunstall Healthcare, 
Submission 8.1, p. 1. 
24  Tunstall Healthcare, Submission 8.1, pp 1-2.  
25  Tunstall Healthcare, Submission 8.1, p. 2.  
26  PERSA, Submission 10, p. 3. 
27  Tunstall Healthcare, Submission 8, p. 3. 
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recent decision to power the data points of the network termination unit 
during a mains failure, which we see as a positive, and also a modification 
for the auto-shutdown functionality from 30 per cent to 50 per cent of 
remaining battery life during a main failure’.28 
5.23 A further change involved ‘informed consent of the battery backup. It is 
not an opt-in or an opt-out anymore; it is predominantly an informed 
consent’.29 By way of background on this point, NBN Co explained that: 
The Government consulted widely with key stakeholder groups 
(including emergency service organisations, consumer groups and 
the medical and security alarm industry) on the extent to which 
NBN Co should provide Battery Backup to different types of end-
users (e.g. phone only end-users and Priority Assist end-users). 
The 2012-15 Corporate Plan incorporates the Government’s policy 
approach that end-users will be able to nominate whether or not 
they want NBN Co to provide Battery Backup. This is known as a 
‘must-opt’ approach. At the time of ordering a service from an 
RSP, an end-user will make an active decision as to whether to 
take the battery back-up unit, or to not take the unit. Priority 
Assistance households will be provided with a Battery Backup 
Unit.30 
5.24 Under the ‘Must Opt’ regime for battery back-up units, end users can 
therefore ‘nominate whether or not they want NBN Co to provide Battery 
Backup’, noting that ‘Priority Assistance households will be provided with 
a Battery Backup’.31 Under this regime, it is assumed that ‘50% of Fibre 
End-Users will elect not to have Battery Backup’.32 
5.25 A key issue under the ‘must opt’ regime, as highlighted by PERSA, is 
therefore not only that consumers are aware that battery back-up is 
optional at the time of NBN service installation but that sufficient and 
clear information is provided for consumers to make an informed choice 
on this matter—reinforcing the importance of this being ‘optional by 
informed consent’.33 
 
28  Mr Feakes, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 1. 
29  Mr Feakes, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 1. 
30  NBN Co, Submission 7.5, Answer to Question on Notice No. 34, p. 3. 
31  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-15, p. 32. 
32  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-15, p. 32. 
33  PERSA, Submission 10, p. 3. 
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Connecting Multi-Dwelling Units 
5.26 The NBN Co updated the committee on how it is progressing on 
connecting multi-dwelling units (MDUs) or apartment blocks to the 
NBN’s fibre network. 
5.27 The NBN Co confirmed that ‘the installation process in apartment blocks 
...take[s] longer than in a single dwelling unit (SDU) because multi-
dwelling units (MDUs) require multiple connections to multiple’ Premise 
Connection Devices ‘(PCDs).’34 
5.28 The NBN Co, however, added that while MDUs are being connected to 
the NBN, this process will evolve and become more efficient as the NBN 
rollout progresses. The NBN Co stated: 
We are working on this. There is no right answer to this. Every 
MDU looks different. There is not one method of connecting 
MDUs, and installation methodologies do evolve rapidly. 
Therefore, what we do today will also change over time because 
there will be more efficient ways of doing this. But we are 
connecting MDUs today.35 
5.29 The NBN Co commented that each MDU has differing numbers of units 
ranging from the average of nine to 50, 100 or more, all with differing 
designs, which determines connection methodology. The NBN Co 
explained: 
We are using figures which we have experienced to date. There 
will obviously be opportunities further in the future. But you also 
need to bear in mind that the average number of premises per 
MDU in Australia is nine. For instance, a block of town houses is 
often considered an MDU. If you have 10 town houses, these are 
basically 10 individual Single Dwelling Units (SDUs) but are 
labelled an MDU, potentially. In small apartment blocks, where 
you have four, five or six units in a block, it is labelled an MDU, 
but the installation methodology would be very, very similar, if 
not the same, as for an SDU. And then, obviously, you have the 
very big blocks, where you have 50, 100 or more units in it. Every 
MDU is an individual design, because every premises will look 
different.36 
 
34  NBN Co, Submission 7.4, Answer to question on notice No. 8. 
35  Mr Ralph Steffens, Chief Operating Officer, NBN Co, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 
30 October 2012, p. 8. 
36  Mr Steffens, NBN Co, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 8. 
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5.30 The NBN Co further stated that it: 
...will need to have a higher degree of engagement with body 
corporate entities and undertake site surveys ahead of time, 
incurring detailed design and installation costs for the internal 
cabling of MDUs.37 
5.31 The NBN Co 2012-2015 Corporate Plan states the NBN Co is using a ‘build 
drop’ method to connect MDUs. The ‘build drop’ method replaces the 
‘demand drop’ approach taken previously. The NBN Co explained the 
difference between the two build methods and stated: 
With a ‘Build Drop’ the connection from the street to the premises 
is carried out when the distribution and local segments of the fibre 
network are being built. ‘Demand Drop’ is when the connection 
from the street to the premises is installed when an order for a 
service is received from a retail service provider.38 
5.32 The NBN Co further stated that the ‘Build Drop’ approach will be more 
cost effective than the previous ‘demand drop approach’ in the long run. 
The NBN Co explained: 
The ‘Build Drop’ strategy is expected to be more cost effective in 
the long run than performing ‘Demand Drops’, particularly in the 
context of the agreement with Telstra to disconnect its copper 
network. ‘Build Drops’ from the street to the premises for single 
dwelling units and multi-dwelling units arc the most effective way 
to minimise mobilisation/dc-mobilisation costs and to realise 
productivity improvements. It is more efficient to provide the 
drop that connects each premises from the street to the Premises 
Connection Device...on the outside of the premises, while the 
construction crews are in the area.39 
5.33 In regard to consultation on connection of the NBN to MDUs, the NBN Co 
2012-2015 Corporate Plan states: 
NBN Co will need to have a higher degree of engagement with 
body corporate entities and undertake site surveys ahead of time, 
incurring detailed design and installation costs for the internal 
cabling of MDUs.40 
 
 
37  Mr Steffens, NBN Co, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra,  30 October 2012, p. 8. 
38  NBN Co, Submission 7.6, Answer to question on notice No. 20. 
39  NBN Co, Submission 7.6, Answer to question on notice No. 20. 
40  NBN Co, Submission 7.4, Answer to question on notice No. 8. 
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Concluding Comments 
Medical Alarms 
5.34 The committee appreciates the concerns raised by PERSA and Tunstall 
Healthcare about the operation of medical alarms for aged and at-risk 
persons under the NBN rollout.  
5.35 The committee was therefore pleased to note that the DBCDE and 
NBN Co had held discussions with PERSA and Tunstall Healthcare on 
these issues—particularly in light of PERSA’s statement that they were 
‘extremely concerned about a potential life threatening situation resulting 
from the rollout of the... NBN in Australia’ in terms of the operation of 
medical alarms for aged and at-risk persons.41 Further, regarding this 
statement, the committee acknowledges significant relevant matters raised 
by the DBCDE and NBN Co, as discussed below—in particular, 
paragraphs 5.36-5.43 refer to medical alarm functionality and the copper 
network; initiatives undertaken by the DBCDE and NBN Co; and a key 
point emphasised by NBN Co that, in the effective operation of medical 
alarms over the existing copper network and the NBN, ‘[a]ll participants 
have a role to play to ensure that end users are given access to the services 
they need’.42 
5.36 In this regard, the committee also notes Tunstall Healthcare’s statement 
that: ‘we have put procedures in place to support clients that have shorter 
backup battery time, so that we can manage risks on their behalf... if they 
were our client we would have an understanding of their situation and we 
would manage that accordingly’.43 Tunstall Healthcare emphasised that 
they had been ‘working closely with NBN Co’ to ‘ensure that the safety of 
[their] clients is not compromised during the transition across to the 
National Broadband Network’.44 
5.37 Accordingly, the committee is aware that the DBCDE and NBN Co have 
discussed a range of initiatives with stakeholders to address these issues.  
5.38 Tunstall Healthcare highlighted to the committee that it understood 
NBN Co was seeking possible ‘legislative amendments’ to address some 
of these issues: 
 
41  PERSA, Submission 10, p. 1. 
42 NBN Co, Submission 7.6, Answer to Question on Notice Nos 26, 27, p. 2. 
43  Ms Capamagian, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 5. 
44  Mr Morgan, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 1. 
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We have been working very closely with NBN, and NBN have 
attended our industry representation meetings and are fully aware 
of our concerns. I believe they are addressing those and seeking 
legislation to address those concerns moving forward.45 
5.39 Tunstall Healthcare explained that these possible legislative amendments 
included looking at ‘extending of the battery run time to be approximately 
30 hours or greater’46, considering ‘other power sources’ in terms of the 
batteries47 and seeking ‘alternate ways... [to] power the NTD’,48 including 
considering ‘some requirement for modification to the power supply unit 
that connects to the NTD itself to have a more generic plug so that 
alternative power supplies can also be sorted’.49 Tunstall Healthcare 
further noted that ‘[c]urrently the battery is only provisioned on the UNI-
V port not the UNI-D port. That is one of the issues they are addressing, 
being able to provide the battery backup to the UNI-D port as well’.50 
5.40 In response to this information, NBN Co clarified to the committee that 
‘NBN Co is implementing a battery backup model in line with 
Government policy’ and that a ‘legislative amendment is not required to 
make changes to the implementation of the battery backup deployment’.51 
NBN Co also explained in further detail the outcome of its discussions 
with PERSA and Tunstall Healthcare: 
During 2011 NBN Co held complex services workshops with 
relevant industry stakeholders, including PERSA and Tunstall 
Healthcare, to assist in the design and development of the User 
Network Interface Voice (UNI-V) product so that it is fit for 
purpose to support a range of legacy services, including medical 
alarms. 
More recently, NBN Co met with PERSA in September 2012 to 
discuss how medical alarms will be supported over the NBN. 
Analogue medical alarms will be fully supported on the NBN via 
NBN Co’s UNI-V port, which is supported by the backup battery. 
 
45  Mr Feakes, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 3. 
46  Mr Feakes, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 2. 
47  Mr Feakes, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 3. 
48  Mr Feakes, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 3. 
49  Mr Feakes, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 2. 
50  Ms Capamagian, Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 5. 
Tunstall Healthcare also commented that they understood NBN Co were ‘working with the 
RSPs on who is responsible for the battery management, whether or not the end user or the 
RSPs, as in the Telstras, Optuses and SkyMeshes will have some role in that’— Mr Feakes, 
Tunstall Healthcare, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 9 October 2012, p. 2. 
51  NBN Co, Submission 7.6, Answer to Question on Notice No. 32, p. 6. 
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Internet Protocol (IP) based medical alarms will also be supported 
by the NBN over the User Network Interface Data (UNI-D) 
product. NBN Co is currently developing battery backup 
functionality for the UNI-D. Once this is implemented, IP-based 
medical alarms will also be fully supported on the NBN. 
NBN Co is also working to extend the run time of the battery for 
both the UNI-V and the UNI-D ports. Both the UNI-V and UNI-D 
ports have Traffic Class 1 functionality, meaning that the highest 
traffic priority over the network is available for medical alarms.52 
5.41 NBN Co also highlighted that, outside of its activities, the 
Communications Alliance is ‘developing a set of recommendations for 
how RSPs inform end-users of their legacy service support at the time of 
sign up’, in terms of what legacy service they ‘do and do not support’.53 In 
addition, the recent Communications Alliance Telecommunications 
Consumer Protection Code C628:2012 (TCP Code) has ‘increased 
protections for consumers who have identified a particular need to their 
RSP’.54 Further: 
The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) 
has the power to issue a specific direction requiring an RSP to 
comply with the TCP code. If an RSP has been directed to comply 
with the TCP code and does not, the ACMA has powers to issue a 
formal warning, or commence proceedings in the Federal Court to 
issue an injunction or seek recovery of a pecuniary penalty from 
the RSP of up to $250,000 for each contravention of the TCP code.55 
5.42 NBN Co noted that it was convening an industry workshop with RSPs 
and PERSA members in November 2012 to ‘discuss medical alarm support 
and help RSPs prepare’, and that it was also ‘keeping PERSA briefed on 
the implementation of the “must opt” battery backup policy’.56 
5.43 The committee welcomes these initiatives. However, at the time of 
finalising this report, the committee had not been made aware of any 
specific new announcements in this area. Accordingly, the committee 
supports further consideration of a number of the initiatives proposed by 
PERSA and Tunstall Healthcare to address these concerns57 and suggests 
 
52  NBN Co, Submission 7.6, Answer to Question on Notice Nos 26-27, p. 2. 
53  NBN Co, Submission 7.8, Answer to Question on Notice No. 28, p. 6. 
54  NBN Co, Submission 7.6, Answer to Question on Notice Nos 26-27, p. 3. 
55  NBN Co, Submission 7.6, Answer to Question on Notice Nos 26-27, p. 3. 
56  NBN Co, Submission 7.6, Answer to Question on Notice Nos 26-27, p. 3. 
57  PERSA, Submission 10, pp 2-3, and Tunstall Healthcare, Submission 8, p. 3. 
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this be progressed as a matter of priority. In doing so, the committee 
acknowledges a key point emphasised by NBN Co—that is: 
It is important to note that the effective operation of medical 
alarms—over the existing copper network and the NBN—requires 
more than technical functionality. All participants have a role to 
play to ensure that end users are given access to the services they 
need. Customers need to advise their... RSP of what services they 
require with their telecommunications service. Equally, RSPs need 
to give customers clear and consistent information about which 
services are supported so that end-users can choose the right 
service to meet their needs... 
In addition to the RSPs providing clear information about what 
legacy services they do and do not support, there is also a role for 
the alarm industry to educate and inform their end-users about the 
requirements of their alarms so that their end-users are better able 
to choose the telecommunications service to best meet their 
needs.58 
Connecting Multi-Dwelling Units 
5.44 The committee notes the NBN Co’s comments regarding the complexities 
involved in connecting MDUs and the implementation of the ‘build drop’ 
approach which will provide cost efficiencies in the longer term. 
5.45 The committee also notes the information regarding MDUs in the NBN Co 
2012-2015 Corporate Plan, in particular the need for it to ‘have a higher 
degree of engagement with body corporate entities and undertake site 
surveys ahead of time.’ 
5.46 The committee believes that a higher degree of engagement with body 
corporate entities is essential for the NBN rollout to be carried out to 
ensure minimal disruption to households and their surrounding premises, 
especially in consideration of smaller MDUs such as townhouse estates. 
 
 
 
 
 
58  NBN Co, Submission 7.6, Answer to Question on Notice Nos 26-27, p. 2; and Submission 7.8, 
Answer to Question on Notice No. 28, p. 6. 
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Recommendation 5 
5.47 The committee recommends that the Department of Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE) and NBN Co 
continue to work with the Personal Emergency Response Services 
Association, the Communications Alliance and retail service providers 
to implement a range of initiatives to address concerns with the 
operation of medical alarms for aged and at-risk persons under the 
National Broadband Network rollout. This process should be in 
consultation with the Australian Communications and Media Authority, 
with the DBCDE to report back to the committee on specific progress in 
this area. 
 
 6 
Private Equity Engagement and Workforce 
Issues 
Introduction 
6.1 The committee has agreed to focus on several topical issues under its 
broad terms of reference, including: 
 the potential of private equity to fund the National Broadband Network 
(NBN) 
 workforce issues in the context of the rollout of the NBN 
6.2 These issues were identified for future inquiry in the committee’s First 
Report and reported on in its Second Report and Third Report. 
Private Equity Engagement 
Background 
6.3 The committee continues to be interested in when and how private equity 
might be engaged in funding the NBN wholesale platform, and at what 
financial return to the Government and, ultimately, taxpayers. This section of 
the report therefore considers: 
 timeframes for private equity engagement in funding the NBN 
 NBN Co’s debt financing arrangements 
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6.4 Government funding of the NBN over the rollout period, under the equity 
agreement between the Government and NBN Co, is discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
Private Equity Engagement Timeframe 
6.5 As in previous committee reports, there was continued interest over the 
Fourth Review period in whether a timeframe for private equity 
engagement in funding the NBN might be brought forward during the 
construction phase, thereby enabling an earlier return to taxpayers. In 
particular, there was interest in clarifying to what extent a timeframe for 
private equity engagement in funding the NBN was influenced by: 
 risk—required rates of return to government on its investment; or  
 government policy objectives and legislation, and learning and 
adapting processes on the part of government and NBN Co at this stage 
of the project. 
6.6 In terms of where the balance might be in this equation, the Department of 
Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE) 
commented that: 
In the adapting and learning category... the government clearly 
has a policy objective in mind with the NBN. It has a detailed set 
of instructions that accompany the statement of expectations and a 
series of policy decisions and the parliament has a set of 
instructions for the company, with legislation. If a private investor 
convinced itself that it was prepared to take the risk and accept 
what is impliedly a low rate of return for long-term strategic gain 
purposes and did want to make an investment then the company, 
first, and then the government as 100 per cent owner, second, 
would both need to satisfy themselves that this owner would not 
get in the way of, if you like, the statement of expectations and 
parliament’s own intentions as expressed in legislation.1 
6.7 This matter was further queried on the basis that, if a private entity were 
willing to take on the risk of the NBN project at a potentially earlier stage 
than had previously been assumed, whether there would still be a level of 
caution, given this ‘adapting and learning’ process. The department 
responded that, ‘[b]efore you get to the adaptation and learning... the 
government would want to be satisfied that it was not risking any basic 
 
1  Mr Peter Harris, Secretary, Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital 
Economy (DBCDE), Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 26 June 2012, p. 10. 
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policy compromise through this relationship, such as uniform pricing and 
rollout priorities and so on. There are a whole lot of quite fundamental 
points you would want to be reassured of before you got to that point’.2 
6.8 The department further clarified that the level of control required by a 
private equity investor was also an issue: 
Historically, being a minority investor is not a comfortable place 
for private equity in these sorts of firms, because effectively they 
are passively stumping up capital and taking the risks but are not 
able to influence at all the direction of strategic change, so private 
equity tends not to be terribly comfortable taking those sorts of 
positions. That is why we think that it is pretty unlikely in the 
circumstances that anyone would take the risk and that, even if 
they did, they would then have to satisfy themselves that they 
would be prepared to follow the directions of the government of 
the day.3 
6.9 It was then queried whether this matter may have been ruled out before it 
had been tested—whether in fact a private equity investor might be 
willing to take on this risk in terms of the level of business control. 
Mr Peter Harris, Secretary of the DBCDE, responded: 
I would go on the record as saying that would be my advice to 
government. My advice would be: be very wary of this. Even if 
they have convinced themselves that the risk is sufficient for them 
to take it up, you then have to satisfy yourself. I would say that the 
risk to the project would be significant in those circumstances—
you would end up with an uncomfortable partner, and that is not 
a great outcome for any party to set up... I doubt, because of the 
practical circumstances I have described, that we would like to see 
much private equity interest in the NBN Co. as a business through the 
bulk of the rollout period, simply because of that risk.4 
6.10 There was further interest in the scenario where, if a private equity 
investor proposed investing in the NBN, whether there would still be an 
impediment to private equity engagement at an earlier timeframe for 
reasons other than rate of return. Mr Harris responded, ‘[t]hat is right... 
When I used the term ‘risk’ a little earlier I was not referring to people’s 
views about the efficacy or otherwise of the business plan... When I say 
 
2  Mr Daryl Quinlivan, Deputy Secretary, DBCDE, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 
26 June 2012, p. 11. 
3  Mr Harris, DBCDE, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 26 June 2012, p. 10. 
4  Mr Harris, DBCDE, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 26 June 2012, pp 10 and 11. 
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risk, it is what I call partnership risk. You would have to convince yourself 
as an investor that you are prepared to go along with the senior partner’s 
decisions, continuously. That is a hard thing to do’.5 
6.11 This led to some discussion on private-public partnerships (PPPs), and the 
example of whether private equity investors who were willing to take on 
that particular risk in terms of level of control over a project reflected the 
nature of many existing PPPs. On the topic of PPPs and the NBN project, 
Mr Harris commented that: 
It is more a question of both parties being confident they are 
prepared to hold hands, as it were, through a period of multiple 
years of—I guess I have to use the term—risk taking together. That 
is quite difficult to crystallise. As you know, the engagement rule 
was switched very quickly from being conceptual to legal. Then 
you start to draw up the obligations that each party has, and 
because the NBN Co. is structured under legislation it will have 
very little room to move. In practice, the ownership structures for 
NBN Co., as you know, have been established by the parliament 
and, therefore, we live within those terms as well as within the 
statement of expectations and intentions of the ministers.6 
6.12 As to whether this made the NBN project different from other 
PPP projects, Mr Harris observed that: 
...most of those are project based; therefore, we can vary the terms 
of a tender or a contract to suit the interests of both parties if both 
parties are happy whereas legislation [as in the NBN project]... has 
to return to the parliament and people in the parliament have to be 
satisfied that the changes are acceptable. It is a long and drawn out 
process and one that tends not to be consistent with commercial 
time frames. I know they have weaknesses but I am probably, on 
balance, a supporter of PPPs when used in the right 
circumstances—and legislation tends not to be part of that.7 
 
5  Mr Harris, DBCDE, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 26 June 2012, p. 11. 
6  Mr Harris, DBCDE, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 26 June 2012, p. 11. 
7  Mr Harris, DBCDE, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 26 June 2012, p. 11. 
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Debt Financing 
6.13 The Government’s Statement of Expectations8 specifies that ‘NBN Co 
should seek to raise debt capital at the earliest opportunity it is able 
without external support’.9 NBN Co’s Corporate Plan 2012-15 assumes 
initial debt-raising in 2015.10  
6.14 NBN Co’s Corporate Plan 2011-13 referred to an estimate of $13.4 billion 
of debt funding over the period to June 2021.11 The new Corporate Plan 
2012-15 refers to an estimate of $13.7 billion of debt funding, over the 
period to June 2021.12 The Corporate Plan 2012-15 also assumes that debt 
funding will contribute ‘up to 31% of the total funding to FY2021’.13  
6.15 The Corporate Plan 2012-15 ‘embeds an assumption of debt-raising, which 
if successful will provide a mechanism to distribute surplus cash and 
repay equity over time after the end of the Fibre network Construction 
period’.14 The Corporate Plan further states that: 
...if actual debt raised at the time was lower than projected, then 
Equity Funding by Government would need to be increased... 
As no assurances can be given that such debt-raising requirements 
will be met, the capital structure and debt issuance decisions will 
be determined at the time by the Shareholder Ministers.15 
Concluding Comments 
6.16 The committee remains interested in the issue of private equity 
engagement in funding the NBN. Against this background, the committee 
notes that in the response to the Committee’s Third Report the 
Government commented: 
Following completion of the rollout, the government will consider 
the optimum capital structure for the Company, noting that 
NBN Co is required to operate within the ownership and 
 
8  Australian Government, Statement of Expectations, 20 December 2010—the Statement of 
Expectations provides an outline of the Government’s policy implementation objectives for the 
NBN. 
9  DBCDE, Submission 10, Third Review of the JCNBN, p. 11. 
10  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-15, p. 80. 
11  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2011-13, p. 141. 
12  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-15, p. 71. 
13  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-15, p. 80. 
14  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-15, p. 16. 
15  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-15, pp 16 and 80. 
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investment settings determined through the National Broadband 
Network Companies Act 2011.16 
6.17 The committee observes that there is also merit, at this point in time, in 
beginning to gauge investor interest in the NBN and explore the optimum 
capital structure for the company. The committee has made a 
recommendation on this matter. 
6.18 With debt financing on the radar for 2015,17 the committee also remains 
interested in NBN Co’s progress to date on debt financing arrangements. 
The committee made a recommendation concerning this area in its Third 
Report: 
 While noting possible revisions in this area in NBN Co’s next 
corporate plan, the committee recommends that NBN Co 
progress its consideration of debt financing arrangements as a 
priority.18 
6.19 The Government response to the report supported this recommendation, 
noting that: 
By the time of raising private sector finance, NBN Co will have 
demonstrated a strong track record in the delivery of its key 
objectives, established investor confidence in both the rollout and 
take up of this critical infrastructure, with clear visibility of 
positive earnings and cashflows.19 
6.20 However, the Government response further observed that, ‘debt 
arrangements are subject to market conditions outside of NBN Co and the 
government’s control and will need to be assessed closer to the point that 
debt is required’.20 
6.21 The committee again concludes that, given the significance of debt 
financing arrangements to its future funding mix and the fast-approaching 
timeframe of 2015 for the commencement of debt financing, NBN Co should 
progress consideration of this matter as a priority. 
 
16  Australian Government, October 2012, Response to the Joint Committee on the National Broadband 
Network Third Report of 25 June 2012, p. 18. 
17  NBN Co, Corporate Plan 2012-15, p. 80. 
18  Joint Committee on the National Broadband Network (JCNBN), Review of the Rollout of the 
National Broadband Network: Third Report, June 2012, p. xxii. 
19  Australian Government, October 2012, Response to the Joint Committee on the National Broadband 
Network Third Report of 25 June 2012, p. 18. 
20  Australian Government, October 2012, Response to the Joint Committee on the National Broadband 
Network Third Report of 25 June 2012, p. 18. 
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6.22 The committee will continue its inquiries into these issues over future 
reporting periods. 
 
Recommendation 6 
6.23 The committee recommends that the Government: 
 seek to gauge investor interest in the National Broadband 
Network; and  
 investigate the optimum capital structure for the NBN Co. 
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Workforce Issues 
Background 
6.24 The committee continues to be interested in workforce issues in the 
context of the NBN rollout. This section of the report therefore looks at: 
 Telstra workforce retraining issues associated with the NBN rollout, 
including the Telstra Retraining Funding Deed and Telstra Training 
Plan, and 
 NBN workforce planning. 
Telstra Workforce Retraining Issues 
Telstra Retraining Funding Deed 
6.25 In implementing structural reform of the telecommunications industry, 
the Government’s NBN policy will have a significant impact on Telstra as 
the highly integrated and dominant industry incumbent.21 The Binding 
Definitive Agreements between NBN Co and Telstra form the basis of 
Telstra‘s participation in assisting with the rollout of the NBN.22 
6.26 In support of these agreements, the Government has committed to 
provide $100 million to Telstra under the Retraining Funding Deed (RFD) 
to assist it in the retraining and redeployment of Telstra employees 
affected by structural reforms of the telecommunications industry.23 The 
RFD between the Commonwealth and Telstra came into force when the 
Binding Definitive Agreements commenced in March 2012. The term of 
the RFD is for eight years, and Telstra can request an extension of a further 
three years.24 
6.27 The objectives of the RFD are ‘to support the availability of an 
appropriately trained workforce for the NBN and to retrain Telstra staff 
 
21  JCNBN, Review of the Rollout of the National Broadband Network: Second Report, November 2011, 
p. 34. 
22  NBN Co, 2011, NBN Co and Telstra Sign Binding Definitive Agreements, media release, 23 June. 
23  Conroy S (Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy) and Wong P 
(Minister for Finance and Deregulation), 2012, Definitive Agreements between NBN Co and Telstra 
come into Force, media release, 7 March. 
24  The DBCDE explained that it is ‘up to Telstra to put a case to the Commonwealth as to why an 
extension should be granted’, and that, under the RFD, ‘the Commonwealth will not 
unreasonably withhold or delay consent to a request for the term to be extended’—
Submission 14, Answer to Question on Notice No. 52, p. 3. 
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who may otherwise face redundancy as a consequence of the rollout of the 
NBN’.25 In its submission to the inquiry, Telstra emphasised that: 
...implementation of [the] Retraining Funding Deed is a critical 
part of Telstra’s agreements with NBN Co and the Government.  
We have long understood that the structural changes being 
imposed on the telecommunications sector, by the roll out of the 
NBN, would have significant implications for our business, 
including our people.  
As we progressively migrate customers to the NBN and 
decommission our copper access network, the scale of the network 
maintenance task will diminish. This will have a direct and long 
term impact on the way Telstra operates and will have practical 
implications for our people.26  
6.28 The RFD sets out how Telstra will identify employees eligible for 
retraining in NBN related technical, process and system activities; the 
scope of training courses to be made available; the standards and quality 
that must be met; and the timing of training. It operates by identifying two 
categories of employee: an Automatically Eligible Workgroup (AEW) and 
another group of employees who may be determined to be eligible. The 
AEW group includes the Telstra: 
 copper and hybrid fibre coaxial (HFC) based field workforce 
which undertakes installation and maintenance and 
construction and maintenance activity on Telstra’s Customer 
Access Network; 
 direct field support workforce which conducts copper/HFC 
based field workforce support, including workforce 
management, workforce and resource planning, and 
construction program management; 
 support of copper/HFC operations workforce which provides 
design of products, management of damages, network 
integrity, plant assigning, customer network improvements and 
contract management; and 
 wholesale copper service workforce which provides the 
interface between retail service providers and Telstra in relation 
to copper services.27 
6.29 The other eligible group comprises those ‘employees who Telstra is 
satisfied may face redundancy over time (if not retrained) as a 
 
25  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12, p. 1. 
26  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12, p. 1. 
27  DBCDE, Submission 10, Third Review of the JCNBN, pp 4-5. 
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consequence of the decommissioning of the copper network or the 
deactivation of the HFC network’.28  
6.30 As at 1 March 2012 the AEW group numbered 6,255 employees.29 To place 
this in context, Table 6.1 sets out Telstra’s workforce composition as at 
30 June 2012. 
Table 6.1 Telstra Workforce Composition (as at 30 June 2012) 
 Domestic full time 
staff headcount 
Total workforce FTE 
Telstra group 30 203 39 972.38 
Domestic controlled entities   3 317   3 895.95 
Offshore controlled entities    5 210.83 
Telstra Corporation 26 886 30 865.60 
Source Telstra Corporation, Submission 12.1, p. 2. 
6.31 The committee was interested in the composition of the AEW and whether 
there might be a group of Telstra employees who could potentially miss 
out on access to the AEW. Ms Ros Eason, Senior National Industrial 
Research Officer from the Communications Division (CWU) of the 
Communications, Electrical and Plumbing Union (CEPU), responded that: 
...the core of [the AEW] is the customer field workforce—service 
delivery and the design and construction functions. We are 
satisfied at this stage that that is going to be targeted... There may 
be some questions around the edges, but I do not think there is 
any question that the core of people who will be targeted by this 
funding are the people who need to be targeted.30 
6.32 There was also interest in whether the size of the AEW group might 
change, depending on how much work Telstra gained over time from the 
NBN rollout. Telstra explained that:  
...the training is for two groups. There is the AEW, and we expect 
that to stay relatively constant. It is that sort of 6½ thousand mark. 
But then there is also another group, which is those people who 
are not within the AEW area but who otherwise may face 
redundancy as a result of the NBN rollout. At the moment we do 
not have a good estimate of what that group will be, but then that 
 
28  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12.1, p. 3. 
29  DBCDE, Submission 10, Third Review of the JCNBN, p. 5. 
30  Ms Ros Eason, Senior National Industrial Research Officer, Communications Division (CWU), 
Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 26 June 2012, p. 3. 
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group may fluctuate depending on exactly what happens in the 
future.31 
6.33 This led to queries about the number of Telstra employees in the other 
eligible group under the RFD. Telstra responded that: 
There is provision within the deed that recognises that there might 
be other groups outside of that eligible group and, therefore, there 
is capacity to bring them into the retraining funding deed if they 
are identified as being impacted by the NBN...  
That number is not known and it is not specified. There is just an 
acknowledgement that there may be more and therefore they 
should have access to the retraining.32 
6.34 As Telstra further clarified, ‘at a time of very significant change for our 
business and at a time when we cannot actually predict seven or eight 
years into the future’, there may be ‘other employees who would be 
impacted in addition to those that we can see now’.33 
6.35 Another matter of concern was whether there would be employment 
within Telstra for every person in the AEW who received retraining under 
the RFD. The CWU commented that ‘it is obviously the expectation... that, 
if Telstra is going to spend money retraining people, we assume that they 
are going to use them. They do not spend the money to retrain them, then 
push them out the door to work for their commercial rivals’.34 
6.36 Mr Daryl Quinlivan, Deputy Secretary from the DBCDE, similarly noted 
that: 
I think that is very much the objective that Telstra has. In fact, that 
is the rationale underlying the arrangement generally. You might 
recall that the origins of this were part of the broader agreement 
with Telstra on the definitive agreements with NBN Co. This was 
an ancillary agreement and the underlying logic was that payment 
to Telstra to retrain staff and avoid redundancies created a lot 
more value for Telstra than the value of the payment and so there 
was a win for both parties in the transaction that contributed to the 
value Telstra was realising from the definitive agreements 
generally. So I think it is very much Telstra’s objective that they 
 
31  Mr Julian Clarke, Director, Workplace Relations and Policy, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of 
Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 29. 
32  Mr James Shaw, Director, Government Relations, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, 
Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 33. 
33  Mr Clarke, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 34. 
34  Ms Eason, CWU, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 26 June 2012, p. 7. 
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retain these people within the company and therefore avoid the 
redundancies, and that is how the value is created for the 
company.35 
6.37 However, in response to this matter, Mr Julian Clarke, Director of 
Workplace Relations and Policy from Telstra, clarified that: 
It will depend on the rollout, the extent of what we are asked to do 
by NBN, how many customers we have at any given time—those 
sorts of factors... 
The purpose of the deed is obviously to retain as many people as we 
can. We recognise that we have a very skilled workforce at the 
moment. We want to retain as many of those people as we can and 
we understand that is the purpose of the retraining. If you are asking 
me whether I can give a guarantee that every employee who is in the 
automatically eligible work groups will be retained, it is not 
something that I could be in a position to do now but more because I 
do not know what will be happening in the future.36 
6.38 Similarly, Mr James Shaw, Director of Government Relations from Telstra, 
added that: 
I think it is fair to say that we are not designing this such that we 
retrain and then just exit employees. We like to keep our 
employees. We have invested a lot in them. Irrespective of the 
Commonwealth funding or taxpayers’ funding, here under the 
retraining funding deed, we have invested a lot in our skilled 
employees out of our shareholders’ dollars and we would like to 
continue to employ those people and utilise their skills to provide 
services to our customers... 
we just cannot guarantee, given what we have in front of us at the 
moment, that everyone would be retained in the business.37 
6.39 To further explore this matter, the committee queried whether one of the 
key performance indicators of the RFD required that a certain percentage 
of employees in the AEW be employed within Telstra for a certain period 
of time. Mr Shaw responded, ‘I do not believe so, no’.38 
 
35  Mr Daryl Quinlivan, Deputy Secretary, DBCDE, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 26 June 
2012, p. 9. 
36  Mr Clarke, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, pp 27-28. 
37  Mr Shaw, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, pp 28 and 
33. 
38  Mr Shaw, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 32. 
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6.40 This led to interest in whether there was instead an expectation by 
government about how long employees would retain employment within 
Telstra as a result of retraining under the RFD. Mr Clarke responded, 
‘[n]ot as far as I am aware’, but emphasised that ‘it is important to 
remember the dual purpose that the deed is expressed to have, which is 
(1) to support the retraining of employees within Telstra and (2) to 
support more broadly the skilling of the workforce to roll out the NBN’.39 
To further clarify this point, Telstra explained that: 
The purpose is so that they either continue employment within 
Telstra or retrain to operate in the NBN environment... In essence, 
they were saying... ‘Here is a Commonwealth contribution of 
$100 million to assist in the retraining of workers affected by the 
NBN, such that they are then skilled up to work in a fibre world, 
either with Telstra or with other people associated with the 
NBN’.40 
6.41 As Mr Shaw further commented, ‘the minister and the NBN Co. have both 
indicated that they expect significant employment during the rollout of 
the network, that it will generate significant new jobs’ and therefore, ‘if we 
look at the market rather than just Telstra for employment, there are a 
range of opportunities that will arise as a consequence of the rollout of the 
network itself’.41 
6.42 Noting commercial sensitivities, this then led to a query about the volume 
of Telstra’s NBN related work, as it obviously had implications for Telstra 
employees being retrained under the RFD. Telstra observed that the ‘bulk 
of the work’ currently being undertaken as a result of the NBN rollout was 
‘related to the build of the transit network, which is part of the definitive 
agreements’, but emphasised that they ‘stand ready to do whatever [they] 
can to assist NBN Co. to expedite the rollout of the network’—while also 
recognising that NBN Co have a ‘commercial imperative’ and are ‘bound 
by procurement obligations’.42 
6.43 Against this background, there was a query about a recent loss of Telstra 
positions, with a number of positions also apparently moving offshore43—
in particular, regarding whether these employees were eligible for 
retraining and redeployment under the Telstra RFD as part of the NBN 
 
39  Mr Clarke, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 32. 
40  Mr Shaw, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 33. 
41  Mr Shaw, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 32. 
42  Mr Shaw, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 30. 
43  ‘Telstra’s “Project New” means big job cuts’, Australian, 22 August 2012, p. 19. 
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rollout. Telstra explained that this was ‘not connected at all with the NBN 
rollout’44 and therefore these employees did not fall under the RFD: 
...those Lismore and Townsville call centres and the like were not 
NBN related. So they were caught up with our general 
provisions... 
The point we would make about the structure and composition of 
our workforce is that there are a range of factors that impact on 
employment decisions in the business. The NBN and the structural 
change to the industry that the NBN is creating is one of them. 
There are a whole range of other factors at play within our 
business at the moment which impact on employment decisions.45 
6.44 As Telstra further clarified, employees whose ‘roles are redundant for 
reasons unrelated to the rollout of the NBN (e.g. reduction in call volumes 
due to more transactions online and/or fewer complaints) would not be 
eligible for retraining’.46 
Telstra Training Plan 
6.45 The RFD requires that a Training Plan be developed by Telstra and 
approved by the Commonwealth. The Training Plan is therefore a 
significant component of the RFD. Each Training Plan covers a three-year 
period, with the initial Training Plan covering the period 30 April 2012 to 
30 June 2014.47 Subsequent plans are to be lodged six months before the 
expiry of the previous plan. The first Telstra Training Plan was formally 
approved by the Government on 25 June 2012.48 
6.46 The scope of the Training Plan is to identify training needs, course 
development, training methodology and targets for retraining. The 
Training Plan deals ‘primarily with employees who are in the AEW, as 
they can be specifically identified’.49 Under the terms of the RFD, ‘not less 
than 70 per cent of funds spent in any three years of a Training Plan must 
go towards the development and delivery of Accredited Training Courses 
by a Registered Training Organisation’.50  
 
44  Mr Clarke, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 29. 
45  Mr Shaw, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, pp 29-30. 
46  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12.1, p. 3. 
47  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12.1, p. 2. 
48  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12, p. 2. 
49  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12.1, p. 3. 
50  Australian Government, October 2012, Response to the Joint Committee on the National Broadband 
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6.47 Noting that the Training Plan is commercial-in-confidence, the committee 
was nonetheless interested in gaining a better understanding of how the 
plan would operate. In response, Telstra provided a summary of the 
plan.51 The DBCDE also provided some background on the Training Plan, 
noting that it included: 
 Forecast inputs to the Training Plan, which identify the class of 
Telstra employees that may be retrained and forecasts their 
retraining needs and possible redeployment options. 
 Curriculum and courseware development, which outlines the 
proposed approach for developing training courses. 
 Learning delivery plan, which details the proposed course 
delivery method and the plan to deliver courses across 
geographic regions. 
 Training and financial reporting, which includes the format for 
reporting and tracking budgets and training activity. 
 Training Targets, which have been set for the eight year life of 
the deed...52 
6.48 In terms of the number of Telstra employees that had received training to 
date under the Training Plan, Telstra noted that, even though the first year 
of the plan had been shortened:  
...in those 2 months, more training was delivered than the Plan 
required with 107 Telstra employees being retrained against the 40 
estimated under the Plan. All of those retrained employees were in 
our copper/HFC areas and retraining related to the installation 
and migration curriculum. In total, there were [2,826] training 
attendances in the 2 months, which comprised [1,890] attendances 
related to structural separation undertaking training and [936] 
attendances related to other curricula. We also developed 
21 courses, primarily in the installation and migration curriculum, 
as was anticipated would be developed under the Plan.53 
6.49 Telstra further outlined that: 
Year 2 of the Plan commenced on 1 July 2012. Between then and 
30 September 2012, we have delivered a further 856 training 
attendances across the installation and migration, value add 
premises, planning design and construction, and customer 
support curricula. Telstra currently has 40 training courses under 
 
51  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12.1, pp 2-4. 
52  DBCDE, Submission 14, Answer to Question on Notice No. 53, p. 4. 
53  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12, pp 2-3—with some figures (bracketed), as later corrected 
by Mr Shaw, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 26. 
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development consisting of 34 new courses and 6 updated courses. 
This is on track to meet the target set in the Plan. Telstra already 
has 30 training courses available in the NBN retraining catalogue.54 
6.50 The DBCDE provided similar statistics on Telstra employee retraining 
under the Training Plan, further noting that, ‘of the 107 Telstra employees 
retrained, 16 were in TAS, 31 in VIC, 44 in NSW/ACT and 16 in QLD’.55 
6.51 It is anticipated that the majority of the technical training delivery will 
occur in years 3-8 of the term of the RFD, reflecting ‘the expected profile of 
the NBN build’, with a ‘minimum of 173 training courses’ having been 
developed or having had content revisions in the first three years of the 
plan.56 
6.52 Certain categories of employees have been identified in the AEW, but the 
committee was interested in the specific types of roles that employees 
might perform once they had undertaken retraining under the Training 
Plan. As Ms Eason, Senior National Industrial Research Officer from the 
CWU, commented, ‘I think what is being said is, “We still don’t quite 
know what the exact profile will be of telecommunication service industry 
workers in the future and just what the skill mix will be which will be of 
use” ...Exactly what that person looks like and what training you need to 
create them is not yet completely fixed’.57 
6.53 On this point, Telstra explained that it had ‘mapped employees in the 
AEW to new functions and forecast the skills required to undertake these 
functions’.58 While noting that the details of this forecast are ‘commercially 
sensitive’, Telstra broadly identified six retraining categories: 
 planning design and construction of the NBN using FTTP, 
wireless and satellite technology 
 operational elements, including installation and migration of 
services from Telstra’s existing networks to the NBN 
 operations and maintenance activity on the NBN 
 support for network elements including network transport and 
interconnect 
 back of house and front of house activities that support 
customer migration, new connections and customer and 
network assurance, and 
 
54  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12, p. 3. 
55  DBCDE, Submission 14, Answer to Question on Notice No. 52, p. 2. 
56  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12, pp 3-4. 
57  Ms Eason, CWU, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 26 June 2012, p. 7. 
58  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12.1, p. 3. 
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 installation and maintenance of in-premises products and 
services.59 
6.54 Telstra also commented that, ‘we know some of the things that we will 
require them to do’, in that the employees who have already been 
retrained ‘can do a new skill, and that was the installation and migration 
of customers from our network onto the NBN’.60 
6.55 In terms of how success would be measured under the Training Plan, 
Telstra noted that the plan included the following targets: 
 a three year high level NBN Retraining Courseware 
Development Plan, which is reviewed every 12 months. It also 
sets out Telstra methodology for developing courseware, how it 
intends to evaluate and review courseware, as well as how 
health and safety requirements will be incorporated into 
training and evaluated 
 targets for the number of courses that will be developed during 
each year of the Training Plan.  
 an annual delivery plan, which details the number of courses 
intended to be delivered and the number of people that are 
planned to attend training during each quarter in each 
geographical location...  
 a forecast, for the eight years of the Retraining Funding Deed, 
of the annual and cumulative planned spend for both 
courseware development and training delivery. It is intended 
that actual spend will be tracked against this. The planned 
spend may be revised, from time to time; and 
 for each of the eight years of the Retraining Funding Deed, 
targets for: 
 total spend on training; 
 the number of courses to be developed/refreshed; and 
 the number of employees who will be retrained in a new 
skill.61 
6.56 The CWU confirmed that it was ‘supportive of the general thrust of 
Telstra’s proposed training plan’—in particular: 
 ...that the training will be based largely on the nationally 
endorsed training package for the telecommunications industry 
 
59  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12.1, p. 3. 
60  Mr Clarke, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 27. 
61  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12.1, pp 3-4. Beyond the first three years of the Training Plan, 
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(ICT10) with outcomes aligned to the Australian Qualifications 
Framework 
 A focus on the development of higher skill levels and roles 
(generally at AQF3 and 4) 
 Targeting of areas where there are well recognised skill 
shortages relevant to the NBN rollout, e.g. network designers 
 Development of skill profiles matched to emerging work 
opportunities.62 
Full Qualification and Recognition of Prior Learning 
6.57 The CWU raised recognition of prior learning (RPL) as a key issue in 
terms of enabling Telstra employees to ‘gain nationally recognised 
qualifications as part of the overall NBN training and certification effort’,63 
noting that: 
...the recognising of prior learning that we are saying we would 
like to combine with the retraining [is] to make sure that people 
have the best chance of coming up with a cert II, a cert III or a cert 
IV—that is, to bring people up to a full qualification level as part 
of the internal training program. Some companies do not like a 
fixation on certification, but most employees like it. Even if 
employees have got a guarantee of work for four or five years, or 
for 10 years, for them to come out of this exercise with a cert IV or 
a cert III would be, in our view, a good outcome. And that would 
be achieved by a mixture of retraining on the basis of recognised 
training packages and, possibly, recognising prior learning. 64 
6.58 On this point, the CWU was particularly concerned about employees 
ending up with a ‘patchwork of skill sets’—‘[y]ou can have a whole range 
of competencies and just have one or two units missing—and therefore 
you will not have a full cert II or a full cert III. That is the issue. You might 
end up with a kind of patchwork of skill sets which leave you just short of 
a full qualification’.65 
6.59 According to the CWU, Telstra had indicated that, as part of its training 
program, it would ‘consider combining RPL with new training “where [it 
was] reasonably able to do so”’.66 The CWU explained that it had raised 
this matter with Telstra and: 
 
62  CWU, Communications Electrical and Plumbing Union (CEPU), Submission 1, p. 2. 
63  CWU, Submission 1, p. 2. 
64  Ms Eason, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 26 June 2012, p. 4. 
65  Ms Eason, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 26 June 2012, p. 5. 
66  CWU, CEPU, Submission 1, p. 2. 
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...again they have said: ‘Yes, where it makes sense’. That is, where 
we are talking about maybe a few units needed to bring somebody 
up to a full qualification. But there is no ironclad guarantee... 
Telstra are saying: ‘We don’t recognise that as necessarily part of 
our obligation under the trust deed... 
[Telstra’s] position has always been: ‘We’ll train people and where 
possible we’ll bring them out at a full qualification level, but if that 
doesn’t make sense for us—if it is just a group of skill sets and not 
a full qualification, then that is it.’ We think it makes sense in this 
context to combine the two things... 
We have raised that with them because we think that not only do 
we want people trained against externally recognised 
qualifications but we also like the idea of people coming out with a 
full qualification.67 
6.60 However, the CWU did note some progress in this area: ‘Telstra do appear 
to be doing some work now on aligning their internal training to the ICT 
team package. And you do that if you are putting in place the 
preconditions for recognising prior learning... but as to getting the 
ironclad commitment of “Yes, we’ll do that,” as you can see, we have not 
got that in these discussions’.68 
6.61 In response to these concerns about whether retraining for NBN related 
work under the Training Plan would see Telstra employees reach full 
qualification level or leave them with only a group of skill sets, Telstra 
explained that ‘what we have said to the CEPU during consultation’ is that 
we are asking, ‘what are the skills that we need people to have? We will 
retrain people to do the things and we will then map that through to the 
AQF. Whether or not that actually gives somebody a full qualification... 
will depend on exactly which modules they do and how many of the 
competencies they gain’.69 
6.62 In terms of whether this would then see employees attaining the full 
competency, Telstra further clarified that: 
It is not a decision we have actually made yet. But what we have 
said is that we understand the position that has been put to us—
that surely it makes sense that if somebody has got 90 per cent of 
the qualification we help them get the 10 per cent—and that is 
 
67  Ms Eason, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 26 June 2012, p. 4, p. 5. 
68  Ms Eason, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 26 June 2012, p. 5. 
69  Mr Clarke, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 31. 
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something we will look to make a decision on when we get to that 
point. What we do accept is that there is some logic in that. I 
suppose what we are not doing is saying to an individual 
employee, ‘We will train you so that you have everything for this 
particular certificate’. That is not the way in which the training is 
being rolled out. It is being rolled out more on an as needs basis, 
based on the particular type of work that we have and the skills 
that we identify they need to be retrained in to do that work.70 
Consultation 
6.63 Consultation is an important aspect of the Telstra RFD. Under the deed, 
Telstra must consult with unions on the implementation of the plan at 
least quarterly, and it is also required to consult with the DBCDE on at 
least a six-monthly basis.71 In accordance with these obligations, Telstra 
commented that, to date, it had: 
...met with the unions and the Department on 4th November 2011, 
19th March 2012, 20th June 2012 and 19th September 2012. On 
these occasions we have discussed: 
 the development of the Training Plan; 
 the training courses that have been developed and delivered 
according to the Plan; and 
 the target number of employees to be retrained and the actual 
number who have been re-trained by Telstra to date in excess of 
that target.72 
6.64 Telstra noted that these meetings had been ‘open and cooperative and... 
involved significant discussion between the participants’.73 
6.65 On the consultation process so far, the CWU commented that ‘[i]t is more 
than tick-a-box... all the way down the company in the different layers that 
we are involved with that is a sharp awareness, and that is creating a sort 
of willingness to engage’.74 
6.66 The DBCDE noted that it had attended, as an observer, Telstra’s quarterly 
meetings with the unions and, in this capacity, considered that ‘Telstra is 
 
70  Mr Clarke, Telstra Corporation, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 2012, p. 31. 
71  Telstra Corporation, Submission 12, p. 4. 
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meeting the consultation and stakeholder engagement requirements under 
the deed’.75 
Reporting Requirements 
6.67 The RFD includes a detailed reporting regime, covering both financial and 
training activities. As the DBCDE outlined, Telstra must: 
 provide a half yearly report to the Department on progress 
against the training plan and a more detailed annual report to 
the Department on the training plan; and 
 meet with the Department every six months and, unless agreed 
otherwise, to discuss, among other things, the progress of the 
retraining; and 
 hold quarterly meetings with its unions which the Department 
will attend as an observer.76 
6.68 Telstra provided the department with its annual report on progress 
against the Training Plan in August 2012, and the report included 
information on: 
 number and geographical location of employees that were 
retrained 
 number of employees retrained from each Telstra work group 
 nature and quantity of training courses developed and 
delivered 
 number of employees trained and the pass rate from each 
course 
 amount of funding used on accredited training as a percentage 
of total funds expended 
 progress against training targets.77 
6.69 Further, the committee notes the Government’s support for a 
recommendation in its Third Review report concerning public 
dissemination of a reporting document on annual progress under the 
Telstra RFD.78 It was agreed that information about progress of the RFD 
could be ‘included in the annual statement outlining the direct and 
indirect employment benefits of the National Broadband Network’, 
 
75  DBCDE, Submission 14, Answer to Question on Notice No. 55, p. 6. 
76  DBCDE, Submission 14, Answer to Question on Notice No. 54, p. 5. 
77  DBCDE, Submission 14, Answer to Question on Notice No. 54, p. 5. 
78  JCNBN, Review of the Rollout of the National Broadband Network: Third Report, June 2012, p. xxii. 
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provided as part of the Government response to the committee’s review 
reports.79 
6.70 In terms of how expenditure for funding under the RFD is budgeted over 
the eight years of the deed, the DBCDE advised that: 
The Australian Government provided Telstra with an upfront 
payment of $100 million (exclusive of GST) in 2011-12, as 
announced in the Economic Statement 2010, which was subject to 
the Commonwealth approving the initial training plan and 
budget. 
The training plan includes training targets, one of which is an 
eight year expenditure forecast which utilises the full $100 million 
payment. It is envisaged that yearly targets will be adjusted from 
time to time. 
Telstra must provide the department with a new annual budget at 
the start of each financial year during the term of the RFD and the 
budget must include a breakdown of proposed spending.80 
NBN Workforce Planning 
6.71 The CWU raised the issue of NBN skills supply issues, noting that it had 
been ‘warning of possible skill shortages in relation to the NBN rollout for 
several years’—in particular, the CWU was concerned that: 
...responsibility for skill development and supply does not and 
cannot be made to rest with any one participant in the project. As a 
result, co-ordination and funding questions in relation to skill 
shortages have inevitably arisen. 
These have been exacerbated by structural changes in the 
telecommunications workforce over the last decade... which has 
seen many former employees become sub-contractors. Such 
workers may often not have the means or the incentives to 
undertake retraining for the NBN project, especially where 
significantly higher skill levels are required.81 
6.72 The CWU further clarified that these activities need to be ‘sufficiently well 
funded and coordinated to ensure a timely supply of skills to the 
project’—however, at present, ‘there does not appear to... be one body 
 
79  Australian Government, October 2012, Response to the Joint Committee on the National Broadband 
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which has the responsibility or the resources for developing an overall 
workforce strategy in this area and ensuring its implementation. This is a 
matter which we consider warrants the committee’s and the government’s 
further attention’.82 
6.73 In response to this matter, the DBCDE emphasised that: 
The Australian Government is committed to ensuring there is a 
well-trained and accredited workforce for Australia’s largest 
infrastructure project and the government is confident that 
NBN Co and its service delivery partners will be able to source 
expertise and resources to fulfil their obligations. 
NBN Co’s analysis suggests that the implementation of a variety 
of resourcing and skilling strategies will ensure that there are 
enough people in the industry to meet the skills requirements for 
the construction of the network.83 
6.74 The DBCDE further noted that the department and the NBN Co are 
‘working closely with all stakeholders including the NBN Co’s service 
delivery partners, the industry skills boards and training organisations to 
facilitate partnerships and support an appropriately skilled workforce to 
support the rollout’.84 
6.75 In terms of the major areas of emerging NBN training need and workforce 
demand, including local/regional employment, the DBCDE explained 
that: 
NBN Co has forecast that the total number of new jobs created in 
the construction of the NBN alone is between 16,000 and 18,000. 
NBN Co has identified that 80 per cent of the workforce will be 
spread across the top five occupational groups of labourers, NBN 
Linesworkers, NBN Installers, NBN Splicers and earthmoving 
plant operators. 
The company undertakes workforce modelling using the national 
rollout schedules to forecast demand for workers, by region, 
occupation and time. This modelling has recently been refreshed 
and reviewed against the current three year rollout plan. 
NBN Co has developed a skills formation strategy which targets 
occupational qualifications at Certificates II and III with the 
 
82  Mr Dan Dwyer, Divisional Secretary, CWU, Transcript of Evidence, Canberra, 30 October 
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84  DBCDE, Submission 14, Answer to Question on Notice No. 56, p. 7. 
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objective of building the industry’s capability. To this end, 
NBN Co is working with selected training organisations to 
identify skills gaps and to provide training.85 
6.76 The Government response to the committee’s Third Report provides 
further details on NBN skilling strategies and major areas of emerging 
NBN training need and workforce demand, in line with the committee’s 
recommendation to that effect.86 
Concluding Comments 
6.77 Over future reporting periods, the committee will continue to be 
interested in monitoring progress under the Telstra RFD and Training 
Plan in supporting the availability of an appropriately trained workforce 
for the NBN. The committee was therefore interested in whether the RFD 
and its accompanying Training Plan were publicly available documents. 
Telstra explained that both documents were commercial-in-confidence.87 
However, as outlined earlier, both Telstra and the DBCDE were able to 
provide the committee with an overview of these documents. The 
committee welcomed the details provided on the RFD and Training Plan 
by the DBCDE and Telstra. The committee further notes the reporting 
regime that has been established for the RFD and the progress reported to 
date against established performance targets under the Training Plan. 
6.78 In this regard, the committee also notes the Government’s support for a 
recommendation in its Third Review report that the DBCDE ‘publicly 
disseminate a reporting document on annual progress under the Telstra 
Retraining Funding Deed’.88 The committee therefore looks forward to 
receiving the next annual update on this matter. 
6.79 The committee will also continue to be interested in monitoring the size 
and composition of both the AEW and the other workgroup eligible for 
retraining under the RFD in terms of the numbers and roles of Telstra 
employees retrained/redeployed and successfully transitioned over into 
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the NBN sector, particularly given the uncertainties about the future size 
and composition of this second group—‘[a]t this point in time, it is not 
possible to accurately estimate how many employees may be in the second 
category’.89 
6.80 The number and role of Telstra employees who do or do not fall into this 
eligible group are of interest here—the reasons for their eligibility or 
exclusion. As the committee heard, ‘employees will only fall into this 
category, and be eligible for retraining, if their role may be redundant 
because of NBN rollout. Employees whose roles are redundant for reasons 
unrelated to the rollout of the NBN... would not be eligible for 
retraining’.90 
 
Recommendation 7 
6.81 The committee recommends that, in providing an annual statement to 
the committee on the progress of the Telstra Retraining Funding Deed 
(RFD), the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital 
Economy include in this information an update on: 
 ongoing company retention rates for employees in the 
Automatically Eligible Workgroup, retrained under the RFD; 
 the current numbers and roles of employees in the other 
eligible workgroup under the RFD and an overview of the 
current reasons for eligibility or exclusion in terms of this 
group. 
6.82 The committee notes the concerns raised about Telstra employees 
receiving a full qualification, where applicable, under the Training Plan as 
part of the RFD, rather than a ‘patchwork of skill sets... just short of a full 
qualification’.91 It therefore sees benefit in further consultation between the 
DBCDE, Telstra and the relevant unions on this matter as part of the 
continuing formal consultation process under the RFD. 
6.83 Given that the purpose of the RFD is to assist in the retraining and 
redeployment of Telstra employees, to prepare them to work on NBN 
related activities, forward projections concerning the scale and 
composition of this employment market are of significance. Against this 
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background, the committee notes the Government’s commitment, in line 
with its response to the committee’s recommendation in its Third Report,92 
to publish such information on an annual basis.93 
6.84 The committee notes that, as further recommended in its Third Report,94 
this annual statement will also include information on major areas of 
emerging workforce demand and training need in this regard, to ensure 
that the Australian workforce, more generally, has the skills-set to be able 
to implement and maintain the NBN into the future. 
6.85 On this point, the committee acknowledges the statement made by the 
DBCDE that the department and NBN Co are ‘working closely with all 
stakeholders including NBN Co’s service delivery partners, the industry 
skills boards and training organisations to facilitate partnerships and 
support an appropriately skilled workforce to support the rollout’.95 The 
committee believes there would be benefit in further coordinating this 
area, in developing and implementing the overall workforce strategy. 
 
Recommendation 8 
6.86 The committee recommends that, in providing an annual statement to 
the committee outlining the major areas of emerging National 
Broadband Network (NBN) workforce demand and training need, the 
Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy 
include in this information a more detailed report on: 
 the workforce development strategy supporting the NBN 
rollout, including current workforce modelling and outcomes 
from work with training organisations and industry skills 
boards, to identify skills gaps in this area and develop training 
programs; 
 how the development and implementation of this overall 
workforce strategy is being coordinated. 
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Dissenting Report by Coalition Members and 
Senators 
1 Lack of Transparency on NBN Build Costs 
 The capital cost of the NBN fibre roll out per premise is the single most 
important determinant of the implications of the Government’s policy 
for end user broadband and telephony prices over time.  
 In the October Joint Committee on the NBN hearing and again in 
February estimates, NBN Co presented an indicative breakdown of the 
cost per premise passed of the fibre local network and distribution 
network.  Indicative costs have been provided for the rollout so far, and 
for what NBN Co forecasts costs per premise will be in 2013. 
 The relevant slide is included below: 
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 While these slides provide at least some information, it is important to 
note the data that matters – on premises which have been completed – 
is not transparent.  On the contrary it is deliberately imprecise.  The 
graphs suggest per premise costs are coming down.  But they do not 
provide  dollar figures for what actual costs have been incurred so far 
during each phase of the rollout, nor how these compare to the 
originally budgeted figures. 
 The most important capex cost information (the estimate for the 
‘volume rollout’ which will account for most fibre deployed) is just a 
prospective estimate – there is no real world data provided. 
 The graph does allow a rough comparison of capex costs in each 
construction phase so far as a multiple of the per premise FTTP cost 
estimated n the NBN Co Corporate Plan: 
 Tasmania Pre Release – 4.125x 
 Tasmania Stage 2 – 3.25x 
 Mainland First Release – 2.5x 
 Volume Rollout (FY2012-13 Forecast) – 1.25x 
 In each case the figure is substantially higher than the current NBN Co 
budget. 
 Additionally, the NBN graph provided to Parliament does not in fact 
provide a comprehensive estimate of per premise costs for NBN Co’s 
FTTP.   Rather it is an estimate of costs across a portion of the fibre 
network – the local network and distribution network; in layman’s 
terms, what it’s costing to get fibre from the exchange to the street 
corner. 
 The figures thus exclude the capex associated with running fibre 
through the lead-in conduit (or overhead from a pole) or equipment 
and installation costs associated with terminating the network at the 
end-user premises. 
 The NBN has also responded to a question on notice regarding the cost 
per premise of the NBN’s fibre network by refusing to detail costs.  In 
its response, NBN Co stated: 
 “NBN Co’s Chief Financial Officer, Mr Robin Payne, provided 
information relating to cost per premises and cost trends at the 
JCNBN hearing on 30 October 2012 (Hansard pp.6-7). Also, Mr 
Quigley has previously provided information about why cost-per-
premises figures can be commercially sensitive, particularly when 
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construction procurement processes are underway. Please see 
October 2011 JCNBN Hearing Hansard pp. 21-22.”1 
 The fully allocated capital cost of FTTP per premise is both crucial to 
the economics of the network and highly variable.  Evidence from other 
markets suggests the average figure over a substantial deployment can 
be as little as <$500 in the case of fibre rolled out by incumbents in 
densely populated cities with well maintained and expansively 
designed underground ducts to >$5000 in the case of FTTP serving very 
low density areas or in challenging terrain. 
 The 2012-2015 NBN Corporate Plan appears to be predicated on an 
average capex spend (including full allocation of all capex shared across 
the NBN’s three networks) of approximately $2700 per premise within 
the fibre footprint. 
 The Coalition acknowledges some areas of investment will appear high 
if reported on a current per premise basis, because assets such as the 
fibre transit network are being built up front but will eventually be 
amortized over larger numbers of premises than at present.  Any 
resulting distortions can be corrected by explicitly breaking capex into 
shared and per premise components, and making transparent, 
reasonable assumptions about amortization of the former. 
 NBN Co has chosen not to release any of this information either to 
Parliament or taxpayers.  Therefore at present there is no visibility into 
whether NBN Co’s capex estimates are plausible or not. 
 The bottom line is that Australia’s largest infrastructure project in 
history is a black box.  The Gillard Government and NBN Co are simply 
refusing to disclose the actual evidence on deployment costs that must 
surely exist in robust form after running fibre past 82,000 premises.  
Taxpayers funding the project have every reason to question why they 
would not be provided with this data. 
 The right hand bar of this slide is labelled “FY2013 256,000 premises’ 
and shows two numbers, $1500 and $1200.  When read in conjunction 
with the other (unlabelled) bars showing much higher capex per 
premise at earlier stages of the rollout, the slide is evidently intended to 
convey the impression that capex per premises passed will be in the 
range $1200-1500 by the end of FY2013. 
 
1 NBN Co, (2013), “Answers to Questions on Notice, Public Hearing 30 October 2012”, Question 
356 
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 During the hearing officials of NBN sought to reinforce the impression 
that the capex per premises passed would be reduced to this level by 
quoting the experience of Chorus in New Zealand. 
Mr Quigley: What is very important for the committee is the 
number on the right. Obviously, what is important is that it has 
come down substantially. There were low numbers to start with. 
With the number on the right we are saying that with our 
corporate plan—as you can see in the yellow there—given our best 
estimate now and given all the data we have, that we are confident 
that we are going to come in for FY2013 between $1,200 and $1,500 
for this component of the cost per premise passed, which is 
consistent with the data you would have seen in New Zealand.  
Mr Payne: I think that Chorus from New Zealand have fairly 
recently published data showing that cost per premise is falling 
from around $3,300 last year to $2,700, $2,900 this year. They are 
targeting, I think, around $1,200 to $1,500 in the long run.2 
 In September 2012 Chorus published a document showing it expects 
connection costs per premises to fall3.  It shows a current cost per 
premises of $3,300 – and it not dropping to a rate of $1200-1500 until 
2020. 
 
2 Hansard, Committee Hearing, Tuesday October 13 2012, p 6 
3 Chrorus, (2012), “Chorus Investor Slideshow: September 2012”, p.32 
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 Coalition members consider that it is misleading of Mr Quigley to 
suggest that the experience of Chorus in New Zealand supports NBN 
Co’s forecast of reaching a cost per premises passed of $1200 to $1500 
by the end of FY2013.  On the contrary, the Chorus experience suggests 
that it will take many years, and a rollout volume substantially higher 
than NBN Co has achieved, before it is able to reduce  the cost per 
premises to this level.   
 It is also worth bearing in mind that labour costs in New Zealand are 
materially lower than they are in Australia. 
Recommendations 
 NBN Co to immediately publish full capital expenditure figures per 
premise (including all direct costs of the relevant network, and an 
explicit and transparent allocation of transit and other shared or 
indirect capital costs between currently passed and future premises) 
for: 
 The cohort of premises passed with fibre in brownfield areas. 
 The cohort of premises passed with fibre in greenfield areas. 
 The cohort of premises covered by the fixed wireless network. 
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 NBN Co should also provide a comparison against the assumed costs 
contained in the 2012-15 Corporate Plan and should publish trends in 
cost over time so that it is able to assess the extent to which the NBN 
Co’s ‘learning curves’ have led to gains.  
2 Telcos Raise Concerns Over Proposed NBN Price 
Hikes  
 Modelling conducted by Optus and submitted to the ACCC suggest 
that under the current Special Access Undertaking proposed by the 
NBN Co to the ACCC, it is likely that there will be significant fixed line 
price increases after a long period of falling prices. 
 Assuming fixed broadband usage (in terms of data volumes) increases 
by around 28 per cent per year which is  its current trend, Optus found 
the SAU and NBN Co’s proposed pricing will drive a 32.3% increase in 
real prices for end users over the next decade4. 
 
 Telstra wrote to the ACCC stating that if usage grew 1 per cent per 
year, prices would rise 3 per cent, but “using the more realistic 
assumption that usage increases by 30 per cent per annum, the CAGR 
for the basket of AVC and CVC services purchased by end-users is 19 
 
4 Optus, (2012), “Optus Submission to the ACCC Consultation Paper”, p.56, available online at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=1099505&nodeId=1a6f2523b5c77adccaa1eb
46da666601&fn=Optus%20submission%20-
%20SAU%20consultation%20paper%20(18%20January%202013).pdf 
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per cent”5.  The monthly price of wholesale broadband (across a basket 
of plans) would rise from $28 in 2013 to $145 in 2028. 
 Additionally, it is concerning to Coalition members that the NBN Co 
has explicitly acknowledged that its current prices reflect neither its 
costs, nor the charges needed to recover its reasonable costs and make 
the return on invested capital that has been  claimed by the 
Government. 
 On January 14, 2013, the NBN Co’s General Manager Engagement and 
Group Coordination Richard Home stated in a letter lodged with the 
ACCC: “The initial prices (as set out in the SAU) were developed in 
consultation with access seekers so as to enable a smooth transition for 
end users from legacy networks to the NBN.  As such the initial prices 
are not the result of modeling of NBN Co’s costs and demand and NBN 
Co has been very clear on this in its consultation with access seekers.”6 
 The implication of this admission for consumers is that the 
Government’s frequent assertions that prices for ADSL2+ equivalent 
services over the NBN will remain at current levels have no basis in 
economic reality. 
Recommendations 
 That the Government submit the NBN project to a rigorous cost benefit 
analysis. 
 That such an analysis include credible estimates of construction costs 
that incorporate actual construction data, credible estimates of revenues 
given current trends in the global telecommunications market, and the 
resulting implications for end user prices given NBN Co’s currently 
proposed SAU and pricing. 
 
5 Telstra, (2012), “Telstra Submission to the ACCC Consultation Paper”, pp.67-68, available online 
at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=1099509&nodeId=9529f1bc961b9371229b6e
5a6fecccfa&fn=Telstra%20submission%20-
%20SAU%20consultation%20paper%20(18%20January%202013).pdf 
6 NBN Co, (2013),  “NBN Co Special Access Undertaking”, available online here: 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=1097798&nodeId=74050df7815c2c03116ed4
2b59af5d51&fn=Letter%20from%20NBN%20Co%20-
%20Response%20to%20Optus%20on%20request%20for%20financial%20data%20(14%20January%2
02013).pdf 
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 That the Government investigate means of delivering super fast 
broadband that permit a more prudent level of investment, and hence 
less pressure from NBN Co for regulatory settings that enable 
aggressive uplift and recovery of costs through rapid increases in real 
revenue per user. 
3. Analysts Question Whether Corporate Plan 
Revenues Achievable 
 In August 2011 RBS analyst Ian Martin wrote in the Telecommunications 
Journal of Australia7 that NBN Co’s corporate plan appeared risky if 
taken at face value. Risks to the Corporate Plan included cost blowouts 
building the NBN; and the danger NBN Co may not meet its take-up 
targets (exacerbated by a very low forecast of ‘wireless-only’ 
households in 10 years time). 
 Other analysts have raised concerns that the NBN will not be able to 
reverse the global telecommunications trend of the past decade which 
has seen nominal revenues flatline despite huge increases in speeds and 
data offered to customers. 
 For instance, in August 2007 TPG offered an 18GB cap at $49.99.  In 
2013 it offers a 500GB cap at $49.99.  Users have enjoyed  more and 
more data for the same price. 
 NBN Co, in contrast, expects to lift monthly wholesale revenue from 
$24 in FY2012 to $63 in FY2021.8  Adjusted for inflation, revenue per 
user more than doubles in nine years. 
 UK analyst Robert Kenny recently wrote: “They [NBN Co] expect 
consumers to be willing to pay substantially more to get higher speeds, 
with a result that the typical user increases their spend by about 70% 
over the next decade. While it is intuitive that consumers might pay 
more for higher speeds, as we have seen historically they haven't had 
to.”9 
 
7 Martin, I., (2011), “A Significant Gap in the NBN Corporate Plan”, in the Telecommunications 
Journal of Australia, Vol 61, No 3. 
8 NBN Co, (2012), “Corporate Plan, 2012-15”, p.69 
9 Kenny, R., (2012), “NBN Co’s Bold Assumptions on Australians’ Willingness to Pay”, available 
online at: http://commsthought.blogspot.co.uk/2012/11/nbn-cos-bold-assumptions-on-
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 There are also questions about NBN Co’s projected revenues vis a vis 
the likely future size of the entire Australian fixed line broadband and 
telephony market. 
 Deutsche Bank analyst Vikas Gour10 in October 2012 released research 
implicitly suggesting NBN Co’s actual revenues could be below 
estimates.  He forecast four retail service providers (Telstra, Optus, TPG 
and iiNet) with 96 per cent of the market in FY2024 would pay $3.8 
billion to NBN Co in access fees that year.11 
 Yet the NBN Co 2012-2015 Corporate Plan projects revenues of $6.2 
billion in FY2021 and $9.8 billion in FY2028.12 This equates to $7.9 
billion in FY2024 if growth is assumed to be linear between NBN Co’s 
two explicit estimates. 
 Bluntly, NBN Co’s internal estimate of the 2024 fixed line market, 
which relies on revenue per user increasing 9 per cent above the  
inflation rate each year over a period of more than a decade , is twice as 
large as that of a respected securities analyst whose work is subject to 
close financial market scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                                                    
australians.html 
10 Deutsche, (2012), “Telecommunications: Leaders and Laggards in an NBN Environment”, 
October 12. 
11 Ibid. p.15 
12 NBN Co, (2012), “Corporate Plan, 2012-15”, p.72 
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 A JP Morgan report on Telstra13 projects in FY 2020 it will pay NBN Co 
$1.7 billion for access and have a retail market share of 39 per cent.  
That implies access revenue for the whole market of $4.4 billion.  It 
compares to NBN Co’s FY2020 revenue estimate of $5.2 billion. 
 The uncertain economic viability of the NBN is a large potential liability 
for future Governments.  NBN Co Chairman Harrison Young has stated 
there is no legal requirement to provide taxpayers with a particular 
return on investment : “Our Shareholder hasn't given us a return 
hurdle. They've given us a task and asked us to keep them posted.”14 
Recommendations 
 That the NBN’s modelling, analysis and detailed financial projections of 
its capital and operating costs, and of future end user prices and 
demand, be made public. 
4. Rollout Delays - Problems With Contractor Syntheo 
 In 83 FSAMs where construction of the fibre network began between 
June 2011 and March 2012, there have been extensive delays. 
 The ‘Monthly Ready for Service’ rollout plans published on the NBN 
website showed that as of June, the estimated construction timeframe to 
completion was 14.8 months on those 83 FSAMs. 
 By December, the average construction timeframe was 16.5 months 
with the vast majority FSAMs still to be activated. 
 
 
13 JP Morgan, (2012), “Telstra Corporation,” December 13. 
14 Young, H., (2011), “The Governance of the NBN”, available online at: 
http://www.nbnco.com.au/news-and-events/news/the-governance-of-nbn-co.html 
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 At a recent estimates hearing, NBN Co CEO Mike Quigley also said that 
forecasts for June 30 have had to be revised down: 
 “You will also notice, if you look carefully there, that we have 
slightly lowered the number of premises forecast to be passed by 
the end of June 2013. In October we were forecasting just under 
300,000 premises passed; we are now forecasting almost exactly 
the target of 286,000. The reason for the change is that one of our 
construction partners has significantly reduced its forecast since 
we presented back in the October time frame.”15 
 Mr Quigley said that these revisions were due to the contractor for the 
Western Australia, South Australia and Northern Territory rollout, 
Syntheo.  On 25 FSAMs that Syntheo began construction on between 
June 2011 and March 2012, not a single one is ready for service. 
 Mr Quigley also said NBN Co has already paid its contractor Syntheo 
pre-payments, as is usual for large construction contracts, and has a 
 
15 Environment and Communications Legislation Committee, (2013), “Estimates”, February 12, 
p.100 
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range of contractual protections against non-delivery but refused to 
elaborate on them: 
 “Senator BIRMINGHAM: What contingencies does NBN Co. 
have in place where contractors fail to meet their targets?  
Mr Quigley: We have a range of the usual commercial conditions 
you would expect in such contracts if a contractor is in default.  
Senator HEFFERNAN: Such as?  
Mr Quigley: We apply, obviously, penalties. We are not going into 
details of the contracts.  
Senator Conroy: This is a hypothetical question. The company are 
not in default.  
Mr Quigley: No, they are not in default.  
Senator HEFFERNAN: Do they get paid in arrears or—  
CHAIR: Order, Senator Heffernan! You do not have the call.  
Senator HEFFERNAN: I think it is a fair question to ask.  
Senator Conroy: You are asking commercial-in-confidence 
questions.  
Senator BIRMINGHAM: What is the nature of payments made to 
Syntheo? Are there up-front payments made?  
Mr Quigley: Yes, there are up-front payments made for 
mobilisation for all of our construction contractors.  
Senator BIRMINGHAM: Can you talk us through the different 
types of payments that are made?  
Mr Quigley: The payments are phased relative to the different 
phases of the project. There is a design phase, then there is a build 
phase, and there are various phases in the build. The payments are 
obviously paid at the different phases, as they are completed.  
Senator BIRMINGHAM: What payments have been made to 
Syntheo to date in relation to these 25 FSAMs?  
Mr Quigley: I do not have that number with me. There have 
obviously been some payments made for the designs of each of 
those FSAMs and some mobilisation payments. I could not give 
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you the number off the top of my head. I would have to take that 
one on notice.”16 
Recommendations 
 The NBN Co and Government should urgently explore ways of 
speeding up deployment of super fast broadband. 
5. NBN Struggling to Connect to Multi Dwelling Units 
 In May 2011, the NBN Co put out a request for proposals for MDU 
cablers.  The RFP stated the NBN was looking for companies to carry 
out “installing fibre cabling and equipment within common areas of 
existing MDUs using pre-supplied detailed designs and bills of 
material”17.   
 As of October 2012, the NBN had still not signed contracts to connect 
MDUs.  At a public hearing into the NBN, the NBN Co’s Chief 
Operating Officer Ralph Steffens said: 
 “Mr Steffens:   We are in trials with a number of contractors. We 
are about to award the contracts for the MDUs. 
Mr TURNBULL:  Yes. Can you tell us who those contractors are? 
Mr Steffens:  No, because we have not concluded it. The number 
of MDUs passed I would need to take on notice.”18 
 Mr Steffens also said that the NBN Co has a particular problem with 
mapping information when it comes to MDUs: “It varies dramatically, 
not only between the geography but also between the types of 
premises. Multi dwelling units are typically a lot more inaccurate than 
single-dwelling units. It is a significant percentage, but there is a huge 
variety between the geographies.”19 
 The NBN noted in its 2012 corporate plan that the difficulty in 
connecting MDUs has led to increased capital costs: “NBN Co’s 
 
16 Environment and Communications Legislation Committee, (2013), “Estimates”, February 12, 
p.109 
17 http://www.nbnco.com.au/working‐for‐us/tenders/a092‐rfp‐mdu‐cabling‐contractors.html 
18 Joint Committee on the NBN, (2012), “Public Hearing”, October 30, 2012, p.18 
19 Joint Committee on the NBN, (2012), “Public Hearing”, October 30, 2012, p.4 
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experience in initial deployment sites has highlighted the challenges for 
connecting premises in MDUs and additional costs have therefore been 
embedded in the 2012-15 Corporate Plan.”20 
 The NBN stated in an answer to questions on notice that only a very 
small percentage of MDUs passed have been connected: 
 “As at 7 December 2012, more than one-third (35 per cent) of 
Brownfields residential MDUs passed by the NBN either had an 
active service or were able to order an active service. The 
definition of MDUs (refer page 93 of the NBN Co Corporate Plan 
2012-15) ranges from duplex type premises to 200 plus unit 
apartment blocks. NBN is currently trialling different connection 
methods in MDUs nationally in First Release Sites. The learnings 
from these trials to date have led to some revisions in the scope of 
work to connect these premises in a more efficient and cost 
effective manner. Many require a bespoke solution different to 
single-dwelling units (SDUs) and this has resulted in some delays 
is servicing these premises. NBN Co is working with the industry 
to provide regular information to MDU owner's corporations and 
residents ahead of connections. NBN Co is currently in 
negotiations with a number of specialist contractors to supply 
project management, design and installation of fibre into these 
premises. Field work commencement is imminent.”21 
 The NBN also stated: “As at 7 December 2012, there were 137 active 
connections in brownfields residential MDUs”.22 
 Two weeks later, the NBN Co issued a press release which claimed the 
network had connected an additional 100 MDUs in just two weeks: “So 
far NBN Co has rolled out the network to 237 residential MDUs across 
Australia, with work underway on a further 131.”23 
 On December 21, 2012, the NBN Co signed a contract with construction 
firm Downer EDI and Universal Communications Group Limited to 
service MDUs.  The contracts were worth $87 million in total and will 
 
20 NBN Co, (2012), “Corporate Plan, 2012-15”, p.14 
21 NBN Co, (2013), “Answers to Questions on Notice, Public Hearing 30 October 2012”, Question 78 
22 NBN Co, (2013), “Answers to Questions on Notice, Public Hearing 30 October 2012”, Question79 
23 NBN Co, (2012), “NBN Co signs contracts to connect flats and units to the NBN”, available online at 
http://www.nbnco.com.au/news‐and‐events/news/nbn‐co‐signs‐contracts‐to‐connect‐flats‐and‐units.html 
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cover 17,600 blocks of apartments across four states and territories over 
the next two years.24 
 The NBN has also created a national register for Multi Dwelling Unit 
strata managers to coordinate connections to the network25. 
 However, it is of concern that the NBN has still not signed contracts to 
connect MDUs in Western Australia, South Australia and the Northern 
Territory. 
 It is also unclear whether the 17,600 blocks of apartments will cover the 
entire network build over the next two years.  The NBN Co has forecast 
that it will pass 1.1m premises by the end of June 2014 in the fibre 
brownfields footprint and will pass 178,000 premises in the fibre 
greenfields footprint. 
 The NBN implementation study found that MDUs account for 34 per 
cent of premises in Australia26.  There are 431,000 buildings with 2-5 
premises, accounting for a total of 1.135m premises.  There are 119,000 
buildings with 5-25 premises, accounting for a total of 1.268m premises.  
And there are 20,000 buildings with 25 or more premises, accounting 
for a total of 1.211m premises.   
 NBN Co’s current contracts cover only 3 per cent of Multi Dwelling 
Unit buildings in Australia. 
Recommendations 
 The NBN is to publish a register of all MDUs already ‘passed’ by the 
network, but which are unable to connect to the network, to allow 
residents and body corporates to see when services will become 
available. 
 If an MDU building cannot connect to the network, those figures should 
be excluded from the figures reported as ‘premises passed’. 
 
24 NBN Co, (2012), “NBN Co signs contracts to connect flats and units to the NBN”, available online 
at http://www.nbnco.com.au/news-and-events/news/nbn-co-signs-contracts-to-connect-flats-
and-units.html 
25 NBN Co, (2013), “Helping to Connect Apartments to the NBN”, available online at: 
http://www.nbnco.com.au/blog/connecting-apartments-mdus-nbn.html 
26 McKinsey, (2009), “NBN Implementation Study”, p.79 
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 The NBN should immediately investigate international experience of 
connecting MDUs using existing internal wiring, including Fibre to the 
Basement. 
 The Shareholder Minister’s Statement of Expectations to the NBN Co 
should be amended so that the NBN Co is no longer expected to 
terminate the fibre at each individual premises.  The NBN Co should be 
given scope to terminate the fibre at an appropriate distance from the 
end user’s premises, as would still allow the delivery of very fast 
broadband. 
6. NBN and DBCDE Spending Excessively on 
Advertising Without Measuring Effectiveness 
 In May 2012 estimates, the NBN claimed its overall marketing spend for 
2011-12 would be $8.12 million.27 
 Yet in its annual report, the NBN listed ‘Communication and marketing 
campaigns’ as having cost $11.226 million in 2011-1228.  This represents 
a 38 per cent blowout in what was reported to Estimates in May. 
 Recent media reports revealed various Government departments have 
spent $29 million on NBN-related advertising since 2010 and that the 
Department is planning a further $20 million spend in 2012-1329. 
 The NBN has stated that its media expenditure is forecast to be 
approximately $11.9 million for 2012-1330. 
 Given that the NBN is forecasting 78,500 net subscriber gains in 2012-
13, this level of expenditure appears excessive.  For each new customer, 
the NBN Co will spend more than $150 on advertising and the DBCDE 
will spend more than $250 on advertising. 
 
27	Estimates,	May	24,	pp.178‐179	
28	NBN	Co	Annual	Report,	2011‐12,	p.79	
29	Battersby,	L.,	(2012),	“Critics	Attack	Plan	to	Spend	More	on	NBN	Advertising”,	available	online	here.	
30 NBN Co, (2013), “Answers to Questions on Notice, Public Hearing 30 October 2012”, 
Question370 
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 It is also important to note that the NBN is not selling services direct to 
consumers.  So the NBN’s advertising is on top of the money spent by 
RSPs who ultimately form the relationship with individual customers. 
 In addition, the NBN Co employees 52 staff in its 
media/communications division31.  As at June 30, the NBN Co’s entire 
staff headcount was 1,67432, so the proportion of media and 
communications staff is very high. 
 By comparison, ACMA employs 15 media and communications staff 
members, the DBCDE employs 23 media and communications staff and 
the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
employs 51 media and communications staff33. 
 It is also alarming that Senator Stephen Conroy continues to 
misrepresent the NBN Committee’s unanimous support for the 
advertising campaign.  In October Estimates Senator Conroy said:  “The 
additional opex is also in part due to increased resources at NBN Co. 
for public information campaigns—something you personally 
supported in the joint parliamentary committee, as did Mr Turnbull. 
Let us not forget that that was your recommendation, and NBN Co. has 
done just that.”34 
 In fact, nothing could be further from the truth.  In the Third Progress 
Report on the NBN issued by the Joint Committee, Coalition members 
issued a dissenting report which included a recommendation stating: 
“The Government and NBN Co conduct a review of its advertising 
spending for effectiveness and measure this against uptake and other 
relevant metrics. Expenditure should be reduced unless it can be 
demonstrated as providing value for money. The NBN Co should 
refrain from advertising Stage One of the fibre rollout in suburbs and 
 
31 NBN Co, (2013), “Answers to Questions on Notice, Public Hearing 30 October 2012”, 
Question389 
32 NBN Co, (2012), “Annual Report”, p.24 
33 Berkovic, N., (2012), “PM's $150m Spin Doctor Brigade”, in The Australian, available online at: 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/media/pms-150m-spin-doctor-brigade/story-e6frg996-
1226448739077 
34	Estimates,	October	16,	p.127	
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regional areas which have not been included in the Stage One 
schedule”35. 
 Announcing an additional $15 million spend by the Government in 
2012-13, the Age reported Joint Committee chairman Rob Oakeshott 
said the committee did not recommend more advertising and the 
upcoming campaign would have to be a ''much better standard of 
advertising than we have seen to date'' to justify the $14.7 million price 
tag. He said the last NBN campaign was “bland, blancmange and 
shameless … that in the eyes of many was a waste of money”36. 
Coalition Criticism of NBN Advertising Campaigns 
 Promotional material was published in regions not included in stage 
one of the rollout, creating confusion over when the NBN will be 
available37. 
 Much of the material created a false impression that many services and 
applications that are of public benefit can only be delivered on a fibre-
to-the-premise network38. 
 There was insufficient focus on pressing public interest issues, such as 
the decommissioning of the copper network and the lack of RSPs 
offering services over the NBN’s Uni-V ports. 
Recommendations 
 The NBN Co and the DBCDE need to measure the effectiveness of their 
overall advertising and marketing spending, to justify any ongoing 
increases. 
 Both the NBN Co and the DBCDE should conduct research into public 
perceptions and understanding of key policy issues such as: 
 The looming decommissioning of the copper network in areas where 
FSAMs are active. 
 
35	Dissenting	Report	by	Coalition	Members	and	Senators,	available	online	here,	p.137.	
36	Battersby,	L.,	(2012),	“Critics	Attack	Plan	to	Spend	More	on	NBN	Advertising”,	available	online	here	
37 See	Dissenting	Report	by	Coalition	Members	and	Senators,	available	online	here,	p.137. 
38 For	instance,	the	‘Connecting	Australia’	newspaper	published	by	the	DBCDE.		See	Turnbull,	M.,	(2012),	“The	NBN	
Supports	Newspapers.	As	for	the	Public	Interest…”	available	online	here. 
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 Retail offerings for essential services, such as analogue medical 
device connections. 
 A home owners’ responsibility in terms of replacing battery back-
ups. 
 If the research shows deficient community awareness of key public 
interest topics, the current spending on marketing and promotion of the 
NBN need to be redirected to address them. 
7. NBN Looking to Sign Longer Contract Periods 
 It was reported last October that the NBN is investigating extending the 
contract period for future contracts to fixed four year terms39. 
 In recent estimates the NBN refused to comment on current contract 
negotiations: 
“Mr Quigley: We are in the process of having discussions with all 
of our contractors. I cannot give you a date when they will be 
concluded or contracts signed. Obviously with all of our contracts 
we look to renewing them as they fall due. 
Senator BIRMINGHAM: The initial contracts were on the basis of 
two year plus one plus one year?  
Mr Quigley: With the construction contractors, yes.  
Senator BIRMINGHAM: Is NBN Co. looking at a variance to that 
for the renewables?  
Mr Quigley: We may. Until we finish the discussions I cannot give 
you an answer on that.  
Senator BIRMINGHAM: Are reports that you are offering fixed 
four-year terms for contractors correct?  
Mr Quigley: I will not comment on what we may or may not be 
offering with particular contractors.  
Senator BIRMINGHAM: Why is NBN Co. looking at changing its 
contract periods?  
 
39 Durie, J., (2012), “Quigley Locks in Fast Track Deals”, in The Australian, October 11, available 
online at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/quigley-locks-in-fast-track-
deals/story-e6frg9io-1226493193077 
116  
 
Mr Quigley: We only look at changing contract periods if we 
believe there is an advantage to NBN Co. to do so—in other 
words, we can get the build done with greater certainty and at a 
lower rate.  
Senator BIRMINGHAM: When does NBN Co. need to resolve 
those contracts by?  
Mr Quigley: I suspect we will want to have some of them that are 
falling due in the middle of this year done before then. We need to 
renew them before then.”40 
Recommendations 
 The benefits of changing contract terms in the lead up to the September 
14 election need to be clearly articulated by the NBN Co. 
 The NBN Co and its board should be clearly mindful of a possibility of 
a change of Government and the need to alter contracts down the 
contract.  The NBN Co and its board should ensure suitable flexibility is 
written into the terms of future contracts.  If this is not possible, then 
the likely costs of changing and lengthening contract terms need to be 
weighed against perceived benefits. 
8. Lack of Transparency and Accountability in 
Reporting to the Committee 
Take-up Rates 
 Take-up rates have a direct bearing on the rate of return for the NBN 
project, even when taking into account the fact that NBN Co will 
eventually be the national monopoly wholesale provider of fixed line 
broadband and voice services. Therefore, accurate and regular 
reporting of take-up rates is necessary for the Committee to understand 
the true state of the NBN rollout. 
 To date, reporting of take-up rates by NBN Co has been unsatisfactory. 
NBN Co provided the following response to the Committee, after being 
 
40 Environment and Communications Legislation Committee, (2013), “Estimates”, February 12, 
p.120 
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asked in September 2012 to provide daily activation rates for the NBN 
fibre network: 
“NBN Co has not done this calculation as it is not meaningful at 
this stage of the roll-out based on a number of factors impacting 
the calculation including the time taken to finalise the Definitive  
Agreements. With the Definitive Agreements now unconditional 
and NBN Co able to ramp up the rollout of the NBN fibre 
network, NBN Go's 2012-15 Corporate Plan is forecasting a daily 
run rate for FY2013 of up to 201 (pg 37 refers) for fibre premises 
connected.41 
 NBN Co bills RSPs for each customer they connect to the NBN network, 
so it is extremely unlikely that NBN Co cannot provide accurate and 
timely figures for the number of customers connected to the network in 
a given period of time. Indeed, if it cannot provide such figures, the 
Committee is entitled to ask how the company is accurately billing 
RSPs. 
Combining ISS and Wireless in Premises Passed/Covered Figures 
 NBN Co has at times included premises passed by the NBN Interim 
Satellite Service (ISS) with premises passed by the wireless network 
when reporting to the Committee.42 Combining premises passed figures 
for the ISS and wireless networks does not allow the Committee to 
develop a clear picture of how the network rollout is progressing. 
Inaccurate and Delayed Answers to Questions 
 NBN Co has, on many occasions, failed to either answer questions 
accurately or to provide answers within the requested timeframe, or 
both. This failure to provide timely and accurate answers to questions 
severely hampers the Committee’s ability to properly report to 
Parliament on the progress of the NBN project, as required by the 
Committee’s Resolution of Appointment. 
 By way of example, Mr Hartsuyker placed questions 19 and 20 on 
notice following the public hearing on 16 April 2012. The questions 
related to additional costs incurred by NBN Co to prepare the 
Bonnyrigg greenfields development in western Sydney for fibre 
 
41 JCNBN Answers to Questions in Writing (17 September 2012), Question 7 
42 JCNBN Answers to Questions in Writing (17 September 2012), Questions 1-5 
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installation. NBN Co provided answers in early June, which were not 
entirely accurate. The Committee sought clarification from NBN Co on 
26 June 2012. The Minister responded on 10 August with new 
information, some of which contradicted the initial answers given by 
NBN Co. The Committee sought further clarification about the 
contradictory answers on 16 August, with a final response received by 
the Committee on 20 August 2012. The outcome of this series of events 
was that it took four months to obtain accurate answers to a small 
number of relatively straightforward questions.  
 As a result of the example above, and other instances of inaccurate or 
delayed responses from NBN Co, it is difficult not to conclude that 
NBN Co and the Shareholder Ministers are at best seeking to avoid 
scrutiny of the NBN project, or at worst, systematically limiting the 
Committee’s ability to carry out its functions effectively. 
Recommendation 
 NBN Co provide the JCNBN with a standard monthly progress report 
not more than ten days after the end of each month, setting out the 
number of premises passed in the previous month by the fibre network, 
the number of premises passed in the previous month by the wireless 
network, and the number of premises that were connected to the 
network on each of the fibre, wireless, and satellite networks, and at 
what speed tier.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP 
Member for Wentworth 
on behalf of the Coalition Members of the Joint Committee 
on the National Broadband Network 
  
 
 
Report on the Committee’s Visit to 
New Zealand 
Introduction 
The reciprocal Australia New Zealand Parliamentary Committee Exchange 
Program (NZCEP) has operated on an annual rotational basis between the 
respective Australian and New Zealand Parliaments since 1989. In addition to 
bringing together Members of Parliament from both countries to discuss apposite 
issues of mutual interest, the NZCEP contributes to consolidating the existing 
Australia-New Zealand economic and diplomatic relationship. 
Although a newly established committee in the 43rd Parliament, the Joint 
Committee on the National Broadband Network (the committee) eagerly 
welcomed the opportunity to represent the Australian Parliament in the 2012 
NZCEP to learn about the New Zealand experience in developing its high speed 
broadband network. The committee was also pleased to offer its views on the 
Australian experience in development and implementation of the National 
Broadband Network (NBN). 
The committee undertook the 2012 NZCEP from 24 to 28 September and met with 
a range of private sector, government officials and parliamentarians, including the 
Commerce Select Committee and the Speaker of the New Zealand Parliament. The 
committee also undertook a half day inspection of fibre and copper broadband 
network infrastructure, including a central exchange. 
This delegation report contains a summary of the information presented to 
Members and the associated issues discussed during the 2012 NZCEP. 
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Visit Objectives 
The objectives of the 2012 NZCEP were to: 
 Reaffirm existing links with the New Zealand Parliament 
 Establish links with the Commerce Select Committee, selected private 
sector organisations and Government agencies responsible for delivery of 
New Zealand’s high speed broadband network 
 Gain a practical insight into the workings, policies and funding 
arrangements underpinning the Ultra Fast Broadband and Rural 
Broadband Initiatives. In particular to explore: 
 The mix of technologies incorporated in New Zealand and the 
rationale for technology selection;  
 The logistic, budget and time implications of selected technologies 
and the possible impact on subsequent wholesale products and 
potential retail service provider take up; 
 Associated telecommunications regulatory issues in relation to the 
demerger of Telecom New Zealand (Telecom NZ); 
 Wholesale pricing issues; 
 Community consultation and community education strategies; 
 Government, corporate and community readiness; 
 Existing employment and skilling issues. 
Visit Program 
Meetings 
The delegation commenced its visit program in Auckland where it met with the 
National Industry Organiser, Telecommunications of the New Zealand Engineers, 
Printers and Manufacturers Union and discussed labour force issues such as 
potential skilling opportunities, future employment demand and supply for 
construction of the high speed broadband network, and skilled workers being lost 
to Australia as part of its higher income and demand for the NBN build. 
The committee also met with representatives of Crown Fibre Holdings Limited 
(CFH), which is responsible for the management of New Zealand’s high speed 
broadband network, with the telecommunications company building the wireless 
network under the Rural Broadband Initiative (RBI): Vodafone New Zealand 
(Vodafone). 
Finally the committee met with Northpower Fibre Limited (Northpower), one of 
four local fibre companies tasked with building part of the fibre network under a 
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public-private partnership arrangement with CFH as the company representing 
the New Zealand Government. 
In Wellington, the committee met with former and present Ministers responsible 
for the establishment, policy development and current build of New Zealand’s 
high speed broadband network and associated public service departments and 
agencies such as the: Ministry for Business Innovation and Employment, Treasury, 
and Ministry of Education. 
The committee also met with the Commerce Select Committee and former Chair 
and members of the Finance and Expenditure Select Committee which inquired 
into the draft legislation underpinning the reform of the New Zealand 
Telecommunications industry, including the demerger of Telecom NZ. 
The committee gained an appreciation of the broader regulatory processes 
surrounding the establishment and build of the New Zealand fibre network by 
meeting with the Commerce Commission which is the equivalent of the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.  
The committee also met with Chorus which was formerly the network arm of 
Telecom NZ prior to its voluntary demerger. 
 
 
 
NZ Figure 1  Delegation Members in front of the New Zealand Parliament Building 
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NZ Figure 2  Delegation Members with Dr the Rt Hon Lockwood Smith MP, Speaker 
 
 
 
NZ Figure 3  Delegation Members with Hon Craig Foss MP, Minister of Commerce and 
Broadcasting and former Chair, Finance and Expenditure Select Committee 
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Infrastructure Inspections 
The committee undertook a half day inspection of newly built and installed fibre 
network components and existing copper network infrastructure at the Wellington 
Central Exchange and at the Churton Park subdivision respectively. 
As part of these inspections, the committee was shown the internal components of 
a newly built fibre cabinet that premises and households may elect to connect to 
and receive high speed broadband. The committee was also shown the existing 
cable television infrastructure and copper network broadband infrastructure 
located within 100 metres of the fibre network cabinet. 
As the committee had previously inspected NBN infrastructure, Members were 
able to compare the visual impact and also gain a basic understanding of the 
practical component parts of New Zealand’s cabinetisation infrastructure of its 
fibre network in relation to its existing copper network. 
The 2012 NZCEP official program is attached at the end of this delegation report. 
 
NZ Figure 4 Delegation Members at the Wellington Central Exchange 
 
 
NZ Figure 5 A Chorus representative showing the cabinet infrastructure supporting the copper 
and fibre networks 
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New Zealand’s High Speed Broadband Initiatives 
Background 
In September 2009, the New Zealand Government announced that it would 
provide up to NZ$1.5 billion to fund the rollout of a high speed broadband 
network or Ultra Fast Broadband Initiative (UFB). The New Zealand Government 
implemented its UFB policy to: 
...improve productivity in the economy, New Zealand’s global 
competitiveness and the lives of New Zealanders. To this end it 
has put in place the Ultra-Fast Broadband Initiative to assist and 
encourage the private sector to invest in early deployment of fibre, 
with a particular focus on sectors that are expected to yield the 
greatest productivity benefits.1 
The UFB is also expected to improve social policy outcomes for education and 
health.2 
The high speed broadband network policy would be realised through the 
combination of the Ultra Fast Broadband Initiative (UFBI) and Rural Broadband 
Initiative (RBI).3 
The UFB and RBI will be rolled out over a ten year period (due for completion in 
2019) and are intended to reach 75 per cent of New Zealanders to provide 
download speeds of at least 100Mbps and upload speeds of up to 50Mbps through 
the combination of a fibre-to-the-premise4 and fibre-to-the-node network5. Priority 
for network rollout for the first six years (ending 2015) is for: broadband users 
such as businesses, schools and health services, as well as Greenfield 
developments and certain areas of residential areas. The UFB will be rolled out to 
urban and suburban residential areas gradually with completion expected by 
2019. 
 
1  Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Ultra Fast Broadband Initiative, 
Government Policy Statement, Extract from New Zealand Gazette, 13 October 2011, No. 155, p. 
4440,  <www.med.govt.nz> 
2  Crown Fibre Holdings, Ultra Fast Broadband Update: Briefing to Australian National 
Broadband Network Committee, 25 September 2012, p. 3. 
3  Both initiatives include a combination of fibre-to-the-premise and fibre-to-the-node as well as 
wireless connections. 
4  Fibre-to-the-home and fibre-to-the-premise are interchangeable terms where fibre is deployed 
directly to each premise or home. 
5  Fibre-to-the-node allows for fibre to be deployed to centrally located cabinets off which 
premises may then be connected. 
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Funding Arrangements for Fibre Network Build 
The network is being funded through a combination of public-private partnership6 
and joint venture arrangements between the New Zealand Government and its 
UFB partners. The Government established Crown Fibre Holdings Limited (CFH)7 
to manage its investment in UFB infrastructure and manage and monitor the 
rollout of the UFB by local, partner fibre companies (Local Fibre Companies).8 
Crown Fibre Holdings has negotiated agreements with four providers to connect 
fibre to different regions and be directed to create open access infrastructure. 
These four companies are:  
 Chorus Limited (formerly the network arm of Telecom NZ)9 
responsible for 69.4 per cent of total UFB coverage 
 Enable Services Limited responsible for 15.3 per cent of UFB total 
coverage 
 Waikato Networks Limited responsible for 13.7 per cent of UFB total 
coverage 
 Northpower Fibre Limited responsible for 1.6 per cent of UFB total 
coverage10 
Chorus Limited (Chorus) was created in December 2011 following the voluntary 
demerger (or structural separation) of Telecom NZ.11 Crown Fibre Holdings will 
invest NZ$929 million directly into Chorus with 50 per cent being non-voting 
shares and 50 per cent interest free loans. For the other three companies, they will 
each form a joint venture known as a ‘Local Fibre Company’ (LFC) with CFH.12 
 
6  Public Private Partnerships are ‘long-term contracts for the delivery of a service, where the 
provision of the service requires the construction of a facility or asset, or the enhancement of 
an existing facility. The private sector partner finances and builds the facility, operates it to 
provide the service and usually transfers control of it to the public sector at the end of the 
contract.’ The Treasury, Guidance for Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in New Zealand, 
October 2009, p. 1. Governments tend to favour public private partnerships to assist in funding 
large scale projects and mitigate associated short term project risks. 
7  Crown Fibre Holdings was formed as a ‘Crown-Owned company’ under the Companies Act 
1993. It is listed on the fourth schedule of the Public Finance Act 1989 and so is subject to the 
Crown Entities Act 2004 requirements to prepare a statement of intent and an annual report. 
8  Crown Fibre Holding’s function is to ensure the implementation of the Government’s UFB 
policy: by managing contracts, monitoring of crown investments, and supporting Government 
policy objectives. Crown Fibre Holdings, Ultra Fast Broadband Update: Briefing to Australian 
National Broadband Network Committee, 25 September 2012, p. 5. 
9  Chorus Limited was the network arm of Telecom New Zealand prior to the structural 
separation of Telecom New Zealand in December 2011 
10  Crown Fibre Holdings, Crown Partners, <www.crownfibre.govt.nz>. 
11  Telecom New Zealand was the largest telecommunications provider in New Zealand 
12  Crown Fibre Holdings, <www.crownfibre.govt.nz>. 
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Effectively the LFCs will build the fibre network and provide the wholesale 
platform from which telecommunications retail service providers (RSPs) will be 
able to seek access and provide an internet service to end users. To foster 
competition and ensure a more level ‘playing field’ into the longer term, the 
wholesale LFCs are prevented from providing a retail service across the fibre 
network. 
Ultra Fast Broadband Initiative 
Overview 
The UFB will be spread over 33 towns and cities across New Zealand as indicated 
in the coverage map with the largest population centres selected as the fibre 
rollout locations. The boundaries of the UFB coverage do not overlap exactly, with 
the ‘UFB being built in the most densely populated parts of metropolitan areas.’13 
The four LFCs are responsible for the build of the fibre network across the major 
cities and towns across New Zealand as follows: 
 Chorus – Auckland, Waiheke Island, Pukekohe, Waiuku, Whakatane, 
Rotorua, Taupo, Gisbourne, Napier-Hastings, Palmerston, North-
Fielding, Masterton, Wellington, Levin, Kapiti, Nelson, Blenheim, 
Greymouth, Ashburton, Timaru, Oamaru, Queenstown, Dunedin, 
Invercargill 
 UltraFast Fibre – Hamilton, Tokoroa, Tauranga, New Plymouth, 
Hawera, Wanganui 
 Enable – Christchurch, Rangiora 
 Northpower Fibre Limited – Whangarei.14 
Deployment, Pricing and Future Demand 
As at the end of June 2012 (represents a year of deployment), there were 76 311 
premises passed under the UFB. 
The pricing offered at the wholesale platform level is creating a situation where 
pricing at the retail level is currently lower than in the former retail market for 
ADSL broadband. 
 
13  Crown Fibre Holdings, Where and When is UFB being delivered?, 
<www.crownfibre.govt.nz>. 
14  Crown Fibre Holdings, Where and When is UFB being delivered?, 
<www.crownfibre.govt.nz>. 
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In line with international trends, CFH has estimated that as the fibre network 
build accelerates, demand for faster broadband will increase. Crown Fibre 
Holdings has estimated residential demand will be driven by ‘back-up and cloud 
based storage, working at and from home, extended school learning, advanced 
gaming, real-time entertainment, home security and triple play.’15 
 
Source Crown Fibre Holdings, <www.crownfibre.govt.nz/ufb-initiative/rollout-timetable/> 
Rural Broadband Initiative 
Overview 
In February 2011, following a tender process, the New Zealand Government 
entered into negotiations with Vodafone New Zealand (Vodafone) and 
Telecom NZ for the delivery of the RBI. The terms of the final agreement were 
accepted by the Government on 20 April 2011. Following the demerger of 
Telecom NZ in December 2011, Chorus Limited (the newly created company from 
the demerger) retained responsibility for implementation of the RBI. 
 
15  Crown Fibre Holdings, Ultra Fast Broadband Update: Briefing to Australian National 
Broadband Network Committee, 25 September 2012, p. 16. 
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Chorus Limited (Chorus) is responsible for the delivery of ‘fibre to schools, 
upgrading the rural network with fibre cabinets and broadband equipment, and 
fibre to the Vodafone mobile sites.’ While Vodafone has created a wireless 
network for rural areas which is designed to overcome distance and terrain 
challenges. 
Broadly, the RBI is designed to enable 252 000 rural households to receive high 
speed broadband at prices and levels of service comparable with urban areas. 
Around 86 per cent of rural households and businesses will receive broadband at 
peak speeds of at least 5Mbps. 
The fibre network will be extended to all rural public schools and hospitals, as 
well as a large number of rural public libraries. Mobile telephone coverage will 
also be extended by 6200 square kilometres. 
Improvements to access to high speed broadband through the RBI is expected to 
benefit rural and remote parts of New Zealand by enhancing the efficiency of agri-
business (which contributes to two thirds of New Zealand’s export income), as 
well as improve access to health services and education. 
Community Consultation 
Community consultation for the RBI has been enabled by the LFCs responsible for 
its rollout. Chorus and Vodafone are meeting with regional and local stakeholders 
on a six monthly basis to ‘build constructive collaborative relationships and 
identify potential efficiencies and benefits.’16 
In addition, a National Advisory Committee (NAC) was established ‘to provide 
advice and guidance to maximise benefits for rural communities.’ The NAC’s 
function is to ‘provide feedback on the RBI plans and guidance and advise on a 
range of issues during the roll out.  It will also facilitate collaboration between RBI 
partners and key rural stakeholders and identify opportunities to raise awareness 
of the initiative and stimulate demand for rural broadband services.’17 
 
16  Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Stakeholder Engagement on the RBI 
Rollout, <www.med.govt.nz>. 
17  Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Stakeholder Engagement on the RBI 
Rollout, <www.med.govt.nz>. 
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Source Vodafone Rural Broadband Initiative coverage 
Reform of the New Zealand Telecommunications Sector 
Telecom New Zealand Demerger 
Recent reform of the New Zealand telecommunications sector was implemented 
through the demerger (structural separation)18 of Telecom NZ. Telecom NZ as the 
largest fixed line and IT services industry market operator held significant market 
share and power and in order to participate in the wholesale provision of the new 
fibre network had to divest itself of its retail component.19 
 
18  Structural separation ‘demands management of network assets through a corporate entity that 
is distinct from the company that provides retail service. It implies greater complexity, costs 
and challenges to the coordination of network investment than functional separation which 
generally marked by ... the creation of divisions and ‘the need for Chinese Walls between 
network provision and the retailing of services within one company.’ Morgan K, 2008, The 
European Debate About Structural Separation: Possible Implications for Australia, 
Telecommunications Journal of Australia, Vol 58, No. 1, Monash University Press. 
19  Telecom NZ proposed its structural separation ‘to satisfy a government requirement that its 
partners in a NZ$1.35 billion broadband project could not also sell telecommunications 
services.’ Withers, T, 2011, Telecom NZ Shareholders Approve Demerger of Chorus Unit, 
Bloomberg, 26 October. 
130 REPORT ON THE COMMITTEE’S VISIT TO NEW ZEALAND 
 
 
The New Zealand Government’s proposed regulatory changes to implement the 
UFB were conditional on the Telecom NZ demerger. The post demerger 
Telecom NZ would be subject to less of the previous Telecom NZ-specific 
regulation allowing it ‘to compete on a similar regulatory footing with its market 
peers.’20 
On 26 October 2011 Telecom NZ shareholders approved the demerger of its 
Chorus21 Unit (which became a new entity – Chorus Limited), with the separation 
day occurring on 30 November 2011. 
Chorus then entered into a public private partnership with the New Zealand 
Government to build the majority of the fibre network22 and provide wholesale 
services through this network. The value of the investment provided to Chorus by 
the New Zealand Government is $929 million.23 Having divested its network arm, 
Telecom NZ became a retail service provider after the demerger.24 
In its presentation to shareholders, Telecom NZ outlined the benefits of the 
demerger as: 
 ‘Facilitates Chorus undertaking a leading role in the Government led 
fibre initiative 
 Aligns the interests of Chorus with the Government’s UFB objectives 
 Avoids Telecom NZ competing with Government backed fibre 
competition 
 Leads to the introduction of a simplified regulatory regime with greater 
certainty, reduced burden and less associated cost 
 Allows Telecom NZ and Chorus to further focus on their independent 
strategies and core competencies 
 Enables tailored capital structure and financial policies for Telecom NZ 
and Chorus 
 
20  Telecom NZ, Stock Exchange Announcement, Telecom to Demerge Chorus, 31 August 2011. 
21  Under the demerger of Telecom New Zealand shareholders received one share in Chorus 
Limited for every five shares of Telecom NZ held. Telecom NZ, Demerger Presentation, 
September 2011, p. 9. 
22  Under the public private partnership arrangement, Telecom NZ is responsible for delivering 
fast internet in 24 of the 33 fibre selected regions including Wellington and Auckland  which 
accounts for 70 per cent of New Zealand, covering 830 900 premises. Telecom NZ, Demerger 
Presentation, September 2011, p. 7. 
23  Telecom NZ, Demerger Presentation, September 2011, p. 7. 
24  Withers, T, 2011, Telecom NZ Shareholders Approve Demerger of Chorus Unit, Bloomberg, 
26 October. 
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 Allows for improved alignment of management incentives with 
performance at Telecom NZ and Chorus 
 Provides greater transparency and flexibility for investors.’25 
Inquiry into the Telecom New Zealand Demerger 
Prior to structural reform of the industry, the New Zealand Parliament’s Finance 
and Expenditure Select Committee was referred for inquiry and report the 
Telecommunications (TSO, Broadband, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill. The 
Bill would amend the Telecommunications Act 2001 to provide the framework for 
the Ultra Fast Broadband and Rural Broadband Initiatives, and implement the 
Government’s telecommunications service obligations. 
While inquiring into this Bill in an effort to provide parliamentary oversight, the 
New Zealand Parliament also referred Supplementary Order Paper (No 204) 
which contained the matter of the Telecom NZ demerger (and associated 
implementation framework). 
The committee gave in principle support to the Bill and accompanying contents of 
the Supplementary Order Paper with recommended amendments. The main areas 
of discussion undertaken centred on: 
 Pricing to ensure competition and adequate consumer take up to 
support a fibre network 
 Migration of customers to the fibre network 
 Attracting private sector financing for the fibre network build 
 Regulation of the major industry entities such as Crown Fibre Holdings 
and the Local Fibre Companies (whether pricing measures should be 
contained in a special access undertaking or whether to install a 
forbearance period preventing the Commerce Commission from 
investigating prices set for supplying the UFB until 31 December 2019. 
 Bringing forward the timeframe for review of the policy framework 
regulating telecommunications services in New Zealand to 2016 and 
widening the scope of the review to include:  
 Consultation with interested parties, the commerce Commission, 
consumers, and Maori 
 Development in wireless technologies 
 
25  Telecom NZ, Demerger Presentation, September 2011, pp 11 and 19 and Telecom NZ, Stock 
Exchange Announcement, Telecom to Demerge Chorus, 31 August 2011, p. 2. 
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 The experience of comparable jurisdictions such as Australia where 
appropriate and relevant. 
In regard to the TSO inquiry the committee met with the Commerce Select 
Committee. As a number of members of the Commerce Committee also 
participated in or had knowledge of the TSO inquiry, through its discussions the 
committee gained an insight into the types of discussions undertaken during the 
inquiry. 
The committee also met with other previous members of the Finance and 
Expenditure Committee, two of which are now Ministers, all of whom discussed 
their experience in undertaking the TSO Inquiry. 
Managing the Fibre Network Build and Rollout 
The New Zealand Government established CFH in December 2009 to ‘ensure the 
implementation of the Government’s UFB policy, specifically: 
 ‘Manage contracts to deliver the UFB objective 
 Monitor Crown investments in the UFB initiative 
 Support Government policy objectives’26 
This requires CFH to: 
 ‘Manage contracts, payments milestones, approvals 
 Manage Crown risk and financial exposure 
 Ensure deployment achieved and prioritised appropriately 
 Ensure UFB consistency’27 
In this context, CFH discussed: 
 the Government mandated UFB rollout target of reaching 75 per cent of 
premises by 2019 
 the investment structure of the UFB 
 how fibre network partners will build parts of the UFB 
 technologies used in the rollout 
 
26  Crown Fibre Holdings, Ultra Fast Broadband Update: Briefing to Australian National 
Broadband Network Committee, 25 September 2012, p. 5. 
27  Crown Fibre Holdings, Ultra Fast Broadband Update: Briefing to Australian National 
Broadband Network Committee, 25 September 2012, p. 5. 
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 current UFB deployment progress 
 product pricing and Australia-New Zealand network comparisons and 
organisational relationships 
 Network security 
As at the end of June 2012, 76 311 premises had been passed, with a view to 
having an accelerated rollout over the next seven years to reach over one million 
premises passed. 
Network Partner Companies 
The committee met with Northpower and Chorus, two of the LFCs responsible for 
the build of the UFB. Chorus is the largest LFC building the network to connect 24 
of the 33 fibre selected locations and Northpower is the smallest, building the fibre 
network for one of the 33 selected locations. The committee also met with 
Vodafone in regard to the build of the wireless network for the RBI and also 
providing services over the UFB. 
Chorus 
As New Zealand’s largest telecommunications infrastructure company, Chorus 
discussed how it is preparing to build the majority of the UFB and the planned 
reach of the UFB. Chorus representatives discussed their experience after a year of 
build which included:  
 extending the fibre network to schools 
 extending the fibre network to apartment blocks 
 future migration planning and factors and incentives to drive uptake of 
future demand for fibre 
 educating the consumer on the benefits of a fibre connection 
 funding arrangements and Universal Service Obligation 
 overview of negotiations in reaching an agreement prior to Telecom NZ 
demerger 
 current challenges of building a fibre network while maintaining a 
copper network 
 subsidy structure of connection per premise. 
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Northpower Fibre Limited 
Northpower is a trust owned company with 53 000 shareholders and is the 
smallest LFC. Northpower discussed its method of build, with 60 per cent 
overhead and 40 per cent underground and its aim of having a minimal impact on 
the environment and existing amenity. 
Northpower also spoke about the efficiency of its method of build and the low 
cost of overhead fibre deployment in comparison with the Tasmanian NBN 
rollout. 
Vodafone New Zealand  
Vodafone discussed the aims of its RBI rollout and its build of the wireless 
network expected to reach a greater number of premises in remote areas of 
New Zealand as well as improve mobile telephony in rural and remote areas. In 
this context Vodafone discussed or commented on: 
 Exploring the span of the satellite option (expected to provide 
broadband to between 2-3 per cent of New Zealand) 
 Size of the wireless network build 
 Consulting and working with local government 
 Building and pricing of towers 
 Number of homes covered per cell site 
 Pricing data model and funding arrangements for build 
 Interest from RSPs 
 Network security 
Regulatory Matters 
The committee met with the Commerce Commission and discussed a number of 
matters relating to regulation of the Telecommunications industry and the recent 
impact of the structural separation of Telecom NZ. In particular issues discussed 
included: 
 Legislative requirements of the Telecommunications Act 
 Regulatory implications of the forbearance period and role of the 
Commerce Commission in relation to the fibre network during this time 
 Expected national contribution of the fibre network build and use 
REPORT ON THE COMMITTEE’S VISIT TO NEW ZEALAND 135 
 
 
 Regulation of the copper network 
 Retail and wholesale structure of the UFB 
 VoiP services 
 Transition from a copper network to a fibre network 
 Wholesale pricing framework 
 Raising public awareness of the fibre network and services available 
through such a network 
Policy Considerations 
The committee also met with a number of Government agencies and discussed the 
objectives of the policies underpinning the UFB and RBI. Those agencies were the: 
Ministry of Business and Innovation and Employment, National Infrastructure 
Unit, Treasury and the Ministry of Education. Areas discussed included: 
 Momentum of the UFB and RBI build 
 Negotiations over wholesale pricing and RSP offerings 
 Measuring the impact of the services on business productivity and 
getting small businesses on line 
 Pricing of the end product 
 Level of regulation to maintain competition and uptake in the market 
 Considering the need to decommission the copper network 
 Cost and logistics of moving from a fibre-to-the-node to a fibre-to-the-
premise model 
 Creating local employment opportunities 
 Improving learning outcomes for students and in particular remote 
students through use of advanced technologies 
 Objective of the School Network Upgrade Project 
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Concluding Comments 
During the course of the 2012 NZCEP, the committee met and spoke with a wide 
range of parliamentary and industry representatives and organisations, all of 
which are participating or have participated in contributing to the development, 
build and regulation of the UFB and RBI. From these discussions, the committee 
has greatly expanded its knowledge of the types of issues, challenges and short 
term outcomes that are common to Australia and New Zealand in working 
towards and building a high speed broadband network. 
The committee has also been privileged to be privy to information on which it has 
not reported, but which was useful in setting the scene for Members to gain an 
appreciation of the ongoing and future challenges facing New Zealand in the 
delivery of high speed broadband. 
The committee thanks all the individuals and organisations who freely gave of 
their time and knowledge to discuss topical issues with Members and increase 
their understanding of the issues currently facing New Zealand in the continuing 
development and build of the UFB and RBI. The committee also thanks the Hon 
Amy Adams MP, Minister for Communications and Information Technology, Hon 
Craig Foss MP, Minister of Commerce, Hon David Cunliffe MP, Spokesperson for 
Economic Development, Mr Jonathan Young MP, Chair of the Commerce Select 
Committee and Members of the Commerce Select Committee. To this end, the 
committee exceeded the objectives of its New Zealand visit as part of the 
2012 NZCEP. 
Lastly, the committee thanks Dr the Rt Hon Lockwood Smith MP, Speaker of the 
New Zealand Parliament and His Excellency Michael Potts, High Commissioner 
for Australia for their hospitality and ensuring the visit was memorable. 
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Membership of the Delegation 
Leader Mr Robert Oakeshott MP 
Deputy Leader Mr Rob Mitchell MP 
Members Senator Doug Cameron 
 Mr Paul Fletcher MP 
 Senator Alex Gallacher 
Mr Luke Hartsuyker MP 
Hon Sussan Ley MP 
Mr Mike Symon MP 
 
Delegation Secretary Ms Stephanie Mikac 
Official Visit Program 
Tuesday, 25 September 
8.00 am Meeting with the Engineering, Printing and 
Manufacturing Union 
9.00 am – 10.00 am  Meeting with Crown Fibre Holdings Limited 
10.15 am – 11.15 am  Meeting with Vodafone New Zealand 
11.30 am – 12.30 pm  Meeting with Northpower Fibre Limited 
2.25 pm   Depart Auckland for Wellington 
3.25 pm   Arrive in Wellington 
4.30 pm – 5.30 pm Meeting with Hon David Cunliffe, Opposition 
Spokesperson for Economic Development 
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5.40 pm – 6.30 pm Telecommunications Forum Function hosted by Hon 
Amy Adams MP, Minister for Communications and 
Information Technology 
7.00 pm Official Dinner hosted by the Speaker, Dr the Rt Hon 
Lockwood Smith 
Wednesday, 26 September 
9.45 am – 12noon  Site inspection of the Wellington Central Exchange and 
the Churchton Park telecommunications and network 
infrastructure 
12.30 pm – 1.50 pm Meeting with Hon Amy Adams MP, Minister for 
Communication and Information Technology 
1.40 pm – 2.45 pm  Observe Question Time 
3.00 pm – 4.00 pm  Meeting with the Commerce Commission 
4.15 pm – 5.00 pm  Meeting with Ministry of Education 
6.15 pm – 7.30 pm Drinks with New Zealand Parliamentary Friendship 
Group hosted by Ms Denise Roche MP, Chair, 
Australia-New Zealand Friendship Group Committee 
Thursday, 27 September 
9.15 am – 10.30 am Meeting with Dr the Rt Hon Lockwood Smith, Speaker, 
House of Representatives, New Zealand 
10.30 am- 11.30 am  Private Meetings 
11.30 am – 12noon Meeting with Hon Craig Foss MP, Minister for 
Commerce and Broadcasting 
12.15 pm – 2.15 pm Meeting with the Chair and Members of the Commerce 
Select Committee 
2.30 pm – 3.30 pm  Meeting with Chorus New Zealand 
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3.45 pm – 4.45 pm Meeting with the Ministry for Business Innovation and 
Employment, National Infrastructure Unite, the 
Treasury, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
4.45 pm Return to hotel TNPLH 
7.00 pm – 10.30 pm Official Dinner hosted by His Excellency Mr Michael 
Potts, High Commissioner for Australia 
 A 
Appendix A – Submissions and Exhibits 
Submissions 
1 Communications Electrical and Plumbing Union Communications Division 
2 Change Agent nb Pty Ltd 
3 Regional Development Australia Far West New South Wales 
4 Hon Wendy Duncan MLC, Parliament of Western Australia 
5 Mr Greg Ingram 
6 Mr Kevin Morgan 
7 NBN Co Limited (additional information to answers taken on notice on 
16 April 2012) 
7.1 NBN Co Limited (additional information to answers taken on notice on 
16 April 2012) 
7.2 NBN Co Limited (answers to questions taken on notice on 18 and 
19 October 2012) 
7.3 NBN Co Limited (answers to questions taken on notice on 30 October 2012) 
7.4 NBN Co Limited (answers to questions taken on notice on 30 October 2012) 
7.5 NBN Co Limited (answers to questions taken on notice on 30 October 2012) 
7.6 NBN Co Limited (answers to questions taken on notice on 30 October 2012) 
7.7 NBN Co Limited (answers to questions taken on notice on 30 October 2012) 
7.8 NBN Co Limited (answers to questions taken on notice on 30 October 2012) 
7.9 NBN Co Limited (answers to questions taken on notice on 30 October 2012) 
7.10 NBN Co Limited (answers to questions taken on notice on 30 October 2012) 
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7.11 NBN Co Limited (answers to questions taken on notice on 30 October 2012) 
7.12 NBN Co Limited (answers to questions taken on notice on 30 October 2012) 
7.13 NBN Co Limited (answers to questions taken on notice on 30 October 2012) 
8 Tunstall Health Care 
9 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
10 Personal Emergency Response Services Association 
11 Professor Jan Thomas 
11.1 Professor Jan Thomas 
12 Telstra Corporation 
12.1 Telstra Corporation 
13 Shareholder Ministers (The Minister for Broadband, Communications and 
the Digital Economy and the Minister for Finance and Deregulation) 
14 Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy 
Exhibits 
1 Communications Electrical and Plumbing Union Communications Division 
Correspondence:  
Letter from Mr Dan Dwyer, Divisional Secretary, Communications 
Electrical and Plumbing Union to Ms Paula Heath, Manager, Workplace 
Relations, Telstra Corporation, dated 28 November 2011 
Letter via email from Mr Julian Clarke, Director, Workplace Relations and 
Policy to Mr Dan Dwyer, Divisional Secretary, Communications Electrical 
and Plumbing Union dated 13 December 2011 
Letter from Mr Dan Dwyer, Divisional Secretary, Communications 
Electrical and Plumbing Union to Ms Paula Heath, Manager, Workplace 
Relations, Telstra Corporation, dated 20 April 2012 
Letter via email from Mr Julian Clarke, Director, Workplace Relations and 
Policy to Mr Dan Dwyer, Divisional Secretary, Communications Electrical 
and Plumbing Union dated 27 April 2012 
2 Tunstall Healthcare 
Package of Information: 
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Brochure titled Stay Independent and safe with Tunstall LifeCare, Telecare 
DVD, Fact Sheet titled: Case Study – Virginie’s Story, Fact Sheet titled: Jack’s 
Story, Fact Sheet titled: About your monitoring service, Fact Sheet titled: Falls 
Management – Life Changing, Life Saving 
3 NBN Co Limited 
Documents titled: 
FTTP Brownfields – Activity Profile, FTTP Brownfields LNDN Capital 
Expenditure, Fixed Wireless Capital Expenditure Per Site, Long Term Satellite 
Service Capital Costs, New Developments – Activity Profile 
 B 
Appendix B – Hearings and Witnesses 
Tuesday, 26 June 2012 - Canberra 
Communications Electrical and Plumbing Union, Communications Division 
Mr Dan Dwyer, National Secretary 
Ms Ros Eason, Senior National Industrial Officer 
Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy 
Mr Peter Harris, Secretary 
Mr Daryl Quinlivan, Deputy Secretary 
Mr Ian Robinson, First Assistant Secretary 
Ms Joanna Grainger, Assistant Secretary 
Tuesday, 14 August 2012 – Canberra 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
Mr Rod Sims, Chairman 
Mr Ed Willett, Commissioner 
Ms Rose Webb, Executive General Manager, Mergers and Adjudication 
Mr Michael Cosgrave, Group Manager, Communications 
 
146  
 
Tuesday, 9 October 2012 – Canberra 
Tunstall Healthcare 
Mr Gary Morgan, Health Services Director 
Mr Geoff Feakes, Chief Information Officer 
Ms Lisa Capamagian, Marketing and Strategy Implementation Manager 
Individual  
Professor Jan Thomas  
Tuesday, 30 October 2012 – Canberra 
NBN Co Limited 
Mr Mike Quigley, Chief Executive Officer 
Mr Robin Payne, Chief Financial Officer 
Mr Ralph Steffens, Chief Operating Officer 
Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy 
Mr Ian Robinson, Acting Deputy Secretary 
Department of Finance and Deregulation 
Ms Stacie Hall, A/g First Assistant Secretary, Government Business, Special 
Claims and Land Policy 
Mr Philip Smith, Assistant Secretary, NBN Policy and Shareholder Branch 
Telstra Corporation 
Mr James Shaw, Director, Government Relations 
Mr Julian Clarke, Director, Workplace Relations and Policy 
Ms Yolanda Chorazyczewski, Group Regulatory Manager 
